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ANTHONY ROBERT BOOTH 
EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION AS A NORMATIVE CONCEPT 
ABSTRACT 
There is a way of talking about epistemic justification, that involves the notion of 
our being subject to epistemic obligations the failure to comply wi th makes us 
blameworthy, called the deontological conception. In this thesis, I defend the 
deontological conception against criticisms first levied by Will iam Alston that i t 
(a) implies doxastic volimtarism which is false and thereby violates the principle 
that ought implies can, and (b) is in tension wi th what is distinctive about the 
epistemic domain, namely its connection wi th the goal of believing truths and 
avoiding falsehoods. 1 argue that the extent to which (a) is problematic depends 
on the extent to which (b) is problematic. Further, that (b) is not problematic to 
the deontological conception if we view i t not as a way to cash out epistemic 
justification, but as a way to understand normativity in general. 1 do this by 
making a distinction between merely evaluative and deontological levels of 
appraisal and that i t is only in the latter that the notion of an obligation functions. 
1 argue that i t is nonsensical to use sortal terms at the level of obligations, (where 
obhgations carry the notion of blameworthiness), i.e. that there cannot be 
obhgations from an epistemic point of view anymore than there can be obligations 
from an ethical point of viexv. However, sortal terms can be used to distinguish 
between differing types of reasons (which, on their own, operate at the merely 
evaluative level), but because obligations only emerge out of a network of 
differing sorts of reasons, i t does not make any sense to talk about different sorts 
of obligation. I stiengthen that last claim up by arguing, against the evidentialist, 
that there are such things as non-epistemic reasons for belief 
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P A R T O N E : 
"Deontologism" and the Problem ofDoxastic Voluntarism 
Introduction: Normativity, Merely Evaluative or Deontological? 
In this thesis I want to work out whether there is any sense in the claim 
that there are such things as particularly epistemic obligations, the sort of things 
involved in statements such as: "you ought to believe that the earth is flat"; " i f 
you believe that p ^ q, and you believe that p, then you ought to beUeve that q"; 
"you ought to seek more evidence when the evidence you have is insufficient to 
warrant your hypothesis". Now, there are probably many, many more of these 
sorts of examples, but my motivation here is not to try to explain the nature of 
this phenomenon and how it comes about, but, rather, to see how (and whether) 
i t determines the arena of justification. For justification, be i t of the epistemic or 
ethical variety, is often said to be a normative concept. Indeed, the most standing 
criticisms of NaturaUsm and Cognitivism are those that accuse these positions of 
failing to leave room for the normativity of justification^. To this end, the 
fact/value distinction is often invoked, for justification, we are told, purports to 
tell us something about what ought to be the case, i t does not purport tell us 
anything significant about what zs the case. Appeals to the fact/value distinction 
' Hence Moore's "open question argument". A classic example of an argument against naturalised 
epistemology which accuses it of failing to account for the normative dimension of epistemic justification 
is provided by Kim 1988. Blackburn 1984 and Gibbard 1990 argue that the issue of normativity is as 
problematic for cognitivists in epistemology as it is for cognitivists in ethics. As Frank Jackson puts it: "just 
as no amount of information couched in purely descriptive terms seems to close the question as to what it is 
morally right to do, so no amount of information couched in purely descriptive terms seems to close the 
question of what it is rational to believe or do" (Jackson 1999, p. 420). Jackson, however, in Jackson 1999, 
disagrees that this latter claim is correct; I will not dwell on this issue here. 
w i l l not yield all that is needed to establish the normativity of justification, 
however. This is because we can judge a belief or an action to have value without 
thereby judging that someone is obliged to possess that belief or commit that 
action. For example, about beUef, WiUiam Alston says that "one can evaluate S's 
believing that p as good, favourable, desirable without thinking of i t as fu l f i l l ing 
or not violating an obligation" (Alston 1989 (a), p. 97). This surely has to be the 
case for action too: consider superogatory actions, for instance, which, although 
we can consider ethically superlative, we do not consider to have normative 
authority over agents, i.e. we would never consider it an obligation to commit a 
superogatory action. So the fact/ value distinction is not the same distinction as 
that between is and ought. Tliis consideration points us in the direction of the 
need for a three way distinction between descriptive, evaluative and normative 
statements: we can report putative facts {descriptive statements - e.g. "that is a 
blue car"), make value judgements which do not also make normative claims 
{evaluative statements - e.g. "that is a great car") and we can make value 
judgements which do entail normative commitments {normative statements - e.g. 
"you really ought to buy that car"). Giving a correct normative negative 
appraisal entails that whom ever we are judging has failed to f u l f i l some relevant 
obligation and we consider this failure worthy of just reproach; conversely 
giving a correct positive normative appraisal entails that the person being 
appraised has not failed to f u l f i l the relevant obhgations and hence is not 
blameworthy, but, instead, worthy of just praise. In other words, normative 
appraisals are action-compelling (i.e. tell us something about what an agent is 
obliged to do) where merely evaluative appraisals may only ever be action-
guiding. This follows if the principle that ought implies can is true, for we can 
make value-judgements about cars, for instance, without holding them 
responsible for whatever i t is about them we are judging. Similarly, we may f ind 
the actions of a psychopath despicable without holding the psychopath 
responsible for their actions if they are not in control of what they are doing. We 
may also judge a subject's beliefs to be radically ill-founded, but not hold the 
subject responsible for holding those beUefs i f there was nothing they could have 
done to beUeve otherwise. Of course, normative appraisals are always also 
evaluative, and merely evaluative as well as normative appraisals may always 
also be descriptive, but no type of appraisal is reducible to another. 
I t may seem imcontroversial to claim that when philosophers say that 
justification is a normative concept in modern ethics, they mean that when we 
determine whether an act is justified (give ethical appraisal)^ we are giving 
normative as opposed to merely evaluative (in the way defined above) ethical 
appraisal. Things look a bit less clear in contemporary epistemology, however. 
Some epistemologists seem to say that justification is a normative concept, for 
^ Throughout this section, because I engage with authors whose preference in words differ; I will use the 
phrases "justification" and "appraisal" interchangeably. So when I say that appraisal is a normative 
concept, I do not mean that the rules by which appraisal is given are normative (though they very well may 
be too), but that giving favourable or negative appraisal (i.e. attributing justification or not) entails holding 
the subject responsible, blameworthy if not justified, not blameworthy if justified. 
instance, whilst criticising Quine's "naturalised epistemology", Jaegwon Kim 
writes: 
..justification manifestly is normative. If a belief is justified for us, then i t is 
permissible and reasonable, f rom the epistemic point of view, for us to hold 
it, and it would be epistemically irresponsible to hold beliefs that contradict 
it. (Kim 1988, p. 267) 
This passage suggests that for Kim epistemic justification is a normative and not 
merely evaluative concept, for i t intimates that behef is something over which we 
can be held "responsible". However, one may judge a belief to be epistemically 
irresponsible without holding the bearer of that behef responsible (and 
blameworthy) for holding i t if (under the principle that ought implies can) they 
could not have believed otherwise. Further Kim does not differentiate between 
normative/evaluative/descriptive but only between "the descriptive vs. 
normative divide" (Kim 1988, p. 278), so there is nothing to prevent a reading of 
Kim that interpreted his use of "normative" as we have defined "evaluative". 
Other epistemologists appear to consider epistemic justification a merely 
evaluative concept, for instance, Susan Haack writes: 
The concept of justification is an evaluative concept, one of a whole mesh of 
concepts for the appraisal of a person's epistemic state. To say that a person 
is justified in some behef of his, is, in so far forth, to make a favourable 
appraisal of his epistemic state. (Haack 1993, p. 12) 
However, because Haack does nowhere make the distinction between normative 
and evaluative concepts, there is nothing inconsistent wi th our reading her 
"evaluative" as our "normative" - making an accurate unfavourable appraisal of 
someone's epistemic state entails thinking them blameworthy for having it. So 
although epistemologists may appear not to be converging on what sort of a 
concept epistemic justification is, i t is more likely that lack of convergence is due 
to an ambiguity that arises from epistemologists not taking notice of the 
normative/evaluative/descriptive distinction; not because they do not think 
there is such a distinction, I suggest, but because they do not consider much to 
turn on it. However, in this thesis, I hope to show that i t is important to bear this 
distinction in mind when considering what we mean by epistemic justification 
being a normative concept. 
To say that epistemic justification is a normative concept can then mean 
two things: (i) i t can mean that when we do or no not grant epistemic justification 
on a subject's holding a beUef, we are saying something about whether or not 
that subject has believed what they were obliged to; or (ii) it can mean that we are 
evaluating that subject holding that belief positively or negatively according to a 
particular standard or norm but not thereby saying anything about whether they 
have done what they were obliged to. The view that epistemic justification 
involves the normativity described in (i) is usually termed the deontological 
conception of epistemic justification. The view expressed by (ii) is usually 
characterised, then, as being non-deontological. Most of this thesis is concerned 
with the deontological conception, since i t is concerned wi th the question of 
whether i t makes sense to say that such things as epistemic obUgations can 
determine the question of what is involved in epistemic justification. In Chapter 
1,1 discuss the deontological conception in more detail. I consider its relationship 
with epistemic internalism and raise some doubts as to whether "deontologism" 
cannot, after all, be compatible with a merely evaluative conception. 
1 then consider a problem with the deontic conception, first raised by 
William Alston in a variety of different papers. The first problem concerns the 
issue of whether we have control over our beliefs. This looks like a problem for 
the deontic conception because it looks like we may not have the right sort of 
contiol over our beliefs, and if the principle that ought implies can is tiue, then i t 
looks like we cannot coherently hold that there are such things as obligations 
pertaining to beliefs. I discuss the issue of whether, and to what extent, we have 
control over our beliefs in Chapter 2, and exactly how this issue is problematic in 
Chapter 3. I also evaluate some potential solutions to this problem in Chapter 3 
and argue that the best solution raises another difficult problem. 
This second problem, also raised by Alston, 1 call the problem of 
"consilience failure". Simply put, the problem is this: if epistemic justification is a 
deontological notion, then there are times when a subject can be epistemically 
justified but be believing in a way that is seemingly at odds wi th the epistemic 
aim of believing truth and avoiding falsehood. Chapter 4 is devoted to 
articulating how exactly this objection is supposed to work. In Chapter 5 I 
consider some potential responses to the problem of consilience failure and 
argue that the most promising of these responses is to invoke a sort of "tolerant 
pluralism" which denies that the truth goal is the only standard by which we can 
appraise behef. However, in examining the truth goal in Chapter 6,1 argue that i t 
is the only thing that can give us some sense of what it is for an appraisal to be 
epistemic. The upshot of this consideration is that eschewing the truth goal as the 
only standard by which we can make epistemic appraisals, leaves us in the dark 
as to what i t is that would make appraisals that did not appeal to the truth goal 
epistemic. Thus we continue to have a problem for the deontological conception 
of epistemic justification. 1 propose that the deontologist in epistemology should 
take this consideration on board, and argue that this is a feature of what i t is to 
make appraisals about obligations, i.e. that at the level of obligations (the 
deontological level) it does not make sense to distinguish between ethical and 
epistemic (or practical, legal etc.) sorts of obligation, as one can only ever have an 
obHgation tout court. So i t is not surprising that deontological justification can 
never be particularly epistemic. 
In Chapters 7 and 8, I try to defend this last conjecture. 1 think that i t 
follows if (a) i t makes sense to distinguish between deontological and merely 
evaluative appraisal, and (b) if there can be such things as non-epistemic reasons 
for belief and epistemic reasons for action (where a reason on its own can not 
determine an obligation). If both (a) and (b) are correct, because different sorts of 
reason can operate in determining what one's obligation is at t, then i t follows 
that one's emergent obligation is not of a particular sort, i.e. not purely, or 
particularly epistemic, or moral, or aesthetic, or legal, or whatever. The claim 
expressed in (b) however, is not without its opponent. "Evidentialism" claims 
that there cannot be such things are non-epistemic reasons for belief. I argue 
against evidentialism in Chapters 7 and 8, and argue that the way to identify a 
relevant sort of reason is via appeal to the standards of appraisal and not by the 
objects of appraisal. This, as 1 w i l l show, leaves room for there being non-
epistemic reasons for beUef and epistemic reasons for action. 
Since W.K. Clifford's famous pronotincement that " i t is always wrong, 
everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" 
(Clifford 1999, p. 551), deontologism has been associated wi th evidentialism^. So 
my hope is to show how one can have an "ethics of belief" without also 
countenancing the thesis of evidentialism, and indeed that deontologism is best 
defended by denying the merits of such a thesis. In so far as I argue that there is 
a unity of appraisal at the level of obligations, then my thesis may not only shed 
light upon what i t is we are talking about when we say that epistemic 
justification is a normative concept, i t may also have an important bearing on 
concerns in ethics. For according to this thesis, not only does the realm of 
obligation cease to be an exclusively ethical concern, the ethicist must now also 
consider those epistemic reasons that are relevant in determining an obligation to 
action, as well as those ethical reasons relevant in determining an obligation to 
beUeve. 
See also Feldman 2000. 
Chapter 1: Deontology in Ethics and Epistemology 
1.1. Sketch of Deontologism in Epistemology 
One would probably be forgiven for assuming that there w i l l be few, if 
any, safient dissimilarities between taking a deontological approach in 
epistemology and taking a deontological approach in ethics. In this chapter 1 w i l l 
argue, however, that although there are similarities between epistemic and 
ethical deontologism, the two are different in important ways, important in the 
repercussions these differences have on the notion of normativity in ethics and 
epistemology. Deontologism in epistemology is the claim that there are certain 
duties, pertaining to a distinctive epistemic domain, to which we are subject qua 
cognitive agents, enquirers, or rational beings. We seem to have a duty, for 
instance, not to believe propositions willy-nilly, on the basis of crass, inadequate 
groimds but to believe, instead, in the light of as much relevant evidence as we 
are able to muster. Both in epistemology and in ethics an account of what the 
notion of duty involves can also serve as an account of what justification involves 
simply by defining justified actions or behefs as those in which the agent has 
fulfi l led their duty, be i t epistemic or ethical. That is the central characteristic of 
deontology, that i t defines justification in terms of the concept of duty. The idea 
that we are subject to epistemic duties is perhaps as old as the notion that we are 
subject to ethical duties and goes back (at least implicitly) to the times of 
Descartes and perhaps even to those of Plato, but here is a more contemporary 
commentator's view: 
We may assume that every person is subject to a purely intellectual 
requirement - that of trying his best to bring i t about that, for every 
proposition h that he considers, he accepts h if and only if h is tiue. One 
might say that this is the person's responsibility or duty qua intellectual 
being. (Chisholm 1977, p. 14) 
Three important issues are here raised by Chisholm's passage regarding the 
similarities and differences between deontology in epistemology and deontology 
in ethics: firstly, there is a similarity in that epistemic duties (or "intellectual 
requirements") are borne out of our being intellectual beings - this view seems to 
chime together well with Kant's view that ethical duties are a necessary 
concomitant to our rational essence. 
Secondly, classical ethical deontology allows that the moraUty of our 
actions does not depend upon their outcome - the right action is independent of 
the consequences of the action. For Kant, for example, there is an imperative, not 
to do one's duty because of the good that w i l l come about if one does, but to do 
one's duty out of the love of duty alone (Kant calls this the "Good Wiir')4. 
Chisholm's passage indicates, however, that we do not f u l f i l our epistemic duties 
purely for the duties' sake (or for the love of duty) but, rather, because fulf i l l ing 
them w i l l mcrease our chances of acquiring only tiue beliefs, and pursuing this 
end is what it is to be an intellectual being. This is because it is not our epistemic 
duty to believe only truths, but i t is our duty to do the best we can to bring it 
See Kant 1998. 
about that we do (because "ought implies can", perhaps). What constitutes what 
doing the best we can involves w i l l more comprehensively delineate what our 
epistemic duties are: believing in accord with adequate evidence, for instance. So 
epistemic duties are duties for us because of their link (contingent or conceptual) 
wi th our goal as enquirers, namely tiuth. Ethical deontologism does not share 
this quasi-teleological feature. As opposed to consequentialist theories, i t aims to 
place whether one has fulfi l led ones' duties as the important ethical 
consideration aside from considerations about maximising utility or furthering 
an ethical telos such as "the good". Further, at least for Kant, only acts committed 
out of a sense of duty (for duty's sake or for the love of duty) and not committed 
simply in accordance wi th duty can properly be described as ethical. It appears 
that deontology in epistemology does not make such a demand as one does not 
f u l f i l one's epistemic duty for the sake of the call of duty alone but because of its 
furtiiering our telos qua enquirers. 
Thirdly, although the latter point might make i t look like deontology in 
epistemology is the less demanding, this need not be the case. Consider the 
concept of "duty" and its offshoots "obligation" and "permissibility". Of course 
obligation is not the same as permissibility: i t might be permissible that 1 drive at 
80mph on certain roads, but this does not imply that there is any sense in which I 
am obligated or required to do so. Perhaps because of the quasi-teleological 
aspect of deontology in epistemology, commentators seek to define epistemic 
du ty (and so also epistemic justification) i n terms of permissibil i ty and not 
obligation. Accord ing to John Pollock, for instance: 
When w e ask whether a belief is jus t i f ied, wha t we wan t to k n o w is 
whether i t is a l l r igh t to believe i t . Justification is a matter of "epistemic 
permissibi l i ty". (Pollock 1987, p. 61) 
When, for the deontologist i n epistemology, is a subject S jus t i f ied i n bel ieving 
that p7 On ly w h e n S has not contravened any epistemic norm, rule or max im. Or, 
more formal ly : 
One is justified i n being confident that p i f and only i f i t is not the case that 
one ought not to be confident that p; one could not be just ly reproached 
for being confident that p. (Ginet 1975, p. 28) 
For instance, let's say that this is a relevant epistemic norm: A l l beliefs must be 
fo rmed on the basis of adequate evidence. Imagine that Mr . X forms the belief 
that his w i f e Mrs . X has commit ted adultery. M r . X thinks this only because Mrs . 
X has been attending more dinner parties than usual and when their f r i end Mrs . 
Z lef t her husband for a much yoimger M r . Q, she had also been attending more 
dinner parties than usual. Is M r . X justified i n believing that his w i f e is hav ing an 
affair? N o t according to the deontological conception, Mr . X has violated the 
n o r m "a l l beliefs must be fo rmed on the basis of adequate evidence". Surely, Mrs 
X's attendance at more dinner parties does not constitute "adequate evidence" 
for her commi t t ing adultery - her increased attendance could s imply mi r ro r an 
increase i n the enjoyment she had at such events. So according to the 
deontological conception, M r . X does not i n this instance possess epistemic 
12 
just if icat ion for his belief as he can be reproached ( f r o m an epistemic poin t of 
v iew) for having the belief that he does. 
Under the deontological conception i n epistemology not only can one be 
reproached for hav ing " i l l i c i t " beliefs, but also for not having certain beliefs. For 
instance, take this possible epistemic norm: Do not ignore sahent, relevant 
informat ion . Imagine that M r . X's attention has been d r a w n to certain irrefutable 
facts w h i c h lead to the conclusion that Mrs. Y has been xmfa i thfu l to h i m - his 
private detective has p rov ided h i m w i t h various video-cassettes of the events, his 
fr iends have reported having seen Mrs . X w i t h a M r . G at various restaurants, 
etc. However , M r . X (because he cannot face the idea of divorce perhaps) refuses 
to believe i n his wife ' s betrayal. Once again, M r . X is i n breach of an epistemic 
n o r m - he has ignored saUent evidence - and so is reproachable. I f he beheves 
that his w i f e is innocent then perhaps his belief is indeed unjus t i f ied; bu t wha t is 
really at issue here is that sometimes (imder the deontological perspective) there 
are things one should believe (Mr. X should have believed his w i f e was cheating 
on h i m given the evidence available to h im) - call these obligations, obligations 
of exclusion (since we have a du ty not to f a i l to do wha t is epistemically required 
of us). So the deontological conception can give an account not only of epistemic 
permissibi l i ty bu t also of epistemic obligation, i n that i t does not preclude 
epistemic requirements f r o m constituting relevant epistemic norms. So perhaps 
i n this respect deontology in epistemology is not so d i f ferent to deontology i n 
ethics. However , under epistemic deontology, does i t f o l l o w that because S is 
13 
jus t i f ied i n believing that p, S is obligated to believe that p7 Call this sort of 
obligation, an obligation of inclusion (since i t is more than an obligat ion not to 
break the rules). So al though epistemic deontologism entails that there are 
obligations of exclusion, does i t also entail there being obligations of inclusion? 
W i l l i a m Als ton thinks that clearly i t does not: 
To say that S is jus t i f ied i n believing that p at time f is to say that the 
relevant rules or principles do not fo rb id S's believing that p at t. I n 
believing that p att,S is not i n contravention of any relevant requirements. 
Again , i t is not to say that S is required or obligated to believe that p at f, 
though this may also be true. (Alston 1989 (b), p. 116) 
For the rest of this chapter I w i l l consider whether Als ton is r igh t about this and 
argue that indeed he is. I n doing so I w i l l discuss an argument by Carl Ginet 
(Ginet 1975) to the same effect. A l though I agree w i t h its conclusion, I w i l l raise 
some problems w i t h his argument and present a di f ferent argument for the same 
conclusion. I w i l l argue as fol lows: though i t migh t be the case that, for ethical 
deontologism, S's being jus t i f ied i n doing (p m igh t i m p l y that S is obligated to tp, 
i t is not the case that, for epistemic deontologism, S's being jus t i f ied i n beheving 
that p implies believing that p is obligatory for S .^ 
However , before do ing this I w i s h to discuss a related issue that concerns 
whether or not deontology in epistemology implies epistemic internal ism - the 
thesis w h i c h claims that S must i n some fashion be "aware" of S's just if ier i f S is 
to be jus t i f ied i n believing that p. Earlier, whi le discussing Ginet's fo rmula t ion of 
' Though there are some obligations of exclusion involved (according to epistemic deontologism), typically 
to have met the requirements of enquiry. 
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the deontic conception, the not ion of epistemic justif ication was l inked to the 
not ion of epistemic blameworthiness. I f one is just i f ied i n believing a certain 
belief just i n case one has f u l f i l l e d one's epistemic du ty regarding i t , then i t also 
fo l lows that not doing one's du ty (whether i t be by breaking a rule or f a i l ing to 
f u l f i l a duty) w i l l render one blameworthy, w o r t h y of just reproach. This is w h y 
the deontological conception l inks blameworthiness to just i f icat ion - one is 
jus t i f ied just i n case one is not blameworthy, having f u l f i l l e d one's epistemic 
duty . Notice that both of the concept of duty 's offshoots, permissibi l i ty and 
obligation, give rise to the not ion of blameworthiness - as one is b lameworthy 
w h e n one has done something impermissible as w e l l as when one has not done 
their duty . I f blameworthiness is going to play a role i n determining whether or 
not someone is jus t i f ied i n ho ld ing a given belief, then i t looks as though the 
no t ion of just i f icat ion here is going to have to be internalist i n character. This is 
because one cannot be b lameworthy for something over w h i c h one has no 
control (this fo l lows f r o m Kant's famous principle that "ought implies can"). This 
seems to i m p l y internalism, I ' l l discuss w h y i n more detail shortly. I w i l l argue 
that deontologism i n epistemology does not i m p l y internalism. I n do ing so I w i l l 
consider A l v i n Plantinga's argument that deontologism does i m p l y internahsm 
and An thony Breuckner and Michael Bergmarm's repUes. I w i l l argue that 
Brueckner's and Bergmann's replies f a i l to show that the deontic conception does 
not i m p l y at least some f o r m of internalism. However , I also argue t l ia t the 
impl ica t ion is, i n fact, incorrect w i t h recourse to the dist inction, made by 
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ethicists, between objective and subjective duty . I w i l l argue (like Russell 2002) 
that epistemic blameworthiness only applies to one's subjective duty , and 
therefore that deontologism implies internalism only about our subjective duty . 
I t does not i m p l y that f u l f i l l i n g our subjective du ty is sufficient (nor, indeed, 
necessary) fo r justification. Further, I suggest that the same need not be tiue i n 
the case of deontological ethics. 
1.2. Does Deontologism imply Epistemic Internalism? 
A l v i n Plantinga (Plantinga 1993) presents an argument for the c la im that 
deontologism implies (epistemic) internalism wh ich uses the dist inction between 
objective and subjective duty^. Simply put , your subjective du ty is wha t y o u 
believe (or recognise) your du ty to be and your objective du ty wha t your du ty 
actually is. But, as Plantinga notes, i t is not enough for me to believe that (p-ing is 
my du ty for (p-ing to be m y subjective duty. 1 may have made a culpable mistake 
about wha t m y duty is. So we need to make the sundry assumptions that I am a 
properly func t ion ing human being and that m y belief was fo rmed i n a non-
blameworthy way, for i t to f o l l o w that (p-ing is my subjective du ty f r o m the fact 
that I believe that (p-ing is m y duty. I f i t is m y belief that i t is m y du ty to d r i n k the 
earth dry , bu t that belief stems f r o m the fact that 1 am an irrevocable sot, or some 
cognitive deficiency i n me, then d r ink ing the earth d ry cannot be considered to 
be m y subjective duty. From this Plantinga crucially infers that i f , i n some cases 
m y subjective du ty coincides w i t h m y objective duty, then a mistake about m y 
* The argument here is ethics/epistemology neutral, i.e. if it is the case that deontologism implies 
epistemological internalism in epistemology, then it does so in ethics too. . 
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objective duty , is either due to some mal func t ion ing on m y part, or else is a 
b lameworthy mistake. I am not sure whether this inference really does need to be 
made, bu t let's have a look at h o w Plantinga constructs an argument that 
deontology implies epistemological internalism f r o m it . Firstly, however, we 
need to see wha t sort of epistemological internalism Plantinga is ta lk ing about. 
Als ton defines t w o versions of internalism i n epistemology, access 
internalism and perspectival internaUsm. Internalism about epistemic just i f icat ion 
involves making one or both of the f o l l o w i n g claims: 
(i) S is jus t i f ied i n believing that p i f f S is cognit ively aware of w h a t 
justifies S's belief that p. (Perspectival Internalism) 
. . . i n order to confer just if icat ion something must be w i t h i n the subject's 
"perspective" or "v iewpoin t " on the w o r l d , i n the sense of being 
something that the subject knows, believes, or just i f iably believes. I t must 
be something that falls w i t h i n the subject's ken, something of w h i c h the 
subject has taken note. (Alston 1989 (d), p. 186) 
(ii) S is jus t i f ied i n believing that p i f f S is cognitively aware of wha t 
justifies his belief that p and such just if icat ion is directly accessible 
to S by means of reflection alone. (Access Internalism) 
... i n order to confer just if icat ion something must be accessible to the 
subject i n some special way, for example, directly accessible or in fa l l ib ly 
inaccessible. (Alston 1989 (d), p. 186)7 
A l t h o u g h Plantinga does not fo rma l ly define wha t he means by internalism, he 
does refer to Chisholm's v i ew that "one can determine by reflection alone whether 
a behef has warrant" (Plantinga 1993, p.6) so I th ink we can take h i m to be 
' Note that though Access Internahsm implies Perspectival Internalism, the reverse is not the case. So 
Access Internalism is the logically stronger of the two. 
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referr ing to Access rather than Perspectival Internalism. Plantinga makes four 
steps to reach the conclusion that the Deontic conception implies internalism: 
STEP 1: For a large, important , and basic class of objective duties, objective and 
subjective duties coincide; wha t y o u objectively ought to do matches that 
w h i c h is such that i f you don ' t do i t , y o u are gui l ty and blameworthy. 
(Plantinga 1992, p. 20) 
So i f a subject does not regulate their belief i n the way required by whatever their 
objective du ty is, then they are blameworthy, for i t is their subjective du ty to 
regulate their belief according to wha t their objective du ty is. 
STEP 2: I n a large and impor tant set of cases, a properly func t ion ing human 
being can s imply see (cannot make a nonculpable mistake about) wha t 
objective du ty requires. (Plantinga 1993, p. 21) 
I f a subject cannot make non-blameworthy mistakes concerning wha t their 
objective du ty is, i t must be the case that they ought s imply to be able to see wha t 
such a d u t y requires of them. 
STEP 3: I n a large and impor tan t set of cases a properly func t ion ing human can 
s imply see (cannot make a nonculpable mistake about) whether a 
proposi t ion has the property by means of w h i c h she tells whether a 
proposi t ion is jus t i f ied for her. (Plantinga 1993, p. 21) (my italics) 
I f a subject can s imply see wha t objective du ty requires of them, then, a forteriori 
(tmder the deontological conception), the subject ought to be able to s imply see 
whether or not their belief is justified. 
STEP 4: I n a large, impor tant and basic, class of cases a proper ly func t ion ing 
human being can s imply see (cannot make a nonculpable mistake about) 
whether a proposi t ion has the property that confers just if icat ion upon i t for 
her. (Plantinga 1993, p. 22) (my italics) 
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Thus, for the deontologist, the property by means of w h i c h a subject determines 
whether a belief is jus t i f ied for them is the same property that confers just i f icat ion 
for them. So Plantinga concludes: "I have a sort of guaranteed access to whether 
a belief is jus t i f ied for me and also to what makes i t just i f ied for me" (Plantinga 
1993, p. 22), so deontologism, for Plantinga, implies Access Internalism. 
This impl ica t ion has not, however, gone unchallenged. A n t h o n y 
Brueckner (Brueckner 1996) and Michael Bergmann (Bergmann 2000) have both 
presented counter-arguments to this implicat ion. I ' l l begin by considering 
Brueckner's first . Brueckner denies the claim that all deontic theories i m p l y that 
objective and subjective epistemic duties coincide. The strategy is a fa i r ly simple 
one: they accept that to adopt deontologism is to marry the concepts of d u t y and 
just if icat ion, but, the claim is, this does not necessarily involve g iv ing an account 
of wha t one's du ty is. True, says Brueckner, that tiaditional deontologists i n 
epistemology, such as Locke, define epistemic du ty i n internalist terms ("to 
regulate our beliefs i n such a way that we believe a proposit ion only i f we have 
good reasons for i t " (Brueckner 1996, p. 528)) bu t this does not preclude us f r o m 
g iv ing a heavily externalist account of what the concept of du ty involves. For 
example, we could specify that a subject has done their epistemic du ty just i n 
case their belief is the product of a reliable belief-producing mechanism^. Under 
this def in i t ion of wha t an epistemic du ty is (which is compatible w i t h 
deontologism because on its o w n deontologism does not specify w h a t one's 
"Externalist" because this does not require a subject's being aware of the reliability.. 
19 
epistemic du ty is) i t is not at al l obvious that a subject w i l l be able to "just see" 
whether or not this requirement is satisfied. So there w i l l be lots of cases when i t 
is possible that a proper ly- f imct ioning (and thus for Plantinga non-culpable) 
human being cannot "just see" wha t their objective du ty requires of them. This 
challenges Step 2 of Plantinga's argument, c laiming that his characterisation of 
deontologism does not "generalize to aU deontological conceptions" (Breuckner 
1996, p. 535). 
The quick response to Brueckner's counter-argument is to say that there is 
something defective about a deontological conception that describes epistemic 
du ty i n such a way that a widespread divergence between objective and 
subjective du ty is possible, i.e. one that does not a l low the subject to "just see" 
wha t their objective du ty requires of them. But this reply may be regarded as ad 
hoc on its own . However , perhaps there are good reasons for this to be the case. 
By invok ing the principle that "ought implies can", we may be able to mainta in 
that the very concept of du ty guarantees that an alleged du ty w o u l d just not be a 
genuine du ty unless a proper ly func t ion ing human being can just see wha t is 
required of them by that du ty (i.e. cannot make a non-blameworthy mistake 
about wha t falls w i t h i n that duty) . Brueckner's response to this is to c la im that 
the abi l i ty to make a non-culpable mistake about wha t one's objective du ty is, is 
compatible w i t h the "ought implies can" principle. 
There are situations, i t could be said, when S ought to F (e.g. act i n a 
certain way; or w i t h h o l d a certain belief), S can F, and yet S nonculpably 
believes that he ought not F (because he suffers f r o m a nonculpably 
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generated gap i n his in format ion regarding his du ty - a gap that he can 
f i l l ) . (Brueckner 1996, p. 533) 
Nevertheless, one may natural ly wonder w h y the subject i n question is 
considered nonculpable for the generated gap i n his in fo rmat ion regarding his 
duty, i f i t is a gap that he is able to f i l l . Surely, i f he has a belief that he ought not 
to F and this belief is due to a gap i n his informat ion , then we wan t to say that he 
is b lameworthy for mainta ining the gap that he is able to f i l l and f r o m w h i c h he 
generates his belief. W h y aren't subjects b lameworthy for f a i l ing to f i l l a gap i n 
their in fo rmat ion when they are (i) able to do so and (ii) the in fo rmat ion is 
relevant to the belief under consideration, even though he is not responsible for 
that gap? There may be answers to these questions but Brueckner does not 
answer them. However , i n a footnote, he does refer to (Alston 1989 (d), p. 217) 
for an argument against using the principle that "ought impUes can" as a 
premise for an argument that connects just if icat ion w i t h epistemological 
internalism. 
Consider Carl Ginet's (Ginet 1985, cited i n Als ton 1989 (d), p. 217) 
argument for Internalism: 
(1) S ought to w i t h h o l d belief that p i f he lacks just if icat ion for p. 
(2) Wha t S ought to do S can do. [Ought implies can principle] . 
(3) Therefore, S can w i t h h o l d belief wherever S lacks just if ication. 
(4) S has the capacity only i f S can tell , w i t h respect to any proposed belief, 
whether or not S has just if icat ion for i t . 
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(5) S can always tell us this only i f just if icat ion is always directly 
recognizable. 
(6) Therefore just if icat ion is always directly recognizable. 
Als ton argues that premise (5) is mistaken. For, he asks, wha t is so special about 
epistemic just i f icat ion that makes i t the case that I cannot k n o w whether or no t I 
am jus t i f ied i n beUeving that p, by any other means than direct recognizability? 
We k n o w many things only because we have reasons for them i n the 
shape of other things we know, and these reasons are not always 
deductively related to wha t they support. Thus direct recognition is only 
one way to acquire knowledge. W h y should we suppose that only this 
way is available for k n o w i n g about justification? (Alston 1989 (d), p. 217) 
Brueckner, i n fact, makes the same point. I n migh t be the case, for example, that 
the property by w h i c h I determine whether or not m y f r i end John is getting 
marr ied (the property of ut ter ing special vows i n a special context) is the same 
property i n v i r tue of wh ich he is actually married. But f r o m this i t does not 
f o l l o w that the property by w h i c h I do the determining "is one to w h i c h I have a 
special pr ivi leged epistemic access, unl ike m y access to ordinary empirical states 
of affairs" (Brueckner 1996, p. 534). 
I th ink that these considerations are devastating to the case that 
Deontologism implies access internalism. I n the case of Ginet's argument, this 
consideration affects premise (5) of the argument (and the conclusion (6)), but 
that premise is unnecessary to establish perspectival internalism. A l l that is 
needed to estabhsh perspectival internaUsm f r o m the "ought implies can" 
pr inciple is for premise (4) to ho ld , and I can conceive of no good reason for i t 
22 
not hold ing . Similar ly, Alston's and Brueckner's consideration only blocks 
Plantinga's argument f r o m getting to step 4 f r o m step 3 - the proper ty by w h i c h 
S determines whether tliey are jus t i f ied i n beUeving that p need not be the 
proper ty that confers just if icat ion upon believing that p. That w o u l d f o l l o w only i f 
direct accessibility alone was the only way of determining whether S was jus t i f ied 
i n bel ieving that p. Once again, this does not mean that perspectival internalism is 
not i m p l i e d by deontologism - for S is s t i l l required to have some sort of 
cognitive awareness of what their objective du ty is as regards belief i n p, i n order 
for them to be jus t i f ied i n believing that p. So for a l l Alston's and Brueckner's 
show, deontologism does i m p l y internalism, be i t the weaker perspectival 
internalism and not the stronger access internalism. 
I th ink a similar po in t can be made as regards Michael Bergmann's 
(Bergmann 2000) argument^. Bergmann's argument begins by st ipulat ing that 
internalism is guaranteed by deontologism only i f deontologism incorporates a 
"non-defeater-condition", which , the claim is, cannot be satisfied by externalist 
theories of just if icat ion. Bergmann characterises the non-defeater condi t ion as 
fo l lows: 
The non-defeater condit ion is satisfied by a belief that B just i n case the 
person ho ld ing B does not believe B is defeated. (Bergmann 2000, p. 89) 
H o w for Bergmann does the deontologist characterise a belief being defeated? 
Just i n case a subject takes themselves to be v io la t ing (or have violated) their 
' See also Bergmann 1997 for a similar argument, I shall focus on its most recent incarnation, i.e. 
Bergmann 2000. 
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doxastic, or epistemic, duty. However , Bergmann argues that deontologism 
cannot i m p l y internal ism because: 
(1) A l l necessary and internal conditions of the deontic conception are 
entailed by the non-defeater condition. 
(2) That the non-defeater condit ion is a necessary condi t ion fo r just i f icat ion is 
compatible w i t h externalism. 
(3) Therefore the deontic conception is compatible w i t h externalism and so 
does not entail internalism. 
W h y does Bergmann th ink that the externalist theories of just i f icat ion are 
compatible w i t h the demands made by the non-defeater condition? Because, he 
argues, the non-defeater condi t ion does not demand that the means by w h i c h S is 
jus t i f ied are determinable by "reflection alone" and, again, that ought implies 
can cannot do the w o r k to guarantee this: 
We can grant that ought implies can w i t h o u t granting that ought implies 
can xvithout doing any research other than mere reflection. The ought implies 
can pr inciple is entirely consistent w i t h the v i e w that al though w e can do 
our duty , do ing so of ten requires much more of us by way of research 
than mere reflection. (Bergmann 2000, p. 98) 
However , these considerations, once again, only show that access internalism is 
not i m p l i e d by the deontological conception, not that perspectival internalism is 
not so impl ied . I t seems clear that i f the deontological conception makes the 
demand of the non-defeater condit ion then i t must i m p l y perspectival 
internalism at least. Externalist theories of just if icat ion, such as Alston's 
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"internalist externalism"^" are indeed going to come out as being consistent w i t h 
the demands made by the non-defeater condit ion, but only because they take on 
board internalist intui t ions i n a way that more extieme externalist theories (such 
as those of Fred Dretske^^) do not. So the deontological conception does 
guarantee some internalism: Alston's, Bergmann's and Brueckner's arguments 
only go through on the s t iong interpretation of "internalism". 
1.3. Does Deontologism even imply Perspectival Internalism? 
I n o w wan t to tiy to show that even the weaker perspectival internalism is 
not imp l i ed by deontologism. The main poin t to note here is, I th ink, that one is 
epistemicalbj b lameworthy only w i t h regard to one's subjective du ty and not 
one's objective duty. Plantinga himself recognises this: " y o u are gui l ty or 
b lameworthy i f y o u f a i l to do your subjective duty, but not necessarily fo r faiUng 
to do your objective du ty" (Plantinga 1993, p. 16). I ' l l t ry to demonstrate this 
f o l l o w i n g some observations made by Bruce Russell (Russell 2002). Recall the 
difference I mentioned earlier between epistemological deontology and 
deontology i n ethics^^ Yhis difference concerns Kant's dist inction between acting 
in accordance with duty and out of a sense of duty. I mentioned that the cjuasi-
teleological character of epistemological deontology made i t the case that acting 
i n accordance w i t h one's du ty was enough for one to mer i t epistemic just i f icat ion 
i n a way that is not the case w i t h tiaditional ethical deontology. Consider, for 
'° See Alston 1989 (e), Bergmann cites Goldman 1986 and Nozick 1981 as examples of externalists who 
concede that the no-defeater condition is required for justification. 
" C f Dretske 1981. 
' ^ C f page5. 
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instance, this case that Russell takes f r o m Kei th Lehrer: M r . Raco, out of an i l l -
conceived prejudice, comes to beUeve that members of a particular racial group 
are more susceptible to certain diseases than others. M r . Raco then goes to 
medical school and learns that this is i n fact the case. Suppose that M r . Raco does 
then indeed possess the appropriate medical evidence to warrant his belief, bu t 
he does not base his belief on the good evidence he has bu t on his prejudiced 
beliefs instead. Here, i t seems, that M r . Raco is doing both his objective and 
subjective du ty since he is aware of the evidence. Nevertheless M r . Raco, w e 
m i g h t say, was acting merely i n accordance w i t h his du ty and not out of a sense 
of i t , g iven that he does not base his belief on the evidence he has. 
This example dovetails w i t h another, again due to Russell. Suppose that 
someone has enough evidence to believe that he w i l l w i n some great prize, bu t 
rather than believe that we w i l l because of the evidence he has, he bases his belief 
on spurious w i s h f u l th inking . He, l ike Mr . Raco, is objectively jus t i f ied i n his 
belief given that he has good evidence to back i t up. However, i t seems that he is 
epistemically b lameworthy i n a way that Mr . Raco is not. What is the difference 
between the t w o cases? "The difference is that the person w h o bases his belief on 
w i s h f u l t h ink ing must th ink that he does not have sufficient evidence to support 
his beUef and so believes against reason" (Russell 2002, p.40). M r . Raco, on the 
other hand, once he has attended medical school, does not believe that he lacks 
suff icient evidence and so does not beheve against reason. Russell draws the 
f o l l o w i n g conclusion f r o m this observation: 
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This shows that epistemic blameworthiness is not a f tmct ion of wha t a 
person bases his belief on. Rather, i t is a fxmction of wha t the person 
beheves about the merits of the evidence he has or, to a l low for 
negligence, of wha t he shoidd believe about the evidence. (Russell 2002, p. 
41) 
So one is epistemically b lameworthy only when one fails to do wha t one's 
subjective epistemic du ty requires. The po in t illustiates a potential difference 
between epistemological and ethical deontologism, as tiaditional mora l 
deontology denies that someone could be blameless by acting merely i n 
accordance w i t h their duty , so, arguably, perhaps for the mora l deontologist 
blameworthiness is as much a func t ion of one's objective du ty as one's subjective 
duty. But, re turning to the issue being considered, h o w does a l l this impinge on 
whether deontologism implies epistemological internalism? 
That fact that one is only blameworthy for f a i l ing to do one's subjective 
epistemic du ty is important to the question of whether internalism is i m p l i e d by 
deontology because i f i t is tiue, then Ginet's suggestion that blameworthiness 
and epistemic just if icat ion go hand i n hand is flawed. Recall: 
One is justified i n being confident that p i f and only i f i t is not the case that 
one ought not to be confident that p; one could not be just ly reproached 
for being confident that p. (Ginet 1975, p. 28) 
One could w e l l have done one's objective epistemic du ty and be b lameworthy 
and one could w e l l be blameless w i t h o u t having done one's objective epistemic 
duty. As we saw, that ought implies can only guarantees that deontologism 
implies access internalism. But i f only subjective du ty is subject to 
blameworthiness, then i t looks like internalism is only guaranteed by 
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deontologism with regard to subjective duty alone. This is because if the concept 
of blameworthiness is not applicable to objective duties, then that ought implies 
can cannot serve to establish internalism about one's objective duties. Without 
the concept of blameworthiness the "ought" in the notion of duty at the objective 
level is merely evaluative since it would no longer contain the notion of it being 
obligatory to abide by one's objective duty. Rather the "ought" would express 
something more like: i t would be a good thing (from an epistemic point of view) 
to abide by one's objective epistemic duty - but by no means is i t obUgatory. Thus 
that sense of "ought" does not rtm afoul of the "ought implies can" principle as 
there is nothing counter-intuitive in judging someone to have failed to do their 
objective epistemic duty if we do not hold them (for that reason alone) in any 
way blameworthy. Further, because deontologism only stipulates that in order 
for epistemic justification to be granted on a subject, that the subject have done 
their duty tout court, there is nothing to prevent a deontologist f rom stipulating 
that the only duties relevant to deontological justification are objective duties. 
Although, of course, one may instead demand that only subjective duties are 
relevant in the conferring of justification, or, indeed that both subjective and 
objective duties need to be met for a subject to be justified. But, as I say, there is 
nothing in the pure rubric of deontologism that suggests going in any of those 
directions. If deontologism is a doctrine about the primacy of duty wi th regard to 
justification, then internalism (a claim about the nature of duties) must be 
independent. So there is nothing in deontologism that implies internalism. 
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I think this has two interesting upshots. Firstly, i t shows that the 
deontological conception is consistent with a merely evaluative conception of 
epistemic normativity. Secondly, it highlights a salient difference between ethical 
and epistemological deontology. If ethical deontology does not necessarily link 
up the concept of blameworthiness wi th our subjective duties, then perhaps i t is 
the case that while epistemic deontologism does not imply internalism, ethical 
deontologism does. 
1.4. "Obligations of Inclusion" 
I move now to discuss the first question I raised: under the deontological 
conception of epistemic justification, does i t follow that because S is justified in 
believing that p, S is obligated to believe that p7 In other words does 
deontologism imply the existence of obligations of inclusion? Carl Ginet (Ginet 
1975) points out that if we think of the distinction between being justified in 
believing that p and being required to believe that p in terms of its being false 
that one ought not to do sometliing means that one ought not to do it, then, 
perhaps, the gap between the two does not amoimt to much: 
Accepting a gift is (perhaps) such a case: if i t is not the case that one ought 
not to accept a gift one has been offered (there is no reason why one ought 
not to) then one ought to accept it; exceptions to this are going to be rather 
special cases. (Ginet 1975, p. 28) 
This view seems to make sense: if S would be justified in believing that p (and 
realizes this) but continues not to believe that p, then we are likely to think that S 
is being unreasonable, unless, of course S can provide some special explanation 
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as to why S does not believe that p. So i t would seem that in normal cases we 
should say that i f S is justified in believing that p, i t follows that S should believe 
that p. But i f we are talking about normal cases then there are going to be 
exceptions. 
Ginet discusses one central exceptional case where "a person may be said 
to be justified whichever he is, confident or not" (Ginet 1975, p. 29)^3. In order to 
formulate the case, Ginet makes use of the distinction between interested and 
disinterested justification. S has disinterested justification for believing that p i f f 
there is a true proposition that entails that S is justified in believing that p, but 
does not entail that S has any wish for i t to be that case that p. Conversely, S has 
interested justification for believing that p i f f there is a true proposition that entails 
S being justified in believing that p, and, also, entails that S has reason or wish for 
i t to be the case that p. Now, according to Ginet, one can have perfectly good 
interested justification for believing that p, even though one might lack 
disinterested justification. For instance, Mr. X and Mrs. Y are married in 
connubial bhss, and have strong reason to trust one another. One day, Mr. W. 
shows his friend Mr. X some evidence (photos, tape conversations) that very 
much support the idea that Mrs. Y is having an affair. Having no reason to 
distrust his friend Mr. W., Mr. X would be justified in believing that his wife was 
having an affair. However, Mr. X, being intimately acquainted wi th his wife's 
trustworthiness, and being sure (as only he can be sure) that she loves him. 
I take Ginet to mean "belief by "confidence" here. 
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decides that there must be some explanation as to his wife's behavior other than 
her perfidy. So Mr. X justifiably (albeit, interestedly) believes that his wife is not 
having an affair, and, even though his reasons for his belief resist impartial 
scrutiny, who can blame him? Thus there may be times where although someone 
may be justified in believing a proposition, i t does not imply that they should 
believe that proposition because tliey would also be perfectly justified if they did 
not beheve that proposition. 
However, according to Ginet, interested reasons for beUef are not epistemic 
reasons for belief, "justification for being confident that p is justification for 
claiming to know that p only if it is disinterested" (Ginet 1975, p. 30). He gives 
the following reasons for doing so: 
When I say of someone that that person knows that p 1 imply that that 
person's position is such tliat were my hearers in such a position they too 
would be justified in being confident that p, regardless of whether or not 
they want it to be the case that p. In this way the assertion that someone 
knows that p - i f the audience can believe the assertion is justified - can 
transfer the subject's warrant for being confident that p to that audience 
(Ginet 1975, p. 30). 
Such transfer of justification from one person to the next does not simply mean 
that i f X were in the same position as S (i.e. had all the relevant desires that S 
had) they should believe whatever proposition S does; rather, we should be 
asking whether X would believe the same proposition as S does even if X has 
different desires than does S. Returning to the previous example, if Mr. W. 
needed to form a belief about Mrs. Y, his belief would differ f rom Mr. X's, 
namely: Mr. W would beheve that Mrs. Y was indeed having an affair. Thus, if 
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we are to follow Ginet, Mr. X has no epistemic justification for believing that 
Mrs. Y is innocent - he cannot, wi th confidence; claim to know what he purports 
to believe. 
However, I 'm not sure tliat Ginet's distinction between interested and 
disinterested reasons for belief really helps delineate the epistemic from the non-
epistemic. If i t is a true proposition that entails S's being justified that p at t, then 
what difference does i t make that that proposition also entails that S wishes i t to 
be the case that p? If S is genuinely justified in believing that p, then surely that S 
also wants i t to be the case that p is irrelevant. What is going to delineate whether 
we are in the presence of a case of epistemic or non-epistemic reasons for beHef is 
going to be the sort of tiue proposition in question. For i t may well be a moral 
truth (assuming such things exist) that S is ethically justified in believing that p 
but is not interested in i t being the case that p. A t the very least Ginet's proposal 
assumes that one cannot be disinterested in believing a moral truth (some sort of 
motivational internalism), as well as, of course, that there are such things as non-
epistemic reasons for belief. 
A better answer, I believe, is to highlight another difference between 
ethics and epistemology. In ethics i t makes sense to talk about an action being 
merely a permissible action. Beliefs cannot be merely permissiblei"*. To do one's 
'"^  For this to be a difference between epistemic and e/A/ca/justification, we need to say that epistemic 
appraisals can only be made about beliefs and ethical appraisals about action (i.e. that there cannot be such 
things as epistemic reasons for action and non-epistemic reasons for belief). In Part three, I deny this last 
claim, so we may just see this as a difference between justification about action and justification about 
belief 
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epistemic duty one must either believe that p, disbelieve that p, or suspend 
judgment about that p. This means that it can never be merely permissible to 
believe that p, because if i t is alright to disbelieve that p, then what one's 
epistemic duty really stipulates is that one must suspend judgment about p. It 
can neither be the case that i t is permissible to either suspend judgment about p 
or disbelieve p, for then one ought to really suspend judgment about p. In short, 
if there is any way in which i t is permissible to adopt more than one attitude 
toward p then suspending judgment is in fact what one's epistemic duty 
prescribes. Moral duty does not share this feature: "assuming that the moral 
reasons for and against my now getting up and getting a drink of water are 
equal, i t is permissible for me to do either" (Russell, p. 36). So when we are 
talking about epistemic justification, i t necessarily follows, after all, that if S is 
justified in believing that p, S also ought to believe tliat p. Further, as noted 
earlier, epistemic deontologism is consistent wi th the idea that this "ought" is a 
merely evaluative concept. 
The case concerning Mr. X and his possibly perfidious wife is explained 
away by reference to the difference between subjective and objective epistemic 
duties that we delineated earher. If Mr. X's behef really is borne out of epistemic 
reasons for belief, then the correct response is to say that while he may be 
subjectively justified (or is doing his subjective duty) in believing what he does, 
and so he is not worthy of just reproach, he is nevertheless objectively unjustified 
in having the behef that he does (he is not doing his objective duty). The 
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confusion arises out of an equivocation between the two senses of the word 
"justified". Of course, a lot w i l l depend on whether epistemic justification 
requires only the fulfil lment of one's subjective duty, or only one's objective 
duty, or both, or indeed either. Yet it still follows, regardless of what the 
deontologist in epistemology requires for justification, that being justified in 
believing that p means, at once, that one ought to believe that p. 
1.5 Concluding Remarks 
A deontological conception of justification in epistemology has different 
implications to such a conception in ethics. The differences highlighted here have 
been that, whilst epistemic justification implies obligations of inclusion as well as 
exclusion and does not entail any sort of internalism, moral deontologism, for all 
1 have shown here, implies tlie opposite. What is the relevance of these 
differences? I think the failure of epistemic deontologism to imply internalism 
(and the reason for this failure) is the more important difference. In a couple of 
well-known articles (Alston 1989 (a), 1989 (b)), William Alston has criticized the 
deontological conception claiming that i t is: (i) committed to doxastic voluntarism 
which, he claims, is untenable; (ii) at odds wi th the truth-conducive character of 
epistemic justification. I w i l l discuss (ii) in Part 2, so for now let's see how what 
has been said so far about the deontological conception affects criticism (i). 
Deontologism about epistemic justification is a thesis about responsibility - i.e. 
that we can be held responsible, or accountable for what we beUeve in (believing 
justifiably is believing responsibly). The notion of responsibility is usually held 
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to imply the notion of voluntary control because, by the Kantian maxim "ought 
implies can", i t seems nonsensical to hold somebody responsible for something 
over which they had no control (no one would blame a quadruple amputee for 
failing to w i n the Olympic ski slalom, nor would anyone blame a pre-Galilean 
sea-farer for believing the earth was flat). Thus, if we are said to be responsible 
for our beliefs, then our beliefs must be under our voluntary controP^, "this 
conception of epistemic justification is viable only i f beliefs are sufficiently under 
voluntary control to render such concepts as requirement, permission, obligation, 
reproach, and blame applicable to them" (Alston 1989 (b), p. 118). Now, according 
to Alston doxastic voluntarism is false, " i t is clear that for the most part we lack 
such powers" (Alston 1989 (b), p. 122). This denial is not unfamiliar, doxastic 
voluntarism has previously been criticized by Bernard Williams (WilUams 1973), 
and earlier still by Hume who said that beliefs "depend not on the w i l l nor can 
be commanded at pleasure" (Hume 1975, p. 48). Yet, if we deny that we have the 
ability to make ourselves believe propositions at w i l l , then we cannot be said to 
be responsible for having the beliefs we do for " i t makes no sense to speak of S's 
being permitted or forbidden to do A if S lacks an effective choice as to whether 
to do A" (Alston 1989 (b), p. 118). Thus, concludes Alston, the deontological 
conception of epistemic justification makes no sense. However, the preceding 
considerations have shown that deontologism about epistemic justification may 
As Alston points out, we may here need to include prepositional attitudes that are not beliefs. For 
instance to "withhold" belief in a proposition does not necessarily entail believing the negation of that 
proposition - so the deontological conception necessitates voluntary control of not only beliefs, but relevant 
propositional attitudes as well. 
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be compatible with a merely evaluative conception of justification (i.e. one that 
does not consist in making appraisals about obligation). This is because, as I have 
argued, we are only blameworthy vis-a-vis our subjective duty, and there is 
nothing preventing a deontological conception from stipulating that we are only 
subject to objective duties. If blameworthiness is only the home of appraisals 
about our obligations, then there is nothing impeding the coherence of a merely 
evaluative conception of epistemic deontologism. The upshot of this is that 
Alston's criticisms of the deontological conception perhaps miss their target, 
since they are aimed at the implications of our having such things as epistemic 
obligations and epistemic deontologism is consistent with a merely evaluative 
view of epistemic justification, the view favored by Alston himself. Still, I think 
Alston's criticisms are worthy of consideration as criticisms directed at 
"deontologism", when it does purport to say something about our obligations. It 
is the latter sort of deontologism that I am interested in tiying to articulate, so I 
w i l l now evaluate how penetiating Alston's criticisms are against such a 
conception. I w i l l firstly consider Alston's claim regarding the putative 
commitment of a deontic conceptions^ to doxastic voluntarism, and that since 
doxastic voluntarism is not true, then the deontic conception is implausible. In 
the chapter that immediately follows I w i l l explore how (and whether) we can 
say that doxastic voluntarism is tiue (i.e. whether, and to what extent, we have 
When I say a "deontological" or "deontic" conception from now on, I mean it in a sense that is not 
compatible with a merely evaluative conception. 
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control over our beliefs); Chapter 3 w i l l then assess responses to the charge of 
commitment. 
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Chapter 2: Doxastic Voluntarism 
2.1 Believe as you Will 
Can we believe propositions at will? It seems that palpably we cannot. We 
do not have the same control over what propositions we believe that we do over 
what actions we perform. I can make myself act like a fool if I wish to, but I 
carmot make myself believe that 1 am in the absence of adequate evidence for it, 
even if I really desire to or i f I have practical reasons for so believing it. For 
instance, imagine that I offer you 1,000 potmds to believe that I am a giant grass-
hopper. You may, i f you were in dire stiaights, behave as if I was a grass-hopper 
(duck from my imagined hops) but could you make yourself actually beheve i t 
just by an act of will? Our intuition, I believe, is stiongly to deny this possibihty. 
As William Alston puts it: 
If 1 were to set out to bring myself into a state of belief that p, just by an act 
of w i l l , I might assert that p with an expression of conviction or dwell 
favourably on the idea that p, or imagine a sentence expressing p 
emblazoned in the heavens with an angehc chorus in the background 
intoning the Kyrie of Mozart's Coronation Mass. A l l this I can do at w i l l , 
but none of this amounts to taking a belief that p. (Alston 1989 (b), pp. 122-
123) 
This consideration on its own does not indicate that we have absolutely no 
control over what propositions we believe. A l l it indicates is that we cannot bring 
ourselves to believe propositions just by an act of wi l l . For we may indirectly be 
able to control what propositions we believe. For instance, someone who's heard 
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Pascal's Wager may wish themselves^^ believe in God, and may in fact achieve 
this feat my shutting themselves off from any atheist literature, go to church lots, 
and put themselves in the company of zealous priests. But here they have not 
achieved their end merely by the means of an act of wi l l ; rather, they willed 
themselves to be put in an epistemic situation were they would believe what 
they had sought and, again as Alston puts it, we do "have voluntary control 
over whether to keep looking for evidence or reasons, and voluntary control over 
where to look and what steps to take" (Alston 1989 (b), p. 130). Yet such control 
is indirect, i t requires taking further measures in order to induce the coveted 
behef(s). In this chapter I am going only to consider whether direct doxastic 
voluntarism is plausible - i.e. whether we have direct control over what 
propositions we believers. 
I t is worth saying a bit more about what direct Doxastic Volimtarism is. 
For a subject S to induce himself directly to believe proposition p at time t, i t is 
necessary that S induces the belief that p immediately at t, i.e. in the absence of 
mediation ("just like that", as i t were). Take, for instance, the case of actions over 
which we are usually held to have direct control. Imagine that I offer you 1,000 
pounds for you to raise your arm. Imagine that you need the money and that you 
do immediately raise your arm. This is a case of immediate inducement because 
" O f course, to what extent we have control over what we desire or intend is also a highly contentious 
issue, as the "Toxin Puzzle" may show, see Kavka 1983. 
For the rest of this Chapter, when I refer to Doxastic Voluntarism, unless stated otherwise, I am referring 
to Direct Doxastic Voluntarism. 
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you raised your arm simply by wil l ing it; no mediating steps needed to be taken 
in order for the feat to be accomplished - you didn't get someone else to raise it 
for you, you didn't put yourself into a position where you'd suffer imwanted 
consequences if you didn't raise it, for example. However, as Jonathan Bennett 
remarks (Bennett 1990 p. 88), there are of course intermediate steps you do take 
to raise your arm in this scenario- you come to believe that I 'm going to give you 
1,000 pounds i f you raise i t and you form the intention to raise it. Yet there is 
something different about these steps in that they are constitutive parts of what i t 
is to be induced to raise your arm, they are not means you have to take in order 
to get your arm up. These constitutive steps are simply part of what i t is to raise 
your arm in that situation. Nevertheless, there is perhaps a stionger way in 
which the raising of your arm is mediated. Your arm would not go up if some 
neural activity in your brain did not take place before or during the event. 
Jonathan Bennett calls this ontological mediation (Bennett 1990 p. 89): the events of 
my offering you money and of you raising your arm lie in a causal chain which 
contains other events in between (like a neuron firing). Bennett contrasts this sort 
of mediation with motivational mediation, which, he argues, is not what occurs 
when one wills oneself to raise one's arm. Consider the practical syllogism 
{ceteris paribus): 
1) Someone's offered me 1,000 pounds to raise my arm. 
2) I desire that I receive 1,000 pounds. 
3) Therefore, I raise my arm. 
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Although i t is the case (I continue to follow Bennett) that neural events are doing 
mediating work in the causal sequence of events, i t is not the case that there is 
some motivating thought about such events intervening in the above syllogism 
(the thought "to get the grand I ' l l have to get my c-fibre to fire in order that I 
may raise hand, so I 'm motivated to tiy to get my c-fibre to fire" does not have to 
intervene to complete the syllogism). So even though all actions (including belief 
at will) must always be ontologically mediated^^, some actions (such as the 
raising of one's arm) are not motivationally mediated. For the rest of this paper I 
w i l l argue that actions that get you to believe something you want to, are always 
motivationally mediated - i.e. that direct doxastic contiol is impossible. 
However, there are two ways in which doxastic contiol might be 
impossible: i t could be conceptually or logicaUy impossible, or i t could be merely 
psychologically impossible. Indeed our intuitions regarding whether beUeving at 
w i l l is impossible has led philosophers to argue that doxastic voluntarism is 
more than just psychologically impossible but conceptually incoherent. Bennett, 
for instance, writes: 
There is indeed something so chokingly unswallowable about the idea of 
someone's voluntarily coming to believe something that I have to suspect 
that this is ruled out at a deeper level than the contingent powers of our 
minds. (Bennett 1990, p. 90) 
I w i l l now formulate some of the arguments used to establish the logical 
impossibility case and argue that they are blocked by appeal to the putative 
"See also Naylor 1985. 
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phenomenon of self-deception. I w i l l then evaluate how appeals to the 
phenomenon of self-deception could be taken as considerations against the 
psychological impossibility case. I w i l l argue that considerations about self-
deception are not successful in refuting the psychological impossibility of 
doxastic contiol. 
2.2 The Conceptual Impossibility Case 
The most cited argument in favour of the conceptual impossibility case for 
doxastic voluntarism belongs to Bernard WiUiams (Williams 1973). The 
argument goes as follows: 
If I could acquire a belief at w i l l , I could acquire i t whether i t was tiue or 
not; moreover I would know that I could acquire i t whether i t was tiue or 
not. If in f u l l consciousness I could w i l l to acquire a "belief" irrespective of 
its tiuth, i t is tmclear that before the event I could seriously think of i t as a 
beUef, i.e. as something purporting to represent reality. ... With regard to 
no belief could I know - or, if all this is to be done in fu l l consciousness, 
even suspect - that I had acquired i t at wi l l . But i f I can acquire beliefs at 
w i l l , I must know that I am able to do this; and could I know that I was 
capable of this feat, if with regard to every feat of this kind which I had 
performed I necessarily had to believe that i t had not taken place? 
(WiUiams 1973 p.l48) 
To paraphrase the argument in a more schematic form: 
(1) It is an essential feature of beliefs that they aim at truth. 
(2) If I can believe at w i l l then I must, in f u l l consciousness, know that I am able 
to acquire a belief irrespective of whether or not i t is true. 
(3) But I could not consider what I had acquired a belief if I had acquired i t in the 
knowledge that I did so irrespective of its tiuth. 
(4) Therefore, I cannot beheve at wi l l . 
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Given the nature of belief there is something conceptually incoherent about the 
idea that I can believe at w i l l , according to Williams, since the exercise of the w i l l 
runs afoul of the claim that beliefs aim at truth. Jonathan Bennett (Bennett 1994) 
has convincingly shown that this argument does not go through, however. 
Bennett makes two separate replies to Williams' argument. Firstly he asks us to 
consider a community whose members, called the Credamites (remember we are 
still within the realm of conceptual possibility), are able to make themselves 
beHeve at w i l l , although they cannot achieve this wi th beliefs that would require 
their other existing beliefs to be radically re-arranged. Importantly, once a 
Credamite manages to acquire a given belief at w i l l , they forget that this is how 
they came by i t - i.e. they forget that they willed themselves to believe the 
proposition in question. Now, although this scenario may seem a little far-
fetched, there is nothmg conceptually incoherent about it. Or, at least, i t does not 
run against any of Williams' demands: it shows that it is conceptually possible 
(given the nature of belief) to wi l l yourself to believe a proposition at w i l l 
without knowing that you had acquired that particular belief regardless of its 
truth - for all the Credamite knows they may have acquired that belief in the face 
of hard evidence. Further, the scenario does not pertain to show that i t is 
coherent to wi l l to believe without knowing that you are able to acquire a (or 
some) beliefs irrespective of their truth - "each Credamite knows that he 
sometimes wills himself to believe something [irrespective of its truth], even 
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though i t is never true that he now has a beUef which he now remembers having 
willed himself to acquire" (Bennett 1990, p. 93). 
Yet perhaps this reply is a bit of philosophical pedantry on the part of 
Bennett, which can be responded to by a bit of philosophical pedantry in turn. 
A l l we need do is modify premise (2) to read; 
(2*) If I can believe at w i l l then 1 must, in f u l l consciousness, know that I am able 
to acquire beliefs irrespective of whether or not they are true and I must be able to 
know whether I have done this for each individual belief I acquire in this way. 
This manoeuvre need not be read as being ad hoc. Take, analogously, the example 
of raising one's arm: to willingly raise my arm, I must know that I 'm generally 
capable of raising i t at w i l l but 1 must also be able to know each time I do so (or at 
the very least, some of the times I do so) whether I 'm exercising that ability. 
Otherwise how can i t make sense for me to know tliat I have that ability? If I was 
not able to know this for at least some instances of my arm raising, I would also 
not know that I can in fact raise my arm at w i l l generally - for otherwise the times 
I raised my arm in the past may have just been a product of a nervous twitch 
over which I had no control, for instance. So, i t seems quite fair to say that one 
caimot generally know that one can G, without having the ability ever to know 
whether one had done G at t. Going back to the Credamite case, when the 
Credamite wills himself to believe, does he satisfy what is required by premise 
(2*)? Surely not i f i t is built in to the Credamite's belief forming procedure that, 
upon acquiring the belief, he forgets how he formed i t when he formed it by 
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wil l ing it. So although, as the Credamite example shows, one may satisfy what is 
required by premise (2) without violating what is required by (3), one cannot 
satisfy what is required by (2*) without violating (3). Satisfying (2*) w i l l mean 
that I w i l l at least sometimes know how I acquired my beliefs, and if I acquired 
them irrespective of their truth, I can no longer consider what 1 had acquired a 
belief. If (2*) is a necessary condition for believing at w i l l , then the Credamites 
cannot beUeve at wi l l . Therefore, one cannot use the possibility of their existence 
as a means to demonstrate the conceptual possibility of doxastic volxmtarism. 
Bennett has a better reply to Williams' argument, however. I t starts off 
wi th the consideration that mediated (indirect) ways of getting yourself to 
believe propositions at w i l l are indeed possible. Indirect Doxastic Voluntarism 
does, indeed, seem possible: we may well get ourselves to believe propositions 
by getting ourselves into epistemic situations where we are forced to believe 
what we seek to believe (re-call the case of the person who wishes to believe in 
God), by hypnotism, by subconscious subliminal means or by contriving to 
deceive ourselves. I think the latter case has special significance and I ' l l say why 
shortly. In the meantime note that Williams himself acknowledges that these 
mediated means to get yourself to believe are possible: 
However, even if i t is granted that there is something necessarily bizarre 
about the idea of believing at w i l l , just like that, i t may be said that there is 
room for the application of decision to belief by more roundabout routes. 
For we all know that there are causal factors, xmconnected wi th truth, 
which can produce belief: hypnotism, drugs, all sorts of things could bring 
it about that I beheve that p. (Williams 1973, p. 149) 
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However, as Bennett notes, Williams' argument rules such cases out. This is 
because Williams' argument does not rule out cases of direct doxastic 
voluntarism by appeal to the fact that all such cases require some mediation, but 
by appeal to the fact that believing at w i l l is beUeving in some way that does not 
involve acquiring evidence for belief. So if there are cases of indirect doxastic 
voluntarism which do not involve acquiring evidence for belief, then they too fall 
foul of Williams' requirements. WiUiams' argument thus seems to prove too 
much. As Bennett puts it, if Williams' argument "holds against beliefs acquired 
voluntarily "just like that" then i t holds against beliefs acquired in any way that 
does not involve gathering evidence" (Bennett 1990, p. 95). 
2.3 Adler's Counter-Reply 
In his book Beliefs Own Ethics (Adler 2002), Jonathan Adler presents a 
counter-reply to Bennett's reply which I think is worth considering. Adler's 
covmter-reply goes as follows: "coming to believe or ceasing to believe in clear 
defiance of one's evidence needs to be accomplished nonconsciously. Indeed this 
restriction is tacitly made in prominent criticisms of Williams' argument" (Adler 
2002 p. 59). But i f believing in defiance of one's evidence is accomplished 
nonconsciously, continues Adler, then we cannot consider such acts of believing 
products of our wi l l , for they are no longer within our (at least direct) control. 
... to the extent that we need to be unaware of or hide f rom ourselves, or 
hide f rom what we are doing, to that extent we weaken the value of 
control. Though you may still be able to accomplish the same ends -
believe the same contents - wi th these indirect means, your success w i l l be 
more dependent on resources outside your wi l l . (Adler 2002 p. 64) 
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Although Adler does not quite put it this way, his cotinter-reply works against 
Bennett's contention that Williams' argument proves too much, by denying that 
indirect ways of believing at w i l l count as instances of voluntarism, i.e. that 
indirect doxastic voluntarism is impossible if it involves believing in defiance of 
one's evidence. The wannabe believer in God who puts himself in an epistemic 
situation in order to get himself to believe what he seeks is not ruled out by this 
restriction, however, as he has consciously sought evidence in order to achieve 
his end - that he seeks a particular type of evidence and does not seek counter-
evidence for his coveted belief is of no consequence here. This type of indirect 
doxastic voluntarism - where a beHever merely changes his epistemic situation, 
i.e. what evidence is available to him - is possible, according to Adler, and, 
further, is not in breach of the requirements Williams set out. However, cases 
where subjects indirectly get themselves to believe in a manner that does not 
involve seeking evidence - cases such as self-deception, or hypnotism - Adler 
does not consider to be genuine cases of voluntarism, since they do not involve 
the subject being fully conscious of their acts, which he takes to be a condition of 
being able to believe at wi l l . The point is, then, that it is not problematic that 
Williams' argument proves such cases out of existence since they are not genuine 
instances of voluntarism. End of counter-reply. 
Whilst some cases of subliminal mediation, for instance cases where one is 
hypnotised or drugged, fail to be cases where the subject is wi l l ing himself to 
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believe consciously, i t is not clear that certain other such cases fail. Take for 
instance an example of the phenomenon of self-deception (I take this f rom 
McLaughlin 1988 pp. 31 -33). Imagine that there is a departmental meeting in a 
few months' time that 1 really wish not to attend but I also feel I really ought to 
attend and I w i l l feel guilty if I don't unless 1 have an excuse (for instance that I 
was mistaken as to when the time of the meeting was). I thus contrive, wi l fu l ly 
and in f u l l consciousness, to deceive myself - knowing that 1 w i l l forget that I did 
this because of my busy schedule, 1 write down the wrong time in my diary (say 
four p.m. when the meeting is really to be held at 11.00 a.m.). When, in the 
future, 1 read the diary I come to believe that the meeting is at four and so have 
successfully deceived myself in f u l l consciousness. 
Now i t may be argued that I 'm not in f u l l control (or I 'm not ful ly 
conscious) of the mediating mechanisms that enabled the act of self-deception to 
take place, e.g. the accuracy of my memory. But this point is, really, by the by. 
For although I may not be in control and be ful ly conscious of all the means by 
which I need to achieve an end I may still be in control over whether or not that 
end gets achieved. For instance, we would want to say that the President of the 
United States is in contiol over whether the United States launches a nuclear 
missile even though he is not at all conscious, nor in control of, the mediating 
means by which his order culminates in a bomb exploding; were he to give the 
order we would still hold him responsible for the bomb going off and we would 
have no problem in saying that i t had been an act of his wi l l . This shows that we 
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can be in considered to be in control of what outcomes transpire in certain cases 
even when we are not ful ly conscious of the means by which those outcomes are 
attained^o. So mediated acts of believing at w i l l in defiance of one's evidence can, 
after all, be considered genuine cases of indirect doxastic control. So Bennett's 
second reply to Williams' argument, that it is too strong in ruling out such cases, 
stands and the conceptual plausibility of direct doxastic voluntarism remains. 
2.4 Two Other Attempts at the Conceptual Impossibility Case 
I t might be worth mentioning that a modified way of formulating 
Williams' argument has been attempted by Dion Scott-Kakures (Scott Kakures 
1994). Scott-Kakures argues that believing at w i l l cannot be coherently 
considered to be intentional action when we consider an intention as something 
that can guide or direct ("rationaUse") action. As he puts it: 
I cannot, f rom my cognitive perspective at t, see my way through to my 
altered perspective at t +1. If this is so, then the intention that I formulate 
at t cannot be one by which I govern or monitor my behaviour through to 
t + 1. And this means that, since the arrival at the belief state at t + 1 is 
imgoverned or unmonitored, my arrival at that belief state cannot count 
as something I succeeded in will ing, as I do when 1 succeed in directly 
wil l ing an arm rise. (Scott-Kakures 1994, p. 95) 
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There is, however, a salient difference between this example and cases of self deception in that it is not 
necessaiy that the President is not conscious of the means by which his will is realised in order for the 
mechanism to work. However, other examples easily fit the bill: take driving a car. There may be 
something about my personality that makes it the case that if I know about all the mechanisms and 
contraptions that go into making my engine work, I'll be so distracted by paying attention to those details, 
that whilst driving I will systematically lose control of the car. So I can only exercise my will (say to drive 
to my aunt's house) if I am not conscious of (at least some of) the means (the inner workings of an engine) 
by which I get there. In any case, even if it were the case that only cases of self-deception contained this 
feature, it would not preclude our being able to ascribe control over ends to someone who was not 
conscious of the intricacies of the means by which to get them, which is alj that is„needed here. 
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So, according to Scott-Kakures, there is a "cognitive fissure" between the belief 
states at t and at t + 1 because at t + 1 S does not believe that S's belief that p is 
not epistemically justified, but at t S does believe that S's belief is not 
epistemically justified (since believing at w i l l means believing for reasons 
irrespective of the beliefs truth). One cannot then, without paradox, intend to 
move f rom t to t +1 because: 
...the beUefs which generate the intention are incompatible wi th my 
believing that p. Thus the intention must be abandoned before its 
satisfaction conditions are realized. If the intention that I formulate must 
be abandoned before I succeed in bringing about the state of affairs i t 
represents, then that intention cannot be one by which 1 direct and 
monitor my activity until success. (Scott Kakures 1994, p. 96) 
Thus believing at w i l l is an incoherent notion. The conceptual impossibility 
argument, modified in this way, can now deal wi th Bennett's response that i t 
rules out aU cases of believing in a way that does not involve acquiring evidence. 
Under this account, being brain-washed into believing that p, for instance, is 
possible but i t is not an intentional action - and it is not a problem to consider these 
ways of acquiring beliefs non-intentional. However, if the argument rules out 
these sorts of ways of acquiring belief, then i t rules out all ways of acquiring 
beliefs in a way that that does not involve gathering evidence - i.e. aU indirect 
cases of doxastic voluntarism. So if there are cases of indirect voluntarism, cases 
such as self-induced self-deception, then Bennett's objection, once again, holds. 
Further, as Dana Radcliffe (Radcliffe 1997) points out, the argument suffers f rom 
a serious flaw since it does not follow f rom the fact that believing at wiU means 
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believing for reasons other than the truth of a belief, that it must be the case that 
if a subject believes at w i l l they w i l l believe that believing p at t is not 
epistemically justified. At a higher lever, not having the belief that my belief ^hai p 
is justified is not the same as the ground-level belief that p is not justified (I may 
later f ind out that p is in fact, justified)2i. AH that believing at w i l l requires is that 
the way 1 acquire my belief is irrespective of the truth of the belief, and this 
requirement is not violated if 1 merely do not beUeve that my belief that p is 
justified. However, there is only a "cognitive fissure" between my belief states at 
t and at t + 1, if I believe that p is not justified at t (since I am aiming to believe 
that p is justified at t +1). If I need not beUeve this at t for me to believe at w i l l , 
then there need not be a tension between my belief states at t and at t + 1, so 
there is no necessary incoherence in believing at wi l l . 
For the sake of thoroughness, I 'd also like briefly to mention another 
attempt at making the conceptual impossibiUty case, this time made by Bennett. I 
mention i t only briefly as Bennett himself only mentions i t to reject it. The 
argument goes as follows: behefs are dispositions, dispositions supervene on 
categorical states; one cannot then create a disposition without altering its 
subvenient categorical state, so one cannot induce a belief immediately, one must 
always do something else first, i.e. alter the categorical state upon which the 
belief supervenes. Direct doxastic control is thus conceptually impossible, in an 
analogous way "\ cannot immediately induce you to make two dissimilar things 
'^ See Alston 1989 (c). 
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alike. It is absolutely, conceptually impossible for you just to make them alike; 
you have to make them alike by - through the mediation of - making an intiinsic 
change in one or both of them" (Bennett 1990, p. 104). As I said, however, 
Bennett himself rejects this proposal. It is perfectly acceptable to hold it necessary 
that going from an inducement to a change of disposition needs to be 
ontologically mediated. It only follows, however, that i t must be motivationally 
mediated, argues Bennett, i f that "must" expresses absolute necessity, and i t 
cannot. Motivational immediacy concerns people's thoughts, whereas absolute 
necessity "of a categorical basis for a disposition resides in a conceptual 
connection which need not constrain the agent's thoughts because he may be 
unaware of it or outiight disbelieve i t" (Bennett 1990, p. 106). In other words, the 
argument only goes through on the assumption that everyone has to realise that 
there cannot be a disposition without a categorical basis, but such an assumption 
is, to use Bennett's phrase, "patently false". So although belief at w i l l must 
always be ontologically mediated i t does not follow that i t is motivationally 
mediated, and if i t is possible for a belief to be induced without i t being 
motivationally mediated (even if this is biologically impossible), then the 
conceptual impossibility of direct doxastic contiol has not been ruled out. 
2.5 The Psychological Impossibility Case 
We have so far had to accept that our being able to believe at w i l l "just like 
that" might be a live conceptual possibility, but of course this does not preclude 
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i t f rom being an actual psychological impossibility. It appears most plausible that 
none of us in this actual world are able to accomplish this feat. However, the 
volimtarist about belief can enlist the phenomenon of self-deception once again 
in order to disprove the psychological impossibility case. Since if there are cases 
of genuine self deception, there are also cases of doxastic control, and so doxastic 
control is possible. Needless to say, the psychological impossibility case is not 
estabhshed by the use of argument, rather i t is estabUshed by appeal to what 
intuitions we have on the matter - ask yourself, could you really make yourself 
believe at will?; and then by appeal to empirical result - can anyone else make 
themselves do this? So the volimtarist can displace the psychological 
impossibility case by appealing to intuitions that rvm in the opposite direction 
and by pointing to cases where behefs are voluntarily acquired. So self-deception 
seems to f i t the bill for the voluntarist. Most of us, I would say, has at some point 
in our lives deUberately ignored a piece of saUent evidence or deliberately 
considered something as evidence when palpably i t was not in order to hang on 
to or acquire a belief we have coveted. Here is a well known example f rom 
Sartre: 
Take the example of a woman who has consented to go out wi th a 
particular man for the first time. She knows very well the intentions which 
the particular man who is speaking to her cherishes regarding her. She 
knows that i t w i l l be necessary sooner or later for her to make a decision. 
But she does not want to realize the urgency; she concerns herself only 
wi th what is respectful and discreet in the attitude of her companion. She 
restricts this behaviour to what is in the present; she does not wish to read 
in the phrases which he addresses to her anything other than their explicit 
meaning. If he says to her, "1 f ind you so attractive" she disarms this 
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phrase of its sexual background; she attaches to the conversation and to 
the behaviour of the speaker, the immediate meanings, which she 
imagines as objective qualities. The man who is speaking to her appears to 
her sincere and respectable as the table is round or square, as the wall 
colouring is blue or grey. The qualities thus attached to the person she is 
listening to are in this way fixed in permanence like that of things. This is 
because she does not know what she wants... 
But then suppose he takes her hand. This act of her companion risks 
changing the situation by calling for an immediate decision. To leave the 
hand there is to consent in herself to fl ir t , to engage herself. To withdraw 
is to break the tioubled and tmstable harmony which gives the hour its 
charm. The aim is to postpone the moment of decision as long as possible. 
We know what happens next; the young woman leaves her hand there, 
but she does not notice that she is leaving it. She does not notice because i t 
happens by chance that she is at this moment all intellect. She draws her 
companion up to the most lofty regions of sentimental speculation; she 
speaks of Life, of her life, she shows herself in her essential aspect - a 
personality, a consciousness. And during this time the divorce from body 
and soul is accomplished; the hand rests inert between the warm hands of 
her companion - neither consenting nor resisting - a thing. We shall say 
that this woman is in bad faith. (Sartre 1998, p 55) 
Self-deception does seem to be a fairly rife phenomenon - for the sake of 
this chapter I've assumed that it is possible - but the question that arises here 
concerns how we are to interpret what is going on when we deceive ourselves 
and whether it entails our having direct voluntary control over our beliefs. To 
appeal to self-deception as a means of disproving the psychological impossibility 
case, the phenomenon needs to be interpreted in a way that (a) shows how (at 
least) some instances of self-deception are achieved via no mediatory means and 
(b) that such acts are conducted deliberately and in f u l l consciousness. The 
"missed appointment" example of self deception is clearly an example where the 
deception is achieved (albeit consciously and deUberately) in an indirect way (the 
memory loss, the diary), so i t cannot be considered an example of direct doxastic 
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control being exercised. But what about Sartre's example? Here the woman 
ignores the evidence which suggests that her companion wants to engage wi th 
her romantically. She does so in order tliat she may continue to believe that she 
does not have to make a decision regarding him and does so, it would seem, 
directly - she does not seem to employ any mechanism to help her achieve her 
end, except for engaging her mind to other things (but this is just what i t means 
to ignore evidence), so her example satisfies condition (a). Does she ignore the 
evidence intentionally and consciously (satisfy condition (b)), however? At some 
level she must, for in order to ignore the evidence she must be able to discern 
which of her companion's actions count as evidence towards his romantic intent. 
No doubt she may reply, were she to have her deception pointed out, that she 
had no idea that she was doing this, that i t had been completely subconscious. 
There would be nothing wrong with our accepting her interpretation, but, on the 
other hand there is nothing in the story that would prevent us f rom interpreting 
what went on as involving her consciously and deliberately contiiving to deceive 
herself. Or is there? It is arguable that S can have the ability to hold the beliefs 
that p (this man has romantic intentions toward me) and that not-p (this man 
does not have romantic intentions toward me) concurrently at t, as long as one of 
those beliefs is not accessed at t (or, at least, not accessible at t). However, to 
interpret the woman carrying out this act of self-deception directly, intentionally 
and in f u l l consciousness, is to interpret the woman as believing that p and that 
not-p concurrently at t, and that both of the beUefs that p, and that not-p, are 
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accessible to her at t. This is not only psychologically impossible but also 
conceptually impossible since i t leads to Moore's paradox: if believing that p 
involves taking p to be tiue, then I cannot believe that p i f I also believe not-p, as I 
would no longer be taking p to be tiue. So i t would seem that no act of self 
deception can be accomplished intentionally and in f u l l consciousness without 
hiding from oneself (making inaccessible) one of the opposing beliefs - but this 
involves a mediatory step. One cannot satisfy condition (a) without violating 
condition (b) and vice versa and since it is necessary that conditions (a) and (b) 
are satisfied for cases of self-deception to be cases for direct doxastic 
volimtarism, it seems that no act of self-deception can establish the psychological 
possibility of direct doxastic voluntarism. Self-deception may indeed, then, 
involve indirect doxastic voluntarism, but i t cannot involve direct doxastic 
voluntarism (since an act of self-deception cannot be both intentional and 
unmediated). 
2.5. Concluding Remarks. 
The tiouble wi th the arguments for the conceptual impossibility of doxastic 
contiol is that they rely on the impossibility of indirect doxastic contiol. The 
possibility of cases of genuine self-deception shows that indirect doxastic 
voltmtarism is in fact possible, so the phenomenon of self-deception causes real 
problems for the conceptual impossibility case. However, cases of self-deception 
do not cause trouble for the psychological impossibility case, for no act of self-
deception can be both intentional and unmediated. So although doxastic contiol 
56 
does not happen to exist, the reverse could conceivably be the case. The 
psychological impossibility of doxastic control is enough, however, to cause a 
deontological conception of epistemic justification problems if such a conception 
has, indeed, to be committed to the possibility of voluntarism - for if nobody in 
this world can believe at w i l l , then, if we accept that ought implies can, nobody 
can be ever be considered responsible (and so at appropriate times blameworthy) 
for their cognitive condition. Accepting that there is no psychological possibility 
of believing at w i l l , I w i l l consider whether such impossibility really is a problem 
for the deontological conception in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Responses to the Voluntarism Problem 
3.1 Framing the Responses 
It looks like, although the case for the conceptual impossibility of doxastic 
contiol is hard to make, the case for the psychological impossibiUty is not, and, as 
I've already mentioned, psychological impossibility is all that is required for a 
rediictio of the deontological conception (if such a conception can only make 
sense i f control is in fact possible). The quickest way for a defender of the deontic 
conception is to deny that doxastic control is psychologically impossible, but the 
involuntarist is going to argue that taking this line would face a barrage of 
intuitions indicating the contrary, and i t does seem that the intuitive support for 
the involuntarism case is stiong. Yet perhaps there is some room for manoeuver 
for the voluntarist. Firstly, and this is the line suggested by Mathias Steup (Steup 
2000), they could respond that even though i t looks as if action and belief are 
unalike when i t comes to the voluntarism question, in fact they are not. It might 
be impossible for you to act without reasons, in the same way that i t is 
impossible for you to believe without evidence, so one could argue that the 
problem of voluntarism is as much of a problem for action as i t is for belief. 
Further, whether you take a compatibilist line or a libertarian constiual (for 
example) of the concept of voluntary control, then your answer to the question of 
whether one can believe at w i l l is going to change accordingly. However, the 
question of how action and belief converge or differ vis-a-vis the question of 
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voluntary contiol has not received the attention i t deserves. The reason is, of 
course, that i t is a gargantuan undertaking, and one, I am afraid, I do not have 
the space to enter into here. Nevertheless, there is, phenomenologically at least, 
an undoubted difference between the contiol we have over our beliefs and the 
contiol we have over our actions, so whatever the result of a study that tiled to 
make sense of the similarities, it would also have to accoxmt for that 
phenomenological difference. This, 1 think, relieves the involuntarist of the 
burden of proof. Still, i t must be conceded that the matter remains at this 
moment unresolved. 
A further way in which one may deny the psychological impossibility 
case, taken recently by Carl Ginet (Ginet 2001), historically by William James 
(James 1956), is to point us in the direction of cases where we seemingly can 
believe at wi l l . I t seems we can believe at wi l l , say James and Ginet, when (and 
only when) i t is permissible for us both to acquire a given belief and not to 
acquire it, as Ginet puts it: " i t is psychologically possible in the right 
circumstances, for a subject to come to believe something just by deciding to 
believe it, where the subject has i t open to her to also not come to believe i t " 
(Ginet 2001, p. 74). If, in such cases, we can believe as we choose, then we can be 
held responsible for such beliefs, and so a deontological conception is not 
incoherent at least wi th respect to those beliefs. However, although it is not clear 
whether we have voluntary contiol in cases where evidence is inconclusive, we 
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cannot rule out the possibility that w e do i n fact lack such powers i n such cases. 
We may reply that, al though i t may appear as i f we have vol tmtary control i n 
such cases, really we do not, perhaps we are compelled to believe wha t we end 
up believing by our probabil i ty estimates, for example, and i f when we are not so 
compelled, we are compelled, when really the evidence does not favor even i n 
some small w a y belief or disbelief (and such cases are going to be rare), to 
w i t h h o l d judgment (i.e. neither beUeve that p, nor disbeheve that p). Ginet does 
not rule out this possibihty, but claims that "we have not been offered any good 
reason to th ink i t is so" (Ginet 2001, p. 75). So, really, al l that these considerations 
show is that the matter is yet to be concluded - we may interpret cases where 
evidence is inconclusive to al low room fo r belief at w i l l , or we may not ( in a 
sense this is just such a case!), w h i c h side we take is going to depend on h o w 
w e l l our intui t ions accord w i t h either interpretation and i t seems like our 
intui t ions may r u n in either direction. I n any case, a better reply to Ginet and 
James may be that a deontological conception wh ich is only about those beliefs 
for w h i c h there is no conclusive evidence has been shrunk to size somewhat. 
Firstly, because w e have considerably reduced the number of beliefs for w h i c h i t 
makes any sense i n apply ing the deontological conception to, but also because 
such cases can only occur where the subject has i t "open" to believe wha t they 
l ike, "open" i n tlie sense that they w o u l d not be blameworthy for believing either 
way - this renders the deontological conception completely toothless i n that i t 
could only apply to behefs that have already been appraised as being blameless 
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(in that they are open f r o m the evidential point of v iew) , so app ly ing the 
deontological conception i n this manner could only have one outcome: that the 
belief being judged come out as blameless. 
A f i na l consideration we may make, this t ime concerning the conceptual 
possibil i ty of doxastic control, wh ich 1 th ink is also inconclusive, is suggested i n 
the last t w o pages of Bennett's paper " W h y is Belief Involuntary" (Bennett 1990). 
Here Bennett suggests that even i f i t is conceptually possible that we can 
immediate ly induce ourselves to believe that p, i t does not f o l l o w that i t is 
conceptually possible that we voluntarily believe that p. That w o u l d f o l l o w only i f 
"do ing something voluntar i ly is being immediately caused to do i t by one's 
desire to do i t " (Bennett 1990, p. 106) and Bennett thinks this is not necessarily 
the case as is demonstrated, he suggests, by the inteUigibiUty of the f o l l o w i n g 
wish: 
I w i s h that m y a rm w o u l d rise r ight n o w w i t l i o u t m y raising i t , going up 
s imply as an immediate consequence of m y wan t ing i t to go up. (Bermett 
1990, p. 107) 
Sti l l , as Bennett himself is aware, this is a suggestion that needs a lot of 
conceptual w o r k before i t is established. Once again, 1 am afra id I am not going 
to at tempt that undertaking here. So for the rest of this chapter I am going to 
concede to the voluntar is t that believing at w i l l is at least conceptually possible, 
bu t concede to the involuntar is t that believing at w i l l is at least psychologically 
impossible. These may tu rn out to be unwarranted and large concessions, but fo r 
the moment 1 a m forced to give them because 1 estimate that they are probably 
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true. I n any case, I a m interested i n evaluating the coherence of the deontological 
conception of epistemic just if ication, and not the possibili ty of direct doxastic 
control, and given that I am going to argue that the deontological conception is 
coherent despite the falsi ty of direct doxastic voluntar ism, noth ing 1 wan t to say 
here turns on these concessions. 
So, assuming that doxastic control is psychologically impossible, for the 
remainder of this chapter I w i l l explore the cri t icism made by Als ton regarding 
the deontic conception's commitment to doxastic voluntar ism. The covmter-
arguments to Alston's cri t icism that I w i l l explore are as fo l lows: 
(i) A l t h o u g h direct doxastic voluntar ism is false, indirect doxastic 
voluntar i sm is not - and we can base the deontological conception on 
indirect voluntar ism. 
(ii) We need not base the not ion of our being responsible for wha t we 
believe on our having voluntary control of our beliefs. We can, instead, 
base such responsibility on our abil i ty (or inabi l i ty) to display certain 
epistemic virtues. 
( i i i ) Doxastic involuntar i sm (of whatever degree) is on ly a problem for the 
deontological conception i f i t is the case that the deontological 
conception is incompatible w i t h i t . This, however, is not the case - the 
deontological conception and doxastic involuntar i sm are i n fact 
compatible. 
I w i l l n o w argue that (for d i f ferent reasons) none of these counter-arguments 
are unproblematic, and that (i) is the more promis ing reply. 
3.2 The Appeal to Indirect Doxastic Voluntarism. 
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Direct doxastic voluntar ism is the claim that I can make myself believe 
propositions at w i l l i n the same way 1 can move m y hand to grab ho ld of a 
pencil. Even i f this c la im is false, perhaps there is another w a y i n w h i c h w e are i n 
some sense i n control of wha t we believe. Consider, for example, the case of an 
atheist w h o - hav ing heard Pascal's wager perhaps - for prudent ia l reasons 
comes to w i s h they believed i n God. That person cannot instantly directly w i l l 
themselves to believe i t (direct doxastic voluntar ism is false), bu t perhaps, 
th rough an appropriate course of action, they can p u t themselves i n a posi t ion 
where they w o u l d believe i t . They might , for instance, start reading the bible 
(omi t t ing to read any contentious passages), go to church regularly, pu t 
themselves i n the persistent company of zealous priests, cease to read or listen to 
any science or philosophy that rtught cast doubt on God's existence etc. They 
may in this manner very w e l l succeed i n believing what they had wished to 
believe. This type of control over our beliefs is indirect (or "non-basic"). 
I f , indeed, we have such indirect cont io l over our beliefs so that (as Als ton 
describes the position) we have "voluntary cont io l over whether to keep looking 
fo r evidence or reasons, and voluntary cont tol over where to look and wha t steps 
to take" (Alston 1989 (b), p. 130) then there is a base on w h i c h to g round the 
deontic conception - a crass belief based on no evidence is b lameworthy, the 
holder of that belief could have done better (i.e. he has control over whether he 
looks for evidence or not). Kihyeon K i m elaborates the po in t by d r a w i n g a 
dist inct ion between the critical formation of beliefs and critical reflection on beliefs. 
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K i m argues, fur ther , "that Als ton regards doxastic voluntar ism as a v i ew about 
the formation of beliefs" and that i f epistemologists w i t h deontological 
conceptions of epistemic just if icat ion are commit ted to any version of doxastic 
voluntar i sm at a l l " i t is one concerning critical reflections on beliefs" ( K i m 1994, p. 
282). So for K i m we can be said to be responsible for wha t we believe because, 
though we lack the capabiUty to form beliefs at w i l l , we do have the capability to 
evaluate such beliefs and then to pu t ourselves into a si tuation (like collecting 
evidence) where our beliefs are groimded more, or less, propitiously^^. 
Basing a deontological conception of epistemic justif ication upon this sort of 
indirect doxastic voluntar ism is also, according to Alston, h igh ly problematic, 
however. Suppose that someone believes that the Holocaust d i d not happen. 
According to the deontological conception of epistemic just i f icat ion based on 
indirect doxastic control, we migh t wi sh to say that such a person's behef was 
not jus t i f ied because they behaved epistemically irresponsibly i n not having 
collected a l l the available evidence (having never visi ted Auschwi tz , f o r 
instance). This w o n ' t do, however. As James Montmarquet points out, " w h y d i d , 
or do, they f a i l to conduct such checks? The most obvious answer is that they are 
suff ic ient ly convinced of the t ru th of these beliefs that they believe that fur ther 
checks are unnecessary" (Montmarquet 1992, p. 335). The denier of the 
Holocaust does not v is i t Auschwitz because he honestly beUeves (for the sake of 
Hilary Komblith (Kornblith 1983) also bases epistemic responsibility on indirect (as opposed to direct) 
doxastic control. 
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argument let's assume some intellectual honesty on his part) that he has evidence 
enough for the belief that he has, fur ther that he has reason to doubt that the 
evidence he w o u l d encounter at Auschwi tz is genuine. N o w , perhaps i t is the 
case that i t is his higher-level (or "second-order") belief (that he does not need to 
pursue fur ther checks on his ground-level belief that the Holocaust d i d not 
happen) that is epistemically irresponsible - i f he checked out this belief he 
w o u l d come to believe different ly. However , this reply invites a vicious regress: 
his higher level belief about the need to conduct fur ther checks on his g round 
level belief w i l l be backed up by an even higher level (3) belief about the 
adequacy of his level (2) (second-order) belief. To question the adequacy of the 
level (3) belief w o u l d be to have the vicious regress ensue^s. Thus, even though 
we may have indirect control over wha t we believe, i t is not to say i t makes sense 
to say that we are responsible for wha t we believe. For this reason, says Als ton , 
the deontological conception cannot be based upon indirect doxastic 
voluntar ism. 
I th ink that the regress problem is a d i f f i c u l t one to circumvent, and doing so 
w i l l require mak ing some substantive claims. Before engaging w i t h the coimter 
replies to the regress problem I wan t to discuss a related problem w i t h the 
appeal to indirect voluntar i sm formulated by Charlotte Katzoff (Katzoff 1996, 
2000). Her argument is, roughly, that (again under "ought implies can") one can 
only have epistemic duties such as the du ty to critically reflect on a belief that p i f 
" See Alston 1989 (a), (b) and (c). 
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S has the second-order beliefs: (i) that S believes that S holds the belief that p, and 
(ii) that S believes that S has strong counter-evidence24 against p ( i f not S w o u l d 
be unable to act otherwise^^). However, Katzoff claims that neither of these 
requirements can be met w i t h o u t f a l lmg into contradiction: i f S believes that they 
have strong cotmter-evidence for believing that p, can i t make sense that S 
believes that they believe that p7 I f we answer "yes", we are i n effect saying that 
S can believe that p and not p at the same time, i.e. we f a l l in to a contradiction 
similar to Moore's paradox, and the claim is that doing so violates a pr inciple of 
doxastic rationali ty. I t a l l depends on how we v iew the higher-level belief "that S 
believes that S has strong counter evidence against that p", because that second-
order belief only contradicts the second-order belief "that S believes that S 
believes that p" i f i t is equivalent to "S believes that S does not believe that p" - i f 
they are equivalent then w e w o u l d have a contradiction; S believes that S does 
not believe that p, and S believes that S believes t l iat p i.e. S believes that p and 
that not p. I f this is the case, we cannot coherently base a deontic conception of 
epistemic just i f icat ion on indirect doxastic vol imtar ism, since do ing so w o u l d 
entail breaking a principle of doxastic rationality. However, the equivalence of "S 
believes that S has strong coimter-evidence against that p" to "S believes that S 
does not believe that p" is only established i f there is a necessary l i n k between 
This is probably too strong, all that is required is that one believe that one does not have sufficient 
evidence to warrant the belief 
" Or, at least that is required for KatzofTs argument to go through; however, we may say that "ought 
implies can" only establishes that S needs to fulfill requirement (ii) if S is going to be motivated to reflect 
on S's belief, though of course he is still able to do so despite fulfilling requirement (ii). For the sake of 
charity, I am going to overlook this difference. 
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second-order and first-order belief, for the two are equivalent only i f this 
counterfactual fo l lows: S w o u l d never believe that p (first-order belief) i f S 
believed that S had strong-counter-evidence that p (second-order belief) - so 
believing that S has strong evidence against that p amounts to bel ieving that S 
does not believe that p. Katzoff 's argument relies on a necessary l i n k between 
higher-order and lower-order belief, imfor tunate ly she does not provide an 
argument for this entailment, Sydney Shoemaker (Shoemaker 1995), however, 
does. 
Shoemaker's argument goes something like this: 
(1) S beheves that p. 
(2) S is rational. 
(3) I n normal circumstances, i t is i n S's practical interest to act i n ways to 
make others believe that S believes that p (since "one is more l ike ly to 
achieve one's aims i f one acts on assumptions that are tiue". (Shoemaker 
1995, p. 218) 
(4) The circumstances are normal . 
(5) Therefore, S behaves i n ways "characteristic of someone t r y i n g to manifest 
to others that she believes that p, inc luding saying " I believe that p"". 
(Shoemaker 1995, p. 219) 
The argument is supposed to estabhsh a connection between first-order and 
second-order belief, but, as An thony Brueckner shows (Brueckner 1998), even i f 
we accept premises (1) - (5)^^, i t fails. I f S believes that p and i f S desires to make 
This may, already, be regarded as a large concession: as Brueckner puts it, the argument "fails to 
elucidate any reasons the P-believer might have for getting others to believe that he has a second-order 
belief that he believes that p" (Brueckner 1998, p. 362). Further, some like Steven Stich may well take 
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others beUeve that S believes that p, i t does not f o l l o w that S has the 
corresponding higher-level beHef (i.e. that S beheves that S believes that p). Or, i t 
only fo l lows "on some reductionist assumption about the nature o f second-order 
belief, such that as believing that one believes is somehow constituted by the 
appropriate behavior plus the belief that p plus the complex desires i n question" 
(Brueckner 1998, p. 363). Such a reductionist thesis, argues Brueckner, is not 
plausible - imagine a case where someone desires that he portray to others that 
he believes that his sister is evil . His fr iends hate his sister and he wants to 
ingratiate himself w i t h them by showing them that he agrees w i t h their op in ion 
of her; he does as a matter fact believe, "deep d o w n " , that she is evi l bu t he 
carmot b r ing himself to admi t this to himself, so he does not believe that he 
believes that she is, " i n such a case, S believes that p, possesses the requisite 
desires, and yet does not have the second-order belief that he believes that p" 
(Brueckner 1998, p. 363). H a v i n g a second-order belief is not the same th ing as 
behaving as if one believes as a result of having the desire to show people that 
one has t l ia t belief. Thus Shoemaker's argument fails to establish an essential 
connection between higher-level and lower-level belief. I f there is no necessary 
l i n k between higher-level and lower-level belief then the incoherence of S's 
believing that S has strong counter evidence against that p and S's believing that 
S believes that p has not been estabUshed. This is because i f there is no necessary 
issue with the idea of it being the case that, in normal circumstances, one is more likely to achieve one' 
aims if one acts on true beliefs, see Stich 1990. 
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l i nk between higher-level and lower-level belief, then S's beheving that S has 
strong evidence against p is not equivalent to S's believing that S does not beUeve 
p, and so there is no Moore's-paradox-like contradiction and no viola t ion of a 
pr inciple of doxastic rationality. Thus i t is entirely legitimate, fo r a l l Katzof f and 
Shoemaker show, that cri t ically reflecting on one's beliefs be considered an 
epistemic duty , i n a sense where one w o u l d be b lameworthy fo r no t abiding by 
i t , and therefore that the deontological conception of epistemic just i f icat ion can 
coherently be based on indirect doxastic voluntar ism. 
So w h a t about the regress problem? A n e f for t to block this regress can 
motivate one to appeal to wha t has been called "vi r tue epistemology". I do not 
th ink that talk of epistemic v i r tue can solve this problem, however (and I w i l l 
show h o w i n sections 3.3 and 3.4), so I w i l l n o w attempt a reply w h i c h does not 
reply on v i r tue epistemology. A n easy way (and similar to that w h i c h is invoked 
by those w h o appeal to v i r tue epistemology) to block the regress is to c la im that 
the second order belief is not required to be jus t i f ied ( f r o m the deontic 
conception), but, rather, required to be true, so that no fur ther (or " third-order") 
behef is required to jus t i fy the second-order belief. Hence no regress ensues. I 
th ink there is a good counter-reply to this claim, however: isn ' t i t somewhat ad 
hoc to require that higher-level beliefs be true (as opposed to just i f ied) i n order 
only to block a threat of regress? Wha t difference is there between higher-level 
and lower-level beliefs that makes higher-level beliefs subject to such strict 
requirements, where lower-level ones are not? I do not see an adequate answer 
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to these questions. But perhaps the trouble arises f r o m mak ing any sort of 
requirement on second-order beHefs, and perhaps an available opt ion for a 
proponent of the deontic conception is to deny that such beliefs are subject to any 
requirement at all. I t m igh t be the case that f i rs t and second order beliefs can 
come apart, but they ought not to, and perhaps doing what that ought requires is 
the only proper object of an epistemic requirement. Given wha t I believe, I 
believe about m y beliefs I am culpable, where there is a divergence between m y 
higher and lower level belief, for not taking the steps necessary to curb that 
divergence and, by extension, I am culpable for having the lower-level belief that 
I do. There may be cases of third-order beliefs that are at odds w i t h second-order 
behefs, and here w e may also say there is an epistemic requirement to make 
congruous the beliefs at the t w o levels; there may also be cases where a subject's 
higher-order belief is not explicit bu t at odds w i t h a lower-level belief, again we 
may say that there is a requirement for the subject to take the steps necessary to 
r i d themselves of the tension since they believe "deep d o w n " that there is one. 
Beliefs are not subject to epistemic requirements only when a subject really does 
not have a higher-level belief about i t , since i n that case no tension w o u l d exist 
between a higher-level and a lower-level belief. This gives us independent 
mot iva t ion for mak ing the claim that the highest-level beliefs are just not subject 
to epistemic requirements and gives us r o o m for a deontic conception based on 
indirect doxastic voluntar ism that does not generate a regress. 
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We may object that the room afforded here is too "thin"27. " T h i n " because 
i t applies to too f e w beliefs, i.e. only those that are contradicted by a higher-order 
belief. I suggest, however, that we ho ld more beliefs that are so contradicted 
than may be apparent, part icularly i f we consider that many higher-level beliefs 
are not explici t to us or are buried "deep d o w n " and that we are epistemically 
accountable for an incongruence between such beliefs and our lower-level 
beliefs. We may n o w ask: is there then an epistemic du ty for us to take 
cognizance of wha t our higher-level beliefs are? Wel l there certainly is i f there is 
very high-level belief about the status of some of our second-order beliefs, such 
as: I believe that I believe that p, but I have not come to realize that 1 believe that 
p. But w h a t about second-order beliefs that we ho ld bu t do not realize we hold , 
and fo r w h i c h w e do not have an accompanying higher-level belief? Where does 
the du ty to make them explicit come f r o m , since i t cannot come f r o m a 
divergence i n levels of beUef? 1 th ink i t can come out of the " t h i n " (this t ime l ike 
i n Wil l iams's mora l use^^) epistemic du ty to jus t i fy one's beliefs where one is a 
truth-seeker qua rational being, and the deontic conception of epistemic 
just i f icat ion is going to stipulate that one cannot be jus t i f ied unless one has 
critically reflected upon one's beliefs. So i f a second-order belief remains "h idden" 
after such critical reflection, then one has not really reflected crit ically on one's 
belief and one has no t done one's epistemic duty, the belief is then unjus t i f ied 
Not in Bernard Williams' sense of a "thin moral concept or property". 
"Thick" epistemic duties, such as checking one's sources or running a control experiment where 
jippropriate, emerge from this thin duty. 
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(even i f based on sound evidence and is true). There is a greater w o r r y the 
deontic conception based on indirect volvmtarism this way round , however. I f 
we remove the need for higher-order beliefs to be subject to any requirements, 
then i t seems that there is a tension between epistemic justification's deontic 
dimension and its connection w i t l i t ru th . As Als ton remarks, w e may be jus t i f ied 
under this conception but s t i l l be " i n a poor posit ion to get at t r u t h " (Als ton 1989 
(b), p. 144): a l l t l iat the deontological conception demands n o w is that a subject's 
lower-order and higher-order beliefs cohere, and since there is no guarantee that 
our second-order behefs are not w i l d l y off the mark, our being jus t i f ied is no t 
going to secure fo r us a greater chance of our believing truths and avoiding 
falsehoods. However , a l though i t looks l ike this complaint is of particular 
discomfort here, because we have eschewed any requirement for higher-order 
beliefs, i t is directed at any deontological conception. So fo r the rest of this 
chapter 1 w i l l evaluate the other candidate responses to the vo luntar i sm prob lem 
and tackle Alston's second complaint i n Part 2. 
3.3 The Appeal to Epistemic Virtues. 
A presently quite popular w a y of cashing out h o w we can be held 
accountable for wha t we believe is i n terms of whether or no t we are being 
epistemically virtuous. For m y present purposes I shall focus on Montmarquet 's 
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fo rmula t ion of this^^, as he explici t ly addresses the issues I wan t to deal w i t h . 
C i t i ng Aristotle, Montmarquet argues that to be moral ly vir tuous, a subject needs 
to do v i r tuous things: a saint is not a saint unless he does saintly things; 
conversely a coward is not a coward unless he does cowardly things. Further, 
Montmarquet continues, we have control over exercising our virtues and 
control l ing our vices and we should treat epistemic v i r tue i n the same w a y w e 
treat mora l vir tue: 
Thus one can exhibit intellectual courage, or moral courage, by t ry ing to 
exhibi t such a trait; or by t ry ing to exhibit some more general normative t rai t 
(such as t r y i n g "to arrive at t r u t h " or "to do wha t is r ight") ; or s imply by 
t r y i n g to carry out some more particular goal such as "standing one's 
g round" (physically or intellectually). (Montmarquet 1992, p . 336) 
The no t ion of epistemic vi r tue can serve tlie deontological conception by 
making this l ink : an epistemically vi r tuous person w i l l believe responsibly and 
so they w i l l be free f r o m just reproach - the un-vir tuous person w i l l be 
epistemically irresponsible and thus blameworthy. Impor tan t ly fo r 
Montmarquet , g rounding the deontic conception of epistemic just i f icat ion on 
epistemic v i r tue circumvents the regress problem he raised w i t h basing such a 
conception on indirect doxastic voluntar ism. So i f the Holocaust denier were to 
reply to someone w h o accused them of being intellectually irresponsible: " I 
believe that I have sufficiently exemplif ied the epistemic v i r tue of checking out 
al l the available evidence", they w o u l d be begging the question. For, " i n a given 
Though there are many, many others that could be cited here, to cite but three see Code 1987 Hookway 
1994, and Zagzebski 1996. Not all virtue epistemology is associated with the deontological conception, see 
Kstzofir 2001. 
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circumstance, a certain level of effort , eitlier intellectual or moral , may r igh t ly be 
expected of one. The fact that one d i d not see t l ie need for such ef for t may itself 
s imply reflect that one was not exercising that e f for t i n the f i r s t place" 
(Montmarquet 1992, pp . 336-337). The vicious regress we saw ensue by basing 
the deontic conception on indirect doxastic voluntar ism is curbed here as no 
higher-level belief can jus t i fy the Holocaust non-believer's belief i f they are 
fa i l ing to pay regard to salient available evidence (if they are displaying an 
epistemic vice) because i n this case we are asking whether he is epistemically 
vir tuous, that he believes he is so, s imply compounds the fact that he is not. 
However , a l though coupl ing the deontic conception w i t h v i r tue epistemology 
blocks this regress, the real issue at stake for the deontic conception is whether i t 
violates the m a x i m "ought implies can". I do not th ink that the appeal to 
epistemic vir tue can answer this charge and I w i l l n o w t ry to show w h y . 
There very we l l may be certain "h igh" virtues to w h i c h we just ly do not 
ho ld each other accountable. For instance, w e just ly do no t reproach someone for 
not hav ing a photographic memory or for not being quick at arithmetic, and w e 
probably do not do so because the possession of these virtues is outside (at least 
to some extent) our contioPO. Consequently, i f ought implies can, the deontic 
conception c u m vi r tue epistemology needs to concern itself not w i t h these 
"h igh" virtues bu t w i t h those virtues possession of w h i c h is under our control. 
For instance take the epistemic v i r tue of believing on the basis of appropriate 
Although we may have different epistemic expectations of people who do possess such qualities. 
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evidence, w e can jus t ly reproach someone for not believing o n the basis of such 
evidence because, for the most part, this is a v i r tue most people are able to attain 
- thus the 'ought implies can" tenet is not violated. 
N o w , under the present rubric, we can just ly ho ld people Like the denier 
of the Holocaust epistemically accovmtable for not believing on the basis of 
adequate evidence (or believing on inadequate evidence) and we can do so 
w i t h o u t s l ipp ing in to a vicious regress. This is because whether or not the denier 
of the Holocaust is able to appreciate the need to check upon the relevant 
evidence is a matter of whether or not he possesses this vir tue: i f he does not he 
is blameworthy, i f he does he is. However , w h i c h v i r tue is i t that he is 
b lamewor thy for not possessing? Surely, i t is the v i r tue of being capable of seeing 
the need to seek fur ther evidence - and this is a different v i r tue to that of merely 
believing on the basis of appropriate evidence. Further, though i t is the case that 
the Holocaust denier is i n control over whether they exhibited the v i r tue of 
hav ing conducted the relevant evidential checks upon their beUef, i t is not 
obviously the case that they are i n control over whether they appreciated the 
need to exhibi t such a vir tue. We are thus ho ld ing someone blameworthy for not 
possessing a v i r tue they are not at l iberty to possess - this violates the "ought 
implies can" maxim. Yet we need to ho ld them blameworthy i f we are to block a 
regress f r o m ensuing. So the appeal, on the deontologist's part, to epistemic 
virtues is either as problematic as the appeal to indirect doxastic vol tmtar ism, or, 
i t becomes inconsistent w i t h the idea that responsibiHty requires control. I f ought 
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implies can, then the appeal to epistemic virtue does little to further the 
deontological conception's plausibility. Of course there may well be other 
suitable motivations for taking a virtue epistemology approach. I w i l l not, 
however, explore them here. 
3,4 The Denial that Epistemic Responsibilit}/ Requires Control. 
So far I have argued that there is no plausible way of formulating the 
deontological conception without violating the "ought implies can" maxim; the 
deontological conception claims that epistemic justification is a notion essentially 
concerned wi th whether a subject is behaving in an epistemically responsible 
way and such responsibility implies that we have control over what we believe. 
We clearly do not possess direct control over what we believe and the appeal to 
indirect control, or to our epistemic virtues, is also highly problematic. If what 
has been said so far is correct, then the only way for the deontological conception 
to remain tenable is to deny that, in epistemology at least, ought implies can. In 
other words, one must hold that epistemic responsibility and doxastic 
involuntarism are i n fact consistent - and thus hold that whether or not doxastic 
voluntarism is true is irrelevant to the tenability of the deontic conception. 
David Owens (Owens 2000) and Richard Feldman (Feldman 1988, 2000) have 
argued just such a case, I w i l l now evaluate how plausible i t is. 
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Like Montmarquet, Owens' theory turns on a distinction between epistemic 
virtue and epistemic vice^i. The deontological conception can be formulated f rom 
this: a subject is justified in beUeving that p just in case that subject is beheving 
responsibly, where beheving responsibly entails exhibiting epistemic virtue. 
Beheving responsibly (and thereby exhibiting epistemic virtue) renders the 
subject free f rom just reproach, while believing irresponsibly (and thereby 
exhibiting epistemic vice) renders a subject blameworthy. As such, following 
Aristotle, Owens claims that we have a duty to cultivate our virtues. For 
instance, discussing the virtue of temperance, Owens writes: 
I can cultivate temperance by persistent self-restraint, attending anger-
management classes and so forth. My irascibihty won't instantly disappear 
but, on this view, I am not to blame for that; my responsibility is to try to 
cultivate a cool temper. If I am to blame for anything, it is for omitting to try. 
(Owens 2000, p. 118) 
We could, then, perhaps accuse the Holocaust denier of being epistemically 
irresponsible for omitting to see that they need to base their belief on more 
appropriate evidence - but what if they had already tried their best? Owens asks 
us to consider a similar case in which two people suffer f rom road rage. In an 
attempt to deal wi th their road rage, both people attend anger-management 
classes and do relaxation exercises i n a car simulator wi th the same level of 
commitment. However, the therapy works much better for one person than i t 
does for the other. The person for whom the therapy did not work (who we 
assume has pressing commitments that mean he must continue driving) 
" Though Montmarquet, unlike Owens and Feldman, does.not deny that ought impli es can. 
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continues to be a danger on the road. According to Owens, we continue to hold 
this angry driver responsible even though he has done his best to suppress his 
rage32: "Here one's reproaches would be tempered by a knowledge of my efforts 
at self-improvement, but one should hardly cease to blame me" (Owens 2000, p. 
118). From this Owens concludes that "the idea that responsibiUty requires 
control must itself be called into question" (Owens 2000, p. 120). 
Likewise Richard Feldman (Feldman 1988, 2000) also denies that 
responsibility always requires control. According to Feldman there are certain 
roles or positions f rom which responsibilities derive: "Teachers ought to explain 
things clearly. Parents ought to take care of their kids. Cyclists ought to move in 
various ways. Incompetent teachers, incapable parents, and vmtrained cyclists 
may be imable to do what they ought to do" (Feldman 2000, p. 248). For 
Feldman, just because these people are incapable of fu l f i l l ing certain 
responsibilities, because of their position, we should not deny that those 
responsibilities still exist for them. Further, we should treat our position as 
believers in a similar fashion: 
we form beliefs in response to our experiences in the world. Anyone 
engaged in this activity ought to do i t right,. .it is plausible to say that the 
role of a believer is not one that we have any choice about taking on. It is 
our plight to be beUevers. We ought to do i t right. It doesn't matter that in 
some cases we are unable to do so. (Feldman 2000, p. 248) 
Thus, qua beHevers, we have epistemic responsibihties that are binding for us 
even when we are unable to meet them - cind so we should deny that ought 
In perhaps the same way we would continue to hold the Holocaust denier responsible for their belief. 
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always implies can. However, is Feldman really giving us good reason for 
denying the ought implies can principle? I think Feldman is guilty of making a 
mis-analogy here. Is our position as believers relevantly similar to tlie position of 
teachers, parents and cyclists? In some ways perhaps, but there seems to be one 
salient difference: i t is in one's power not to have chosen to be i n any of those 
positions - i f I choose to be a teacher then there are obligations I ought to fu l f i l l , 
i f I can't f u l f i l l them then I ought not to be a teacher. We justly blame teachers 
who do not f u l f i l l their obligations as teachers because they have control over 
whether or not they remain in that profession, bad parents because they could 
have chosen not to have children, bad cycHsts because they could have walked. 
I t is not clear that these cases are examples in which responsibility does not 
require control. Being a beUever (especially if doxastic involuntarism is true) is 
not something we can choose not to be, as Feldman himself points out, thus i f 
there are epistemic obhgations on us qua believers that we are unable to fu l f i l l , 
then there has been a breech of the ought implies principle. However, we are not 
provided by Feldman with any good reason why we ought to deny this 
principle: we cannot appeal to our intuitions concerning the obligations of 
parenthood, pedagogy, or cycling, for example, because i t is not clear that the 
obligations that emerge from these activities are examples of obligations that do 
not require control. To deny the ought implies can principle all we have here is 
the existence of epistemic obligations that do not require control, but we cannot 
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appeal to them because the existence of those obligations is the very thing we are 
trying to ascertain. 
David Owens provides a more lengthy accovmt of why we should give up 
the principle that ought always implies can which I shall now evaluate. 
According to Owens the intuition that responsibility requires control can be 
explained away by making a distinction between epistemic virtues and epistemic 
talents and, further, tiiat "we can build a theory of responsibility on this very 
distinction" (Owens 2000, p. 123). This is how the distinction is made: we can ask 
whether somebody is estimable in a certain respect. We can ask whether they are, 
for example, a good dancer, a good drinker, a good skier, a good Nazi, etc. The 
answer to this question wi l l not tell us how estimable a person is as such: i t w i l l 
only tell us how good a person is in a certain respect. We might, then, also ask 
how good a person is tout court, qua person - whether they have a particular talent 
(such as being unspeakably good at skiing) w i l l not answer this question. This, 
says Owens, "is why we blame people for vice but not for lack of talent. My 
personal merit is my responsibiUty in a way that nothing else is" (Owens 2000, p. 
122). This explains why sometimes (but not always) we do not feel that we 
should blame someone if what they have done was outside their contiol. 
Now, for Owens, the same distinction applies to epistemic virtues and 
talents. Whereas my possession of an epistemic virtue can be used to assess 
whether I am good qua person, epistemic talents cannot. Owens offers the 
example of gullibility as an epistemic vice. Someone is gullible, for example, i f 
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they beheve that in 2028 a comet w i l l coUide on the earth, destroying us all, on 
the basis of what they have read in the National Enquirer. That person may not be 
in control of their gullibility but we would still (according to Owens) rightly hold 
them blameworthy, and so epistemically irresponsible, for having the belief they 
do, "my gullibility means that 1 can't be an esteemed human being" (Owens 
2000, p. 124). Conversely (and importantly), intelligence is not, for Owens, an 
epistemic virtue but an epistemic talent: one is not culpable for being "unable to 
think up a certain hypothesis, or grasp a complex argument, or recall something 
someone said yesterday", because "epistemic talent is about identifying and 
retaining reasons for belief; epistemic virtue is about being suitably responsive to 
those reasons" (Owens, p. 125). Being epistemically virtuous is to be wise and: 
"Wisdom is perfectly consistent wi th intellectual mediocrity" (Owens 2000, p. 
125). 
To sum up Owens' view, there seems to be a conflict between our 
intuitions: sometimes we feel that a subject is epistemically blameworthy even 
though they possessed no control over what they believed; sometimes we feel 
that a subject should not be held responsible for beUeving a proposition if they 
could not help believing it. According to Owens, basing a notion of epistemic 
responsibihty on the virtue/talent distinction accommodates both intuitions - i t 
explains why sometimes (and not always) we feel that someone should not be 
blamed for something they had no control over. Thus, we should reject tlie claim 
that responsibiUty always requires control, for sometimes i t does not. Tlie 
deontological conception based on this distinction then makes sense. Justified 
beliefs are beliefs the bearer of which is free f rom just reproach in believing, 
where we interpret a subject being "free f rom just reproach in beUeving" as 
exhibiting epistemic virtue (not necessarily talent) and/or not exhibiting 
epistemic vice, thereby believing in a responsible manner. Unjustified beHefs are 
those the believer of which is not free from just reproach in believing, where we 
interpret a subject "not free f rom just reproach in believing" as exhibiting 
epistemic vice (though they may exhibit epistemic talent, but certainly not 
epistemic virtue) and so believing in an irresponsible manner. 
Now, although these considerations show, perhaps, how the 
deontological conception and doxastic involuntarism are not inconsistent they do 
not give us good reason for either adopting a deontological conception or 
abandoning the ought imphes can principle. Within the deontological 
conception, the denial of the principle that responsibility requires control might 
make sense, but i f we are given no good reason to abandon the principle 
independently of defending the deontological conception, we have reason to 
consider the tension problematic. So has Owens given us good reason to abandon 
the principle that ought imphes can? Take the case of the gullible reader of the 
National Enquirer who on the basis of what they have read believes that the world 
w i l l come to an end in 2028. Are they worthy of just reproach, even though they 
have done all they could to curb their gulhbility? According to Owens they are, 
not because i t is a lack of talent they are failing to exhibit but because they are 
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exhibiting an epistemic vice, and exhibiting vice is always worthy of just 
reproach. Thus, for Owens, ought does not imply can because in this case a 
subject is blameworthy although they were not in control over what they 
believed. Further, to call the subject blameworthy in this case is not counter-
intuitive because the virtue/talent distinction has taken the place of the principle 
that responsibility requires control. 
However, someone who does not already defend the deontological 
conception (and who accepts the ought implies can principle) may reply that the 
gullible person is not blameworthy for the beUef they had no control over; i f they 
are blameworthy for anything at all, i t is the actions (which they have control 
over) they might take according to their beUef (neglect of their family 
responsibilities to prepare for the comet's collision, for example). How would 
Owens persuade someone who does not defend a deontological conception? He 
could try to do so by pointing out that in this case, the subject had displayed an 
epistenuc vice, so should be held blameworthy. This fact is not going to persuade 
them to abandon the ought implies can principle, however. For what motivated 
the story about epistemic responsibiUty being based on the virtue/talent 
distinction was the fact that we should hold the gullible person responsible - but 
what makes Owens say this is the now presupposed virtue/talent distinction. So 
without already wanting to hold the gullible person responsible, no reason can be 
given to abandon the ought implies can principle. To the person who does not 
defend the deontological conception, Owens' reasons for abandoning the claim 
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that responsibility requires contiol are going to seem somewhat question-
begging (i.e. not independent of the wish to abandon that ought implies can). 
If the deontic conception and the principle that ought implies can are 
indeed in tension, the question is: how are we going to treat this tension? I t 
seems that the only option available to a proponent of the deontological 
conception is to reject the principle that ought implies can, and as Feldman and 
Owens show, there is nothing incoherent about doing so within the framework 
of a deontological conception. However, because we have to assume the 
deontological conception in order for us to be comfortable wi th rejecting the 
principle that ought implies can, the rejection of the principle is available to the 
opponent of the deontic conception as a reason for not accepting such a 
conception. We are thus left with a dilemma, either we eschew our intuition 
concerning the principle that ought implies can, or we jettison our intuition that 
the correct way to talk about epistemic justification is in deontological terms. To 
ascertain the deontic conception's tenability we thus have to weigh up our 
intuitions, vis-a-vis the ought implies can principle and the idea that the correct 
way to talk about epistemic justification is in deontological terms, in favor of the 
deontological conception. Although I make no substantive conclusion on the 
matter, the latter seems as likely or as unlikely as weighing up our intuitions 
against the deontological conception. 
3.5 Conclusion to Chapter 3 
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In this chapter I have evaluated some responses to Alston's criticism of the 
deontological conception of epistemic justification, that i t is in some way 
committed to doxastic voltmtarism, and that this makes i t violate the principle 
that ought implies can. There are two options open to a holder of the 
deontological conception, one can either try to base the conception on indirect 
doxastic voluntarism or deny that the principle responsibility requires control. 
Both options are not without their problems; if one bases the deontological 
conception on indirect volimtarism one faces the threat of spinning into a 
regress; the other option forces us to give up a pretty intuitive principle in order 
to hold that involuntarism is compatible wi th our being subject to epistemic 
duties. I have argued that appeals to epistemic virtue are tmsuccessful in 
reneging the regress problem and have suggested that giving up the principle 
that ought imphes can is too much of a f ly in the ointment. I have argued that 
although Owen's response is partly successful, it is still problematic. Although 
there are means available to the holder of the deontic conception to explain away 
the ought implies can principle, they only make sense if the deontic conception is 
already assumed -this means that if we do not already subscribe to the deontic 
conception we can rightly consider the rejection of ought implies can as a 
problem for such a conception of epistemic justification. So i t looks as though we 
have to go for, if we want to hold the deontological conception, basing the 
conception on indirect voltmtarism where we deny that there can be any 
epistemic requirements on our higher-level beliefs. Whilst this strategy sidesteps 
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the regress problem, i t seems particularly vulnerable to Alston's second 
complaint that a conception of epistemic justification of this i lk would be very 
much at odds wi th epistemic justification's special relationship to truth. The next 
part of this thesis offers an attempt to understand exactly what that relationship 
is, and how it might affect our trying to define epistemic justification as a 
deontological concept. 
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PART TWO; 
The "Truth Connection" 
Chapter 4: The Problem 
4.1 Preliminaries 
In this thesis 1 am trying to work out what exactly i t would mean to say 
that epistemic justification involves appraisals about oWigation. In Part 1,1 made 
a distinction between merely evaluative and deontological normative concepts. I 
also, however, had some reservations as to whether deontological justification 
could not be consistent wi th a merely evaluative conception. Deontologism 
stipulates that to be epistemically justified is to have done one's epistemic duty; 
but since deontologism does not stipulate what the content of that duty is (i.e. 
whether i t is an objective or subjective duty), and because, as I argued, we are 
only blameworthy for not meeting our subjective duties, then a deontological 
conception can be a merely evaluative one. This is because it would be consistent 
with deontologism to hold that only objective duties are relevant in determining 
whether one has epistemic justification. This also means that deontologism, on its 
own, does not imply internalism. When I talk about "deontologism", I do not 
mean i t in the sense above, but rather in the sense in which failing to do one's 
duty does render one blameworthy, and so identifies an obligation. William 
Alston criticizes the deontological conception on the grounds tiiat i t is 
committed, because of the tenet that ought impUes can, to doxastic voluntarism 
(which he claims is false). He does so on the grounds that the deontological 
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conception impHes our having epistemic obligations or duties the failure to comply 
with, which would result in our being blameworthy, and we can only be justly 
blamed for something we have control over. So Alston's meaning of the term 
"deontologism" is the same as mine here. Nevertheless, we must add the caveat 
that Alston's criticism fails to vitiate all of deontologism, even if Alston is right 
about the impossibility of our having epistemic obligations. The proper target of 
Alston's criticism is then really our having obligations and duties for which we 
are blameworthy for violating (hence the home of the principle that ought 
implies can). 
In Part 1, I also evaluated Alston's argument concerning doxastic 
voluntarism and I argued that the only way for the deontological conception to 
deal wi th i t is to appeal to indirect doxastic voluntarism. However, as we saw, 
the appeal to indirect forms of volimtarism suffers f rom a threat of an ensuing 
vicious regress, since we now need to tell a story about how our higher-order 
beliefs come to be justified - are these behefs under our control, and if not, are 
they not subject to epistemic obhgations? I argued that two options are open to 
the deontological conception: either demand that our higher-level beliefs are true, 
or deny that we can make any demand on such beliefs. I argued that the latter 
option is the more viable, or at least less ad hoc and more consistent wi th the 
theoretical climate the deontic conception. There is a "thin" epistemic duty to 
critically reflect upon all our beliefs (higher-order and lower-order), and do our 
best to bring our higher-order behefs into line with our lower-order ones, doing 
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this w i l l entail our having "thicker" duties to, where appropriate, seek more 
evidence, check for logical consistency etc. etc. We thus escape spinning into a 
regress, since we do not make any demand on our highest-order beliefs (when 
they are in fact our highest-order beUefs) except to critically reflect on them, i.e. 
bring them into consciousness when they conflict wi th their lower-level objects. 
Taking this strategy might make us especially vulnerable to the second objection 
Alston raises against the deontological conception: that fu l f i l l ing what can 
reasonably be expected of one wi th respect to one's beliefs can still mean being in 
a very "poor position to get at truth". Because the very aim of epistemic 
justification is to get us in a good position to get at truth, being epistemically 
justified cannot consist in our ful f i l l ing epistemic obHgations without violating 
the very reason why we bother being in the business of justifying our beliefs. Or 
as Alston puts it, the deontological conception 
...fails to capture what we are looking for in epistemology imder the rubric 
of "justification", when we are looking for something i n the 
neighbourhood of "being in a favourable position in believing that p", 
favourable f rom the standpoint of the aim at believing the true and 
avoiding the false. (Alston 1989, p. 149) 
I w i l l attempt to defend the deontological conception f rom this attack. Doing so, 
however, w i l l require us to re-think radically what epistemic justification is all 
about, how so w i l l be discussed in chapters 5 and 6. For now, a fairly recent 
debate between Mathias Steup and Paul Tidman featured in Analysis, 1 think w i l l 
help to frame the initial problem. 
4.2 Tidman vs. Steup 
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Mathias Steup has argued that we have an epistemic duty to f ind out 
whether or not what we believe is held on good grounds through critical 
reflection (Steup 1988), he later sums up his view as follows: 
(J) With regard to any proposition p I consider, I can f ind out through 
critical reflection (i.e., through examining my evidence wi th regard 
to p) whether 1 am, or I would be, justified in believing p. (Steup 
1996, p, 277) 
I agree wi th Steup that we do have a duty to critically reflect on our beliefs, but 1 
do not think a deontic conception requires that such critical reflection expose 
whether or not our beliefs are held on good grounds, but only that i t expose any 
incongruity between higher-level and lower-level beliefs: where there is de facto 
incongruity we have a duty to do the best we can to curb it, I w i l l say more about 
the difference between my view and Steup's in 4.3, but for now consider an 
objection to Steup's view raised by Paul Tidman (Tidman 1996). Tidman raises 
some putative counterexamples to (J) above, i.e. examples where "even after 
critical reflection we may be unable to see the significance of the evidence we 
possess" (Tidman 1996, p. 271). Tidman presents us wi th four types of such 
cases. The first involves instances where two or more people are unequally 
capable at critical reflection. Here Tidman asks us to consider the example of 
Watson and Holmes; isn't Holmes better than Watson at critical reflection? 
Holmes can understand the significance of the evidence he possesses, i.e. he can 
see what beliefs the evidence would warrant, where Watson sometimes cannot. 
"Many of us resemble Watson more than Holmes" (Tidman 1996, p. 271), so is i t 
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not plausible that even after critical reflection we sometimes have not come any 
closer to finding out whether or not we would be justified in believing that p7 
Tidman's second type of case involves episodes where we are unable to 
remember some piece of evidence that we have acquired. Suppose that that piece 
of evidence is crucial in determining whether or not a belief that p is justified. In 
some sense we "possess" the evidence, but because it is "locked away" in 
memory, we are unable to f ind out, through critical reflection, whether we are, or 
would be, justified in believing that p. Tidman's third type of case consists of 
people who possess evidence that they overlook in the process of critical 
reflection, and his fourth consists of episodes where people misevaluate their 
evidence upon critical reflection: someone who takes themselves to be 
remembering something that they take to be a piece of evidence when in fact 
their memory is faulty, for example. The second, third, and fourth types of cases 
may be subsumable under the first, since they may be constitutive of what is 
involved in being poor at critical reflection, but nevertheless they serve as 
counter-examples to the view that I can f ind out through critical reflection 
whether or not my belief is justified. 
Now, how vitiating these counterexamples are depends on how internalist 
an interpretation of (J) we have. If we go for a very internalist reading of (J) 
which stipulates that we can always and only determine whether or not our beliefs 
are or would be justified by reflection, then the counterexamples obviously 
contradict (J). However, as Steup formulates (J), we can read i t as merely 
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stipulating tiiat we can sometimes f ind out whether our beUefs are, or would be, 
justified by critical reflection - so under this reading, Tidman's counter-examples 
do not vitiate (J), since they do not show tliat we can never find out whether or 
not our beliefs are, or would be, justified by critical reflection. Steup's reply to 
Tidman, however, does not reply on a particular interpretation of (J), so, if 
Steup's reply is successful, then Tidman's counter-examples may not force us to 
take a stand on how internalist we wish to view (J). 
Steup's reply consists in showing how Tidman's examples fail to accovmt 
for a difference between "an inability to figure out the facts of a case and an 
inability to assess what one is justified in believing about that case", and that " i t 
would be a mistake to think that the former kind of inability must coincide wi th 
the latter kind of inability" (Steup 1996, p. 280). Take the case of Watson and 
Holmes. It might be true that Holmes is better than Watson at critically reflecting 
on his beliefs, that does not mean that Watson is unable to find out whether his 
behefs are justified, "just like somebody who is less good at being honest than 
others can be honest" (Steup 1996, p. 278). Further, i t may well be the case that 
Holmes is a better detective than Watson and this might mean that Holmes w i l l 
more often be right (have tiue beliefs) about the crimes he and Watson 
investigate. However, this does not rule out that, as Steup points out, "the beliefs 
Watson forms during their investigations, though frequently false, might just as 
often be justified as Holmes's" (Steup 1996, p. 278). Steup's point is that the 
ability to form true beliefs is not the same as the ability to acquire justified beliefs 
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- Watson could then have as many justified behefs as does Holmes concerning 
their latent investigations, even though Holmes owns a lot more true beliefs 
about them. 
Imagine that Holmes and Watson are on a case where a new piece of 
evidence, the significance of which only Holmes's brilliant investigative mind 
can discern, is revealed. Watson does not see the real significance of this piece of 
evidence and continues to hold on to his own theory about the case. Is Watson 
justified in continuing to believe his theory? According to Steup he is, providing 
he really is cognitively imable to see the cormection. Watson has done all that he 
could have done wi th respect to his belief, and, further, it is perfectly plausible to 
have justified/fl/se beliefs. Steup apphes this strategy to deal wi th Tidman's other 
type of alleged coimter-example: if we genuinely cannot recall a piece of saHent 
information, then we are justified in believing something which pays no 
credence to i t - if we can really recall it, then i t is in fact discernable on reflection; 
i f we overlook an item of evidence in the process of critical reflection then we 
either "possess" that piece in a way that is accessible by critical reflection in 
which case i t is not true that no amount of critical reflection can fix the problem, 
or it is not accessible to us, in which case we are justified in believing 
propositions not informed by that piece of evidence. When we misevaluate 
evidence then, that we committed such a misevaluation is either accessible to us 
by critical reflection, or i t is genuinely not accessible (and so we would be 
justified in believing on the basis of a misevaluation). 
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It should now be pretty apparent, as Steup himself admits, that his defence is, 
after all, built on internalist premises. Firstly, the defence requires that only 
accessible evidence is relevant in ascribing justification, where "accessible 
evidence" is taken to mean "accessible to me on reflection". Steup, however, 
does not see this as a weakness since he considers internalism "a venerable 
epistemological approach wi th good credentials" (Steup 1996, p. 277). Of course, 
many philosophers disagree with Steup on this matter, but perhaps i t would be a 
little question-begging to cite externalism as a foil to reject (J). There is a second 
way in which I think Steup assumes an "internalist" approach, though he does 
not make this assumption explicit. That is to assume it plausible that "truth" and 
"justification" can come apart, i.e. that i t is coherent for a subject to have a 
justified false belief that p. Perhaps, since only the most extreme externalist 
would deny this possibility, it is unfair to label this assumption necessarily 
"internalist". However, Steup's counter-argument relies on the idea that one 
cannot consider items of evidence outside the "control" of, or accessibility to, 
relevant in determining a subject's justification in believing that p, so although 
this might not render Steup's account strictly internalist, i t does seem to suggest 
that he has in mind a deontological conception of epistemic justification since 
talk of "control" invites application of the principle that ought implies can, which 
in turn invites talk of our having obligations. Now, although 1 think Steup's 
response dispatches Tidman's alleged coimter-examples to (J), i t brings to the 
fore another more prominent problem (as suggested by Alston). Steup himself 
94 
admits tliat critical reflection can fail "to uncover that what 1 believe is false" and 
that "this is a shortcoming all right, but not the kind of shortcoming that turns a 
case into a counterexample to (J)". So although Steup is successful in discarding 
Tidman's putative counter-examples, we are still faced wi th a "shortcoming" for 
the deontological conception, i.e. that ful f i l l ing our epistemic obUgations can 
nonetheless leave us in dire straits when i t comes to achieving the aim of 
believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. 
4.3 Critical Reflection 
In order to sharpen up the problem I am going to discuss some cases 
developed by Michael Bishop which claim to show how one can beheve 
irresponsibly but reliably (i.e. fail to do abide by one's epistemic duty but by so 
doing be in a better position to believe the truth). I ' l l discuss these in 4.4, before 
doing so, however, I would briefly like to point out how my strategy vis-a-vis 
critical reflection differs f rom Steup's. As I have already mentioned, the most 
f ru i t fu l strategy to take in order to deal wi th Alston's first objection concerning 
doxastic voluntarism is to appeal to the possibility of indirect forms of control 
over beliefs. However, as we saw, and as Alston complains, we now have to face 
the issue of how second-order beUefs are justified in a way that is neither ad hoc 
nor threatens a regress to ensue. Steup's strategy is to claim that we have an 
epistemic duty to critically reflect on our beUefs and by doing so, and only by 
doing so (there is the internalist component), can we determine whether we are 
justified in holding those beHefs. Tlie problem is that we cannot reasonably be 
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expected to critically reflect on our beliefs all the time, so when can it reasonably 
be expected of one to do so? Steup's strategy invites the answer that i t is 
expected when our higher-order beliefs mandate it, i.e. when S believes that S 
should reflect on S's belief that p. How do we know if that higher-level belief is 
justified? Steup's answer is that we can do so merely by reflecting on it. Tliat is 
fine as far as i t goes (at least i t is not ad hoc since i t does not posit different 
requirements for different levels of belief), but i t does not answer the question of 
when i t is a requirement for us to reflect on those higher-order beliefs, and citing 
further higher-order beliefs anyway invites a regress. 
My stiategy aims to overcome this problem by agreeing wi th Steup that 
we have a thin epistemic duty to reflect on our beliefs johen there is a prima facie 
conflict hetiveen S's first-order and higher-order beliefs. This answers the question of 
when we can reasonably be expected to critically reflect on our beliefs and is 
neither ad hoc nor does it threaten a regress. It also has the added advantage, I 
think, in being neutral with respect to internalism: critical reflection, and only 
critical reflection, can expose genuine divergence between higher-order and 
lower-order belief, but because it is a thin duty, thick duties may emerge f rom i t 
depending on the situation, such as; "check your evidence once again", "conduct 
further experiments", "consult reliable authorities" etc. In such cases what 
determines whether one's belief turns out to be justified may not always be 
determined by reflection alone. However, this stiategy is at least as problematic 
as Steup's wi th regard to Alston's second objection; i f we make no requirements 
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on our second-order behefs other than their being in tune with our lower-order 
ones, then there is no guarantee that ful f i l l ing our epistemic obligations is going 
to get us closer to a situation that is in any way more favourable wi th respect to 
believing truths and avoiding falsehoods than, had we jettisoned believing in 
accord wi th our epistemic obligations. 
4.4 Consilience Failures 
Externalist theories of epistemic justification have faced the complaint that 
a subject's beHef could be the product of a reliable belief-forming mechanism and 
yet that subject be systematically in a poor position to get at truth^^: a properly 
fimctioning epistemic agent Uving in a world puppeteered by an evil genius 
might f ind themselves in such a predicament, for example. Micheal Bishop (2000) 
presents an argument against intemalism on this score by way of tu quoque, i.e. 
that one may be epistemically justified in internalist terms in believing that p, but 
yet be systematically in a poor position to believe p just in case p is true. He calls 
such a situation a "consilience failure". He aims to add force to his examples of 
consilience failure by presenting them in real world scenarios as opposed to 
scenarios that "require powerful evil demons, perfectly reliable clairvoyants, 
epistemically serendipitous brain lesions, and other creatures quirky and 
contiived" (Bishop 2000, p. 181). 
Bishop starts out by formulating two central ideas that have dominated 
what contemporary analytic epistemology takes the concept of epistemic 
" For example see Foley 1983, 1985. 
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responsibility to consist of. Before I cite those, 1 think i t is worth pointing out that 
an epistemically responsible agent is, for Bishop, one that has fulfi l led their 
epistemic obligations, it is not flie claim that such an agent is responsible for their 
beUefs34. Analogously, we can take "he's a responsible father" to mean that the 
father has behaved in the ways that being a father requires, and not to mean that 
he is responsible for being a father. We thus do not need to adjust Bishop's 
vocabulary too much to consider his argument with respect to what I have been 
calling the deontological conception of epistemic justification. The two central 
ideas, then, he claims are: 
(V) To be epistemically responsible is to display in one's reasoning the 
virtue (or virtues) epistemic internalists take to be cential to 
warrant or justification, e.g. coherence, having good reasons, fit t ing 
the evidence. (Bishop 2000, p. 180) 
(C) In normal (non-skeptical) circumstances and in the long run, being 
more epistemically responsible tends to lead to more reliable 
judgements. The more responsible a reasoning strategy, the more 
rehable it w i l l tend to be, and the most responsible strategy w i l l 
typically be the most reliable. (Bishop 2000, p. 182) 
Having identified these two cential ideas. Bishop's stiategy turns to formulating 
examples where no reasoning strategy is "responsible" according to both (V) and 
(C). The upshot of considering these examples, he claims, is that for a variety of 
real-world reasoning problems, eiflier (V) or (C) must be abandoned. Bishop 
concludes that (V) should be abandoned: "For the sake of consilience, we must 
smother our inclination to attend to good reasons, to attend to f i t wi th evidence. 
Though, of course, the two claims are intimately related. 
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to attend to coherence" (Bishop 2000, p. 203). Further, if one abandons (V) the 
notion of epistemic responsibility is exhausted by (C), "being epistemically 
responsible would involve nothing other than employing reliable belief-forming 
procedures" (Bishop 2000, p. 205), and this seems to make externafism tiie more 
attractive theory of epistemic justification. 
The examples used by Bishop to show that there are cases where no 
reasoning strategy can satisfy both (V) and (C) centie on imiversity gate-keeping 
problems, i.e. what is the best stiategy for picking out the best students when 
faced wi th himdreds of applications and limited places? One may think that the 
best strategy would be to have a panel of professors wi th lots of experience in 
gate-keeping and have them read through the appHcations and perhaps 
interview some of the applicants. Not so, argues Bishop, pointing us in the 
direction of a scientific study by Paul Meehl (Meehl 1954). Meehl makes a 
distinction between clinical and actuarial prediction, clinical prediction is the sort 
that might be made by human experts (such as a panel of Professors), actuarial 
prediction is a mechanical statistical procedure. One can use actuarial 
predication as a tool for recruiting undergraduates by simply giving certain 
factors (such a student's GPA) a score and then applying them to an equation. 
According to Meehl's study, actuarial predication always results in more accurate 
predications than does clinical predication, i.e. by using the actuarial method one 
can more reliably predict which students are going to do well at university than 
you can by relying on the predications of experts. The example seems to show 
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that there can be better ways of achieving (C) than using the methods prescribed 
by (V). Nevertheless, because using the actuarial method is pretty labour-
intensive - i t requires "access to lots of data, a good statistician and a computer" 
(Bishop 2000, p. 185) - using clinical prediction may continue to be the most 
reasonable strategy to take for those involved in gate-keeping situations. 
However, claims Bishop, employing the actuarial method need not be that labour 
intensive since we can use improper models to predict student performance. One 
can do this by "simply adding each students' high school rank (out of 100) to 
their test score rank (out of 100) and then predicting that the candidates wi th the 
highest totals w i l l be the best students". Meehl's empirical results, claims Bishop, 
suggest that this "irresponsible" stiategy w i l l always outperform the 
conventional (in keeping wi th internalism), labour-intensive stiategy involving 
professors on a panel. These results seem curious, but they are explained by the 
"Flat Maximum Principle" used in statistics. Without going into statistical 
technicalities, the Flat Maximum Principle implies that for problems of social 
predication improper models are about as rehable as proper models and so 
"since humans do considerably worse than proper models, it follows that 
improper models w i l l outperform humans too" (Bishop 2000, p. 187). 
This scenario shows, according to Bishop, how sometimes being lazy is the 
best strategy to take in order to achieve reliability. Bishop also gives us another 
example that shows how being ignorant can sometimes be the most reUable 
strategy to take. According to results by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (Goldstein 
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and Gigerenzer 1999), when U.S. students were asked to answer which of the 
cities of San Diego or San Antonio had the largest population, they answered 
correctly only 62 per cent of the time. German students, on the other hand, 
answered the same question correctly 100 percent of the time and "even if we 
grant the superiority of German education, it's hard to believe German students 
know more about U.S. geography than do U.S. students" (Bishop 2000, p. 194) 
(further, U.S. students were also better at picking out larger German cities than 
German students were). Goldstein and Gigerenzer call this the less is more effect, 
for Bishop this effect demonstiates that under certain circumstances less 
knowledge can yield more reliabiUty, and is yet another case where being 
irresponsible systematically leads to more reliable judgements. Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer explain the less is more effect by recourse to what they call the 
recognition heuristic, i.e. the students, when they did not recognise one of the 
cities, assigned higher value (according to the criteria) to the city they did 
recognize - so German students correctly picked out San Diego as the city wi th 
the higher population because they did not recognise 'San Antonio'. The less is 
more effect works when the recognition validity is greater than the knowledge 
validity. So infers Bishop, there are times when "too much learnin' can be a bad 
thing". 
Bishop's stiategy is to use these results to nudge us in the direction of 
defining epistemic responsibility in externalist terms, since being responsible in 
an internaUst sense can result in our having irresponsible but reliable belief-
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forming stiategies (and responsible but unreliable beHef-forming stiategies), i.e. i t 
can result in our having systematic consilience failure. So, he concludes, "for the 
sake of consilience, we must smother our need to attend to good reasons, to 
attend to fit wi th evidence, to attend to coherence" (Bishop 2000, p. 203). Now, 
although I accept that these examples, interesting as they are, show that we can 
have epistemically lucky belief forming strategies, I do not think that they tell 
against the internalist view of responsibility. A l l they show is that the externalist 
is not the only view of epistemic justification that has to deal wi th the 
phenomenon of epistemic luck. In that sense they level out the burden of proof: a 
tu quoque argument never refutes its opponent. Precisely because these strategies 
are lucki/, we cannot say that (V) and (C) are always systemcatically at odds wi th 
each other - although we can say that sometimes they are systematically at odds 
with each otiier - so i t may continue to be the case that in the long run, being 
more epistemically responsible (in the internalist sense) is going to yield more 
reliable judgements even though there are times where it w i l l systemicatically fail 
to do so. That responsible believing in an internalist sense can at times 
systematically fail to guarantee reliability, does not refute the contention that the 
most responsible stiategy tends to be the most reliable: even i f there are times 
when an irresponsible stiategy is the more reliable stiategy, employing the 
irresponsible stiategy in the long run (i.e. on most other situations) w i l l be less 
reliable than employing the responsible stiategy. At the very least. Bishop's 
argument tiades on an ambiguity in the phrase " in the long run" since there is a 
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difference between demanding that continued employment of a responsible 
strategy to solve a particular problem wi l l in the long run be more reliable, and 
demanding that employing responsible strategies w i l l in most situations (i.e. " in 
the long run") be the most reliable beUef forming strategy. There is nothing in (C) 
or (V) that blocks the internaUst from demanding only the latter. 
Further, even if we accept that Bishop's argument succeeds in showing 
how (V) and (C) are systematically at odds, i t is hard to see how an "externalist" 
replacement is going to be a view about epistemic responsibility. In order to block 
Bishop's examples as counting as counter-examples to a view about what 
epistemic responsibility is, we would have to define an epistemically responsible 
stiategy as that which is always the more reliable. But making this move raises 
the question of what work the notion of responsibihty now does: i f a responsible 
belief forming stiategy is always the more reliable one why bother demanding 
that the stiategy be responsible and not merely reliable? And if we accept that an 
internaUst accoimt views reliability as its goal (i.e. takes (C) on board) then why 
is this view externalist except for its denial that responsible believing is of any 
importance? Surely, then, if Bishop's argument against an internalist conception 
of responsibility goes tlirough then it goes through against any conception of 
epistemic responsibility^^ - internaHst or externalist. If the notion of epistemic 
responsibility is a deontological and not merely evaluative notion, then this once 
That is not to say, however, that internalism and "responsibilism" are necessarily linked. 
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again shows that the correct target of this type of consideration is deontological 
conception construed as involving appraisals of obligation, and not internalism. 
4.5 Alston's Version of the Problem 
I now want to move on to discuss Alston's version of the "consilience 
problem". I ' l l argue that although Alston's formulation of the problem is more 
persuasive that Bishop's, i t shares the feature that i t is properly an argument 
against the deontological conception as I have construed it, not its ostensive 
targets: all of deontologism (i.e. including deontologism that is consistent wi th a 
merely evaluative conception) and internalism. Alston (Alston 1989 (a) and (b)) 
offers us two types of example where "one may be deontologically justified in a 
belief without forming the belief in a truth-conductive way" (Alston 1989 (b), p. 
145), the first are cases of "cultural isolation" and the second cases of "cognitive 
deficiency". Let's look at the cultural isolation case first. 
Alston asks us to consider a subject S who has, all their lives, lived in an 
isolated primitive community. The community has certain entrenched traditions 
that nobody living in that community questions. The content of those traditions 
is embedded in events in distant time and space about which S (and the other 
members of S's tiibe) has no possible way of obtaining any independent 
evidence. These traditions form a very important role in the communal life of the 
tribe and S has never encountered anyone who has questioned those traditions 
and the implied folklore of the tiibe. We could add to Alston's example that there 
is no way that S can escape from the tiibe - the inhabitants of Easter Island were 
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in such a predicament during the period when the west had not discovered the 
island, and when its inhabitants had cut down all the tiees on the island thereby 
making it impossible to make a raft necessary for escape. Hence evidence against 
the folklore of their tiadition is inaccessible. According to Alston, the beliefs that 
S forms on the basis are in no way culpable, since S has failed to do anything S 
could reasonably expected to do, S's beliefs "about, for example, the origins of 
the tiibe stem from what, as far as he can see, are the best grounds one could 
have for such beUefs" (Alston 1989 (b), p. 145). However, suppose, asks Alston, 
that the traditions have not been formed in a way that makes them a reliable 
indication of their tiuth: S would then be deontologically justified, but not 
believing in a way conductive to tiuth. 
The second case Alston considers, a case of "cognitive deficiency", 
involves a university student who "doesn't have what i t takes to follow abstract 
philosophical exposition or reasoning" (Alston 1989 (b), p. 146). The student 
comes to read book four of Locke's Essay, and upon reading i t the student comes 
to think that Locke's view is that everything is a matter of opinion. The student is 
just "cognitively" incapable of seeing the difference between the latter and the 
view that one's knowledge is restticted to one's own ideas, and, further, there is 
nothing that he could do that would lead the student to appreciate the difference. 
No amount of re-reading the text or consulting with their lecturers w i l l help 
them appreciate the difference. So, argues Alston, we cannot hold that student 
culpable for having the belief about Locke that they do, so we must consider them 
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justified from a deontological point of view, even though the belief is terribly i l l -
grounded "based as i t is on the student's dim-witted impressions of Locke" 
(Alston 1989 (b), p. 147). So once again, he have an example that demonstiates 
that there can be a gulf between deontological justification and the truth 
conductive character of epistemic justification. 
Mathias Steup (Steup 1988) objects that subject S, or the student above, 
cannot really be said to be justified under the deontological conception. As 1 
indicated in 4.2, for Steup, we have a duty as rational agents to critically reflect 
on our beUefs and upon critical reflection we can find out whether our beUefs are 
based on good grounds or not: 
No matter how grim the circumstances are, i f an agent holds a belief 
contrary to evidence, i t is within his power, given that he is a rational 
agent, to reflect upon his beUef and thereby to f ind out that he had better 
withhold it, or even assent to its negation. Being a rational agent, I would 
say, involves the capacity to f ind out, wi th respect to any behef, whether 
or not it is being held on good grounds. (Steup 1988, p. 78) 
So if S's beliefs are not based on good grotmds, it means that S has not critically 
reflected on their beliefs and thereby has not done their epistemic duty and so 
cannot be said to be justified f rom a deontological point of view. Likewise, the 
student of Locke is capable and has a duty to ask themselves "Do I understand 
Locke's Essay well enough to be justified in assenting to this interpretation?" 
(Steup 1988, p. 80). Had they asked themselves the question, they would have, 
according to Steup, realised that they had not got good grounds for having the 
belief they did about Locke and so we cannot grant the lousy student of Locke 
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deontological justification; they could be reasonably expected to do more, they 
did not meet their epistemic requirements. 
With regard to the cultural isolation case, Alston replies that Steup is 
"displaying an insensitivity to cultural differences" (Alston 1989 (b), p. 146). 
According to Alston, Steup presupposes that judgements about adequacy of 
grounds are going to be uniform across cultures. Alston denies this 
presupposition, claiming that "what can reasonably expected of a subject wi th 
respect to, for instance, critical examination of beliefs and their bases w i l l differ 
across cultures" (Alston 1989 (b), p. 146). This is not to advocate some sort of 
cultural relativism, however, since i t does not entail the claim that what is in fact 
adequate evidence varies from culture to culture. The claim is rather, that 
deontological justification has to take on board cultural differences because i t 
depends, because ought implies can, on what can reasonably be expected of a 
subject, and this w i l l sometimes be influenced by what one's cultural inheritance 
is, "but truth conductivity does not so depend. Hence they can diverge" (Alston 
1989 (b), p. 146). 
Vis-^-vis the cognitive deficiency case, Alston replies that, although the 
student is indeed capable of asking themselves whether or not they understand 
Locke's essay well enough, asking themselves that question is not going to lead 
them to withhold assent. The student does ask themselves that question (answers 
i t in the affirmative) and continues, wi th confidence, to believe that their 
interpretation of Locke is the right one. Why should they deny it, since i t is based 
107 
upon multiple readings of Locke's seminal text? Now, 1 think the problem here 
consists in putting the debate in the terms of a debate between deontologism 
(and for Alston, thereby internalism) and externalism. Of course, if one is an 
internalist, then one is going to agree wi th Steup that the student's critically 
reflecting on their interpretation is going to be enough for him to determine 
whether or not he is in fact holding the interpretation on good groimds; the 
externalist is clearly going to deny this, so here we are in danger of this turning 
into a fruitless debate. 
As 1 see it, the proper target of Alston's cases is the deontological 
conception of epistemic justification, independent of any claims with regard to 
internalism or externalism. Everyone agrees that the student of Locke can ask 
himself whether or not their interpretation of Locke is held on good grounds, 
whether or not such asking w i l l be enough to tell them whether or not having 
such an interpretation is in fact held on good grounds is what is at issue in the 
debate between internalists and externalists. But that is not really the nub of the 
issue, what matters is zohen can we be expected to ask ourselves questions such 
as these (given that we cannot reasonably be expected to critically reflect upon 
our beliefs all the time)? As we saw earlier, there is something wrong wi th the 
answer: when our higher-level beliefs mandate i t - for perhaps the Locke 
student's higher level-beliefs do not mandate asking himself any questions. To 
keep them from being justified f rom on deontological conception, we would then 
have to say that they have failed to do their duty with regard to their higher-level 
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beliefs, but then i t is easy to see how a regress can ensue. (Note: this point goes 
through, or fails to, independently of the issue doxastic voluntarism of whatever 
version). M y solution to this problem, as outlined in 4.3, is to assign blame only 
when one's higher and lower order beliefs are in conflict. However, we still face 
the scenario where the Locke student's higher-order behefs sanction their lower-
order interpretation, so we still face a scenario where someone may be justified 
f rom a deontological point of view (being free f rom just reproach) but still be in a 
poor position wi th regard to truth. 
4.6 Summary/ of Chapter 4 
The scenarios dreamt up by Bishop and Alston do, then, pose a problem. 
We must be clear, however, what they pose a problem for. In this chapter 1 have 
suggested that the proper target of these concerns is, as I have outlined it, the 
deontological conception of epistemic justification. They do not have any real 
bearing on the internalism vs. externalism debate. Nor do they have any bearing 
on a deontological conception formulated in such a way as to be consistent wi th 
a merely evaluative one, in a way that w i l l allow S to have failed to contravene 
any epistemic norm relevant to beUeving that p, so be entitled to believe that p, 
and thereby be in a very good position to get at truth because the norms relevant 
prescribe precisely, because they are externalist in character, that S is in a good 
position to believe p i f true and disbelieve p i f false. I think, then, that the 
deontological conception (not construed in the latter fashion) must bite the bullet 
in the wake of Bishop's and Aston's cases and concede that under this conception 
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of epistemic justification, truth and justification can come apart. In the chapters 
that follow, however, 1 w i l l seek to demonstrate why this concession is not really 
so problematic, but doing so w i l l force us to rethink some of the ways in which 
epistemologists have been discussing epistemic normativity. 
Chapter 5; Responses to the Problem 
5.1 Introduction 
In the light of the "truth problem" - as outlmed in Chapter 4 - Alston 
recommends abandoning a normative conception of epistemic justification 
altogether an to opt, instead, for a merely evaluative one where "one can 
evaluate S's believing that p as good, favourable, desirable without thinking of i t 
as fu l f i l l ing or not violating an obUgation" (Alston 1989 (a), p. 97). In this chapter 
and the next I shall attempt to formulate a solution to the problem that w i l l 
hopefully serve as a coherent alternative to Alston's recommendation. In order to 
formulate my response, 1 w i l l first consider some further responses to (Feldman 
1988) and critiques of the problem as formulated by Alston (Vahid 1998). 1 w i l l 
also consider a related problem, termed "the responsibilism dilemma" by 
Stephen Hetherington (Hetherington 2002) and a reply to i t f rom Gordon Barnes 
(Barnes 2002). In this chapter I w i l l suggest that the replies f rom Barnes and 
Vahid, whilst not entirely successful, indicate a promising line of defence of the 
deontological conception. In the following chapter I w i l l attempt to develop this 
line wi th particular reference to Alston's recent "desiderata view" of epistemic 
appraisal (Alston 1993, 2005), and try to show that the defence's seemingly 
radical implications are not so coxmter-intuitive. 
5.2 Feldman on Objective and Subjective Justification 
Richard Feldman (Feldman 1988) argues that epistemic (unlike ethical) 
objective justification is equivalent to what he calls moderate subjective 
justification, he calls this the Equivalence Thesis. Here are the three relevant ways 
in which he claims someone may be justified in holding a beUef: 
Objective Justification: S is objectively justified in believing that 
p just in case S has good reasons to 
believe that p. 
Subjective Justification: S is subjectively justified in believing that 
p just in case S believes he has good 
reasons for believing that p. 
Moderate Subjective Justification: S is moderately subjectively justified in 
believing that p just in case he is 
objectively justified in believing that he 
has good reasons for believing that p. 
Making the analogy wi th action, he says: 
There can be actions that are subjectively justified, but not objectively 
justified. For similar reasons, actions can be objectively justified without 
being subjectively justified... I w i l l argue that objective and moderate 
subjective epistemic justification are not similarly related. (Feldman 1988, 
p. 415) 
Feldman regards cases like Alston's cultural isolation case as trying to show how 
(moderate) subjective justification and objective justification can systematically 
come apart. Feldman asks us to consider his own case of apparent "consilience 
failure"36: Imagine that a student is taught to make the Gambler's Fallacy (G) by 
their otherwise very reliable logic teacher. To believe (G) is to believe that i f a 
certain number on a die does not come up after a series of tosses, then the 
chances are that i t is going to come up on the next toss. The student rolls a die 
and comes to realise, after a series of tosses, that a particular number has failed to 
Although Feldman does not use this term. 
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show up (evidence E). On the basis of E and given their justified belief in G, the 
student forms the belief that there is a high likelihood of that nvunber coming up 
in their next toss (W). So, here there seems to be a case where S is (moderately) 
subjectively justified in believing that p, but in a poor position to beUeve the 
truth, or not objectively justified, since the belief is based on inadequate grounds. 
Feldman, however, disputes this is a genuine case of consilience failure, because 
i t is the student's total evidence (E*), and not just E, that should be assessed for 
adequacy. Since E* also includes the testimonial evidence that the student has for 
G, then, unlike E, E* is really a good grounds to believe W - so the belief is, after 
all, objectively justified. Feldman claims that this strategy can be used to show 
how every moderately subjectively justified belief is always also an objectively 
justified one. 
However, as Vahid (Vahid 1998) has pointed out, i t is rather difficult to 
see how this stiategy can lend credibility to the Equivalency Thesis. Firstly, 
consider the thesis of the underdetermination of theory by evidence the claim 
that, contrary to Hempel, confirmation is a "three-place relationship between 
hypothesis, observations, and background assumptions" (Vahid 1998, p. 294). If 
this last thought is right then E can be said to support W only in the context of 
some background theory, so whether or not E counts as adequate evidence for W 
is determined by whether or not the background theory (i.e. G) is itself 
adequately supported, "that is why we are inclined to say, wi th Feldman, that E 
is not a good reason for W" (Vahid 1998, p. 294). This is because were G itself to 
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be adequately supported then we xuould consider E as good reason for W, and the 
point is that replacing E wi th E* does not alter the evidential support for G, so E* 
is also not adequate grounds for W. Further, I continue to follow Vahid here, the 
situation is not remedied by appeal to the to the student's other beliefs and that 
W is deduced from them since "surely she is objectively justified in believing 
what she knows to follow by modus ponens f rom other things she is objectively 
justified in believing" (Feldman 1988, p. 416). There is no remedy here, argues 
Vahid, because for the argument to go through i t would have to take this form: 
(1) S is objectively justified in believing E 
(2) If S is objectively justified in believing E, then S is objectively 
justified in believing W 
So by, modus ponens, 
(3) S is objectively justified in beUeving W. 
Yet, as Vahid points out, premise (2) is not available to us. A l l we are entitled to 
is the premise that we are objectively justified in believing that i f E then W, and 
that is not the same premise as (2). From this premise and premise (1), no 
application of modus ponens can get us to (3) without use of the Principle of 
Closure (i.e. that if one is justified in believing that p, and p implies q, then one is 
also justified in believing that q). Vahid concludes that the principle of closure is 
so controversiaP'' as to discredit Feldman's argument. Perhaps Vahid's 
conclusion is too stiong (since it is not clear that the Principle of Closure is that 
" See for example Dretske 1970, Nozick 1981, Breuckner 1985, Feldman 1995. 
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contentious), but his considerations do, nevertheless, seem to volley the burden 
of proof back onto Feldman's court. They also seem to indicate the difficulty and 
potential fruitlessness of pursuing Feldman's Equivalence Thesis as an avenue of 
defence against Alston's problem. It is, of course, even more fruitless if 1 am right 
in considering the deontological conception consistent wi th either objective, 
subjective, or moderately subjective accotmts of epistemic justification (so its 
tenabiUty w i l l be assured or not independently of whether subjective and 
objective justification diverge). So 1 wi l l , instead, for the moment, pursue Vahid's 
own line of defence which 1 w i l l outline in the following section. 
5.3 Vahid on Alston 
Vahid (Vahid 1998) presents us with two different lines of defence for the 
deontological conception. The first is ingenious and well-worked out, but 
unfortunately, 1 don't think, ultimately works. The second is cursory and not 
much more than suggested, but I think is the more f ru i t fu l line to take. The first 
strategy involves looking at how Alston himself tries to formulate a 
deontological conception in a non-partisan way. A deontological conception has 
i t that to be justified in beUeving that p one has not flouted or contravened any 
epistemic norm. As I have already mentioned and Vahid notes, the content of 
these norms could be "construed in a number of different ways, requiring the 
formation of beHefs that, say, cohere with the rest of one's beUef system, that are 
produced by reliable cognitive processes and so on" (Vahid 1998, p. 287) and so 
is consistent wi th both externalist and internalist theories. Alston's alternative to 
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a deontological conception he calls evaluative, that alternative we can formulate 
as follows: 
(Je) S is Je in believing that p just in case S has adequate grounds for his 
belief "where the adequacy is measured by whether the grounds 
are sufficiently indicative of the tiuth ofp". (Vahid 1998, p. 288) 
For Alston to evaluate someone as being justified in believing that p, is just to say 
the they have done a "good thing" f rom an epistemic point of view, it is not to 
hold them in any way accotmtable, since "one can evaluate S's believing that p as 
good, favourable, desirable without thinking of i t as ful f i l l ing or not violating an 
obligation" (Alston 1989 (a), p. 97) and, of course, does not radically diverge f rom 
our proper epistemic aim to believe true propositions and avoid beUeving false 
ones. How does Alston characterise the deontological conception in a non-
partisan way? According to Vahid, Alston discerns three^^ modes in which i t 
could be cashed out, they are: 
(X) S is objectively justified in beHeving that p i f f S has adequate 
evidence for p. 
(XI) S is subjectively justified in beheving that p i f f S believes he has 
adequate evidence for p. 
(XII) S is cognitively justified in believing that p i f f S is justified in 
believing that he has adequate evidence for p. (Vahid 1998, p. 287) 
Alston rejects (X) as embodying deontological justification on the premise that 
deontological justification is essentially a concept about freedom from 
blameworthiness and this feature is lost in (X); he dismisses (XI) on the grounds 
In fact he says there are four, but I'm leaving the fourth, motivational version, out for the sake of 
simplicity and, anyway, Alston thinks it is subsumable under (XII) . 
that it makes i t too easy for one to be justified. So concludes Alston, (XII) best 
represents deontological justification. The problem, as Vahid sees it, is how to 
cash out what is involved in the justification of the higher-order belief, or as he 
puts it, "the sense in which 'justified' is used on the RHS of ' i f f ' " (Vahid 1998, p. 
289). Or, rather, the problem is that Alston himself cashes i t out in his own ]e. So 
deontological justification turns out for Alston to be something like: 
DJ: S is deontologically justified in believing that p just in case S is Je in 
believing that he has adequate evidence for p. 
The trouble according to Vahid is that (a) this definition does not seem all that 
deontological anymore, and more importantly (b) rules out case like Alston's 
"cultural isolation" and "cognitive deficiency" case (see Chapter 4) as cases 
where a subject is granted deontological justification. This is because in neither 
of the two cases are the subject's higher level beliefs about the adequacy of their 
grotmds as a matter of fact adequate. Defining deontological justification in the 
marmer above then renders i t "no longer relevant whether or not the cognizer is 
to blame for failing to discover the adequacy of the reasons for p" (Vahid 1998, p. 
291). So if there is a consilience failure in tiiese cases i t is not due to defining 
epistemic justification in deontic terms but f rom the common acknowledgement 
that justification does not guarantee truth since " i t follows that S can be ]e in 
believing that his evidence for p is adequate, thus satisfying the RHS of the 
definition, and yet the evidence be in fact inadequate" (Vahid 1998, p. 291). So 
Alston's cases merely illustrate cases of consiHence failure, they do not reveal the 
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source of the discrepancy between justification and truth as somehow 
inextricably linked to the deontological conception. 
However, although these considerations show that tliere is a problem with 
the way Alston sets up his target, I think they are unsuccessful in showing that 
cases of consilence failure do not pose a problem (specifically)) for the 
deontological conception. Vahid seems to think that Alston's "oscillations" f rom 
the voluntarism problem and the consilience problem as "symptomatic of the 
deeper problem of how exactly the distinction between deontic and nondeontic 
conceptions of justification should be drawn, and how to express the underlying 
intuitions" (Vahid 1998, p. 296). But 1 do not think the problems are as separate 
as all that, making Alston's oscillations understandable. The problem concerning 
doxastic voluntarism showed us just how difficult it is to make demands on our 
higher-level beliefs. If the proper mode of deontological justification is the 
cognitive mode (XII), then the demand on the higher level belief cannot itself be 
couched in the cognitive mode without inviting a vicious regress. Nevertheless, 
as 1 already mentioned in Chapter 3, there is something at best inconsistent about 
a deontic conception that is merely evaluative with respect to higher-level beliefs. 
But as 1 suggested, perhaps the best way for the deontological conception to go is 
to steer clear f rom making any justificationary demands on higher-order beliefs 
outside their co-inciding wi th those at a lower-level. This, again as 1 highlighted 
in Chapter 4, makes cases of consilience failure especially problematic, for there 
is no guarantee that a consistent set of beliefs is any more likely to yield truth 
than a maximally inconsistent one. 
Nevertheless, Vahid suggests anotiier line of defence to take against 
the problem of consilience failure. A l l that Alston shows is that one can be 
deontologically justified without being ]e. This can only tell against the 
deontological conception if, and only if, believing on adequate, truth-conducive 
grounds is an essential feature of epistemic justification. And i t does seem like i t is 
this feature that regulates Alston's critique since deontological justification, as he 
puts it: 
...fails to capture what we are looking for in epistemology under the rubric 
of "justification", when we are looking for something in the 
neighbourhood of "being in a favourable position in believing that p", 
favourable f rom the standpoint of the aim at believing the true and 
avoiding the false. (Alston 1989 (b), p. 149) 
As Vahid points out, however, the premise that believing on tiuth-conducive 
grounds is an essential feature of epistemic justification, has only been assumed 
and this fails to give a fair hearing to the deontological conception: 
If the problem is to adjudicate between deontological and tiuth-
conductive conceptions of justification, then by taking truth conducivity to 
be an essential feature of epistemic justification we have already identified 
the winning side. (Vahid 1998, p. 296) 
If we fail to make the consilience assumption, tiien, argues Vahid, what Alston's 
arguments seem to suggest is some sort of "tolerant pluralism in justification 
theory". There appears to be something right about the claim that our concept of 
what epistemic justification should take into account the tiuth conducivity of our 
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grounds of belief, but there seems to be something equally right about our being 
subject to certain epistemic obligations, so that: 
In epistemology, too, perhaps we should resign ourselves to working wi th 
distinct interpretations of its key concept, in much the same way that it 
has been suggested we should also proceed with respect to the key 
concept of such multifaceted disciplines as probability theory. (Vahid 
1998, p. 298) 
Alston does, later (Alston 2005), argue that truth-conducivity is the core feature of 
the epistemic and I w i l l evaluate his arguments for this claim in due course. 
Meanwhile I am now going to try to further the case for pluralism about 
epistemic justification as well as see what i t might look like. To do so I am going 
to look at what Stephen Hetherington has called the "responsibilism dilemma" 
(Hetherington 2002, p. 399). 
5.4 The Responsibilism Dilemma 
Hetlierington asks: "might epistemic justification be, to some substantive 
extent, a function of epistemic responsibility - a belief's being formed, or its 
being maintained, in an epistemically responsible way? (Hetherington 2002, p. 
398) It seems that if we are minded to have a deontological conception of 
epistemic justification, we need to answer "yes" to that question, but, argues 
Hetherington, once we tiy to work out exactly what the notion of epistemic 
responsibility consists in we find a dilemma which "reveals how fundamentally 
misaligned are the concepts of epistemic responsibility and epistemic 
justification" (Hetherington 2002, p. 403). Hetherington begins to formulate what 
he calls "the responsibilism dilemma" by making a distinction between 
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responsibility-for and responsibility-in. Making an analogy wi th ethics, we 
would say that a person could be morally responsible for performing an action 
without being morally responsible in performing it. For example, we would say 
that a murderer was responsible for committing the atiocities he did and tiiat he 
was not acting in a responsible manner. Similarly, mutatis mutandis, because being 
epistemically justified entails positive appraisal, being epistemically responsible 
for believing that p cannot entail being justified in (or being responsible in) 
holding that belief. Responsibility-for is thus only a necessary, and not sufficient, 
condition for epistemic justification, since responsibility, so understood, is a 
matter of control irrespective of whether or not that control is exercised well or 
badly. So, fairly trivially, we have the first horn of Hetherington's dilemma: 
RespDl To the extent that epistemic responsibility-for is not strong enough 
to be epistemic responsibility-in, i t is too weak to constitute the 
presence of epistemic justification. (Hetherington 2002, p. 400) 
The second horn of Hetherington's dilemma is less trivial. Again to make 
the analogy wi th ethics, moral responsibility is usually held to involve the 
principle of alternate possibilities, which we can recast in terms of belief as 
follows: 
PAPB A person is epistemically responsible for his forming a specific 
belief, only if (in the same circumstances as he is in prior to forming 
that belief) he could have done other to form it. (Hetherington 2002, 
p. 401) 
121 
Now, to avoid the first horn of the dilemma and paint responsibility-for in a 
strong enough fashion to be sufficient for epistemic responsibility-in, we need to 
make PAPB into PAPB*: 
PAPB* A person is epistemically responsible in his forming a specify belief, 
only i f (in the same circumstances as he is in prior to forming that 
belief) he could have done otherwise. (Hetherington 2002, p. 402 my 
italics) 
Note that neither PAPB or PAPB* entail doxastic voluntarism, or at least not 
direct doxastic voluntarism, since each merely demands that one have some 
freedom of doxastic action or outcome and not that one can choose freely what 
one believes. More importantly, endorsing PAPB* "has dire consequences for 
responsibiUsm" (Hetherington 2002, p. 402), because an agent who was perfectly 
rational could not be epistemically responsible in having the beliefs they do, 
since they could not have done otherwise tlian form their beliefs in a perfectly 
rational way. Yet i t is exactly tlaose kind of believers who, we would want to say, 
embody what i t is to be epistemically justified. The notion of epistemic 
responsibility is thus too strong. So we get the second horn of the dilemma: 
RespD2 To the extent that epistemic-responsibility-for is strong enough to 
be epistemic-responsibihty-in, i t is too strong to constitute the 
presence of epistemic justification. (Hetherington 2002, p. 401) 
Either epistemic-responsibility-for is not strong enough to constitute epistemic 
responsibility-in, in which case i t is too weak for epistemic justification, or else 
epistemic-responsibility-for is strong enough to be epistemic-responsibility-in. 
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but in that case i t w i l l be too stiong for epistemic justification. So we are in a 
bind as to how to formulate responsibilism. 
For my present purposes 1 am not all that interested in the dilemma 
formulated here in itself, but, rather, what is taken to be a reply to it. Gordon 
Barnes (Barnes 2002) makes two replies to Hetherington, the first 1 think is 
uninteresting and is raised only to be rejected by Barnes himself. The second 1 
think fruitful and interesting, and chimes in wi th Vahid's suggested pluralism 
about justification. The first reply brought up by Barnes is to concede to 
Hetherington that responsibility (for) is not a necessary condition for being 
justified, but that i t is a necessary condition for being unjustified, and, further, 
that one is justified just in case one is not unjustified. So a perfectly rational 
being, such as God, would after all be justified in holding their beliefs since they 
are not unjustified in holding them. However, as Barnes himself notes, the reply 
is unsuccessful since making this caveat fails to rule-in clearly unjustified beUefs. 
For example, someone who could not do otherwise but form their beliefs in an 
irrational way, could not be said to be unjustified when they formed their 
irrational belief that p at t. So then responsibility cannot be a condition for being 
unjustified either. 
1 am not that sure that this first reply is quite so bad. Do our intuitions so 
stiongly point us in the direction of saying that the man who could not reason 
otherwise was unjustified in his belief? And, further, is there any sense in which 
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our intuitions point us in the direction of saying that the perfectly rational 
believer is somehow beyond the scope of justification, "no more than we would 
say tliat a calculator was justified in its display, or a thermometer justified in its 
reading" (Barnes 2002, p. 418)? But there is the rub of Barnes' next reply, for even 
granting Hetherington's intuitions to say 'no' to both of the above, i t would not 
mean, argues Barnes, that responsibilism is thereby false: "perhaps an essentially 
rational being would be justified in some sense of that term, but not in another, 
equally important sense" (Barnes 2002, p. 418). And it might, further, be the other 
sense that the responsibilist is concerned about. The strategy is then to deny that 
typically epistemic terms such as "knows" or "is justified in believing" are 
strictly vmivocal, and that 
speakers use such terms to express many and various properties in 
various contexts. If this is correct then we can reconcile responsibilism 
wi th the intuition that an essentially perfectly rational being would be 
"justified" in some sense of that term. (Barnes 2002, p. 418) 
So Barnes' conclusion here resembles that of Vahid in positing some sort of 
pluralism about justification, i.e. that there could be various ways in which one 
could be said to have epistemic justification, and that neither one is the way in 
which justification should be characterised. This strategy is useful in avoiding 
the responsibilism dilemma as well as circumventing the problem of consilience 
failure for the deontological conception, since satisfying the demands made by 
consilience are "desiderata" for only one, not any more fundamental, way of 
construing what epistemic justification is all about. As i t stands here, the strategy 
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seems a little ad hoc, as no independent motivation (besides circumventing 
problems) has not been provided. William Alston has, in his most recent work 
(Alston 1993, 2005), provided some arguments for a similar view about 
justification that he calls the "epistemic desiderata" view. So in the next section 
of this chapter I w i l l try to motivate the view by citing his arguments for it. 
However, Alston also argues that even taking a pluralist view about justification 
does not remedy the situation for the deontologist^^. I w i l l argue against this 
being the case in the chapter which follows but concede that some alterations 
about the way we take epistemic justification to be a deontological concept need 
to be made. 
5.5 "Epistemic Desiderata" 
Recently Alston has argued (Alston 1993, 2005) that "we should abandon 
the idea that there is something or other properly called 'epistemic justification'" 
(Alston 1993, p. 527) and that there is no one essential property that picks out 
what i t is for someone to have epistemic justification. Alston picks out six 
different candidates for what would constitute a necessary condition for 
justification, all of which, he argues, should at best be construed as "desiderata", 
and all the opponents of which no not deny are necessary conditions for 
knowledge. They are: (1) The basing relation (the idea that for a belief to be 
justified i t is necessary for that belief not simply to be appropriately grounded, 
but that i t be grounded/or me by that appropriate ground); (2) Truth-conducivity 
" Note that Alston only brings in this extra feature in Alston 2005, it does not figure in Alston 1993. 
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(the demand that the basis of a belief be actually indicative of the truth of that 
beUef for i t to count as being justified); (3) Cognitive accessibility (a subject must 
be aware of v^hat is justifying his belief if he is to have epistemic justification); (4) 
Higher-level requirements (the demand that S's higher level belief about the 
status of his belief that p be justified for S to be justified in beheving that /?); (5) 
Coherence (for S to be justified in believing that p, S's belief that p must cohere 
wi th a total system of beliefs that itself exhibits a high degree of coherence); (6) 
Satisfying intellectual obligations (S is justified just in case S has satisfied their 
intellectual obligations^o) (Alston 1993, p. 528 - 533). 
So, according to Alston, given that there is so much varience among what 
differing epistemologists take to be the central concept of epistemic justification, 
it seems imlikely that there is enough commonality in the different parties' pre-
theoretical understanding of the phenomenon under consideration, 
i t seems, rather, that they are highUghting, emphasizing, "pushing" 
different concepts, all called 'justification'. It seems...that they are 
selecting different epistemic desiderata, or packages thereof, as deserving 
of the honorific title 'justification'. (Alston 1993, p. 534) 
If that is the case then when there are disputes about what constitutes epistemic 
justification, none of (1) - (6) can be deployed in an attempt to specify what the 
debate is about without begging the question against one another. No wonder 
debates wi th regard to, for example, externalist vs. internalism, responsibilism 
vs. reliabilism, coherentism vs. foundationalism seem to persist. However, 
'° Alston 1993 cites the exercise of an intellectual virtue under (6) as an allied idea, Alston 2005 presents 
such an exercise as a stand alone desiderata see Alston 2005, p. 20. 
126 
although the "the persistence of these disputes leads to the suspicion that there is 
no unique common item concerning the nature of which people are disagreeing" 
(Alston 1993, p. 532), the mere persistence of these issues does not establish the 
lack of a common element about which the debates are about. We need some 
further arguments to estabUsh this. Alston's sti'ategy is to accept that it is possible 
that we may share a common concept without being able to formulate a common 
definition, but that, nevertheless, we "want some reason for thinking that a 
single concept is, indeed, shared" (Alston 1993, p. 537). So the argumentative 
strategy now turns to denying those reasons that could be given for thinking that 
there is, or need to be, a shared concept. 
The first reason Alston raises that could be taken to indicate the need for a 
shared concept is that the 'epistemic point of view' is usually defined in terms of 
the aim at maximising truth and avoiding falsehood. This cannot, however, 
argues Alston, serve to pick identify what is distinctive about epistemic 
justification because there are many desirable features of a belief that may not 
contribute to achieving that end, this follows from the fact that "true beUefs can 
be imjustified and, false beliefs can be justified" (Alston 1993, p. 535). 
Maximising truth and avoiding falsehood is indeed a desirable property for a 
belief to have but, as has already been pointed out, all of (1) - (6) pick out 
desirable properties and none of them can be enlisted, without begging the 
question, to describe what is being allegedly discussed. 
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The second way an epistemologist might try to identify the distinctive 
feature of epistemic justification is to define i t as that which turns true belief into 
knowledge. Or, more precisely, to define justification as that component that 
would turn true beKef into knowledge in a way that deals with those notorious 
Gettier cases^i. However, argues Alston, this definition does not really serve to 
pick out the proper way to think about justification in a neutral way because 
different theories about what justification is, recognise different criteria for what 
counts as justification, "and should i t turn out that what turns true beUef into 
knowledge does not recognize those constraints they would not recognize i t as 
justification" (Alston 1993, p. 536). Suppose a reliabilist comes up wi th a way of 
understanding justification (in a suitably reliabilist fashion) that very 
convincingly turns true belief into knowledge in a way that circumvents Gettier 
problems, so convincingly in fact that the internalist is also convinced. Would the 
internalist then identify epistemic justification with reliability? Not, according to 
Alston, "unless he undergoes a drastic philosophical personality change" (Alston 
1993, p. 536), since the 'justification' in question would not possess the qualities 
the internalist saw as necessary for epistemic justification. What the internalist 
would infer f rom this scenario, suggests Alston, is that they were mistaken in 
thinking that i t is justification that turns tiue belief into knowledge, not that 
justification must be couched in reliabilist terms. Of course, the internalist may 
not in fact make this last inference, but the point is that i t would be legitimate for 
i.e. those cases that demonstrate that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. 
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them to do so. So trying to determine what is distinctive about justification by 
appeal to that which turns true belief into knowledge fails. 
Again, however, all these considerations show is that we carmot 
independently formulate what the common concept of justification might be, 
they do not show that one is not as a matter of fact shared. Are there not, for 
example, paradigm cases that all epistemologists take as exemplars of 
justification and non-justification? There may be, but, argues Alston, what 
differing sides take as the hallmark of justification w i l l " deeply infect" how they 
view the particular exemplar. For example, internalists w i l l view the beliefs a 
subject has in a Cartesian evil genius world as the same beliefs that are justified 
in a normal world. The externalist w i l l view the scenario in the opposite way. 
Consider once again Hetherington's example of a perfectly rational believer - our 
intuitions regarding what we take as justification's core feature w i l l determine 
whether we intuit the believer within or without the realm of justification. 
Alston does not wish to deny that there may be a large body of cases that 
everyone agrees on, but argues that "there are quite different ways of 
extiapolating from these cases to other cases. And so, on this way of construing 
concepts, these different patterns of extrapolating from the paradigms would 
determine different concepts" (Alston 1993, p. 537). 
5.6 Concluding Remarks to Chapter 5 
The upshot of all these considerations, concludes Alston, is that what look 
like different opinions about what is required for the application of the common 
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concept of justification are really different selections of epistemic desiderata, 
none of which completely capture the essence of what epistemic justification 
consists in. Why? Because there is, really, no one thing that could do that. 
Ironically then, Alston seems, in the end, to answer his own charge against the 
deontological conception in coming up wi t i i a position akin to Vahid's "tolerant 
pluralism" - if (6) the fulf i l l ing of epistemic obligations is a different desideratum 
to that of (2) tiuth conducivity, then i t looks like it is question begging to deny (6) 
in terms of its failure by (2). We must, however, keep in mind two reservations: 
firstly that what we are calling 'justification' here has altered, so the 
deontological conception of epistemic justification has not remained unchanged. 
Secondly, now that the goal of acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false ones has 
been severed f rom that of abiding by one's epistemic obligations, we must ask 
what exactly i t is that makes these obligations particularly epistemic. In the end, 
Alston's position is not as "tolerant" as is first presented, as I shall show in the 
next chapter, and i t is the deontologist's failure to answer this last question that 
motivates Alston, in his latest book, to raise "serious questions as to the viability 
of deontological desiderata" (Alston 2005, p. 58). In the following chapter I 
discuss these reservations further and I wi l l argue against Alston's claim that 
deontological desiderata are not viable, doing so, however, w i l l require a close 
look at what it is we call epistemic. 
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Chapter 6: Epistemic Right and Good 
6.1 The Persistence of the "Truth Problem" 
A t the end of Chapter 5 i t was proposed that, as a response to the problem 
of consilience failures for the deontological conception, we take a sort of pluraUst 
line about epistemic justification. The claim is that there is no one unique concept 
that captures the essence of what epistemic justification is about, and that the 
different demands made on what i t takes for epistemic agents to be justified 
(such as coherence, cognitive accessibility, truth conductivity, and the satisfying 
of epistemic obligations) are best viewed as different "desiderata" (being 
conflated wi th the term "justification") each valuable f rom the epistemic point of 
view. However, again as was suggested at the end of Chapter 5, this is not 
strictly speaking a defence of the deontological conception of epistemic 
justification, since what is now being countenanced is the rejection of the viability 
of talk of justification. This considerably weakens the purchase of the deontic 
conception as i t is now applicable only in a particular epistemic domain. Further, 
because these differing demands are viewed as epistemic desiderata, there is 
another sense in which the response is just a palliative for the deontological 
conception in that, because we have severed the goal of truth conductivity f rom 
that of fu l f i l l ing our epistemic obligations, the deontic conception now faces the 
question of what precisely is epistemic about those obligations we are supposed 
to abide by. In this Chapter, I make some considerations as to what i t is to say 
that something is epistemic, and consider the repercussions of this on the 
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deontological conception. 1 w i l l suggest that "epistemic" obligations, under a the 
deontic conception, are best viewed as categorical imperatives and suggest that 
although the problem of identifying the epistemic is a problem at the level of 
obUgations (deontological level), it is not a problem at the level of reasons 
(evaluative level). In the chapters which follow, I w i l l further develop how 
keeping this distinction in mind, amongst some other considerations, abrogates 
the problem of identifying the epistemic for the deontological conception. 
6.2 Saying 'Epistemic' 
I t seems intuitive to say that epistemic justification is independent of, or at 
least different to, other sorts of justification (say ethical, or practical 
justification)'*2. So what is it that renders justification particularly epistemic? To 
confer epistemic justification on S's believing that p is to appraise S's beHeving 
that p, positively f rom an epistemic point of view, i.e. f rom the epistemic 
standard of appraisal. The epistemic standard of appraisal is nearly always^^ 
taken to be the increase of the likelihood of having true behefs and avoiding false 
ones44, since, as Lawrence Bonjour puts it: 
if finding epistemically justified beliefs did not substantially increase the 
likelihood of finding true ones, epistemic justification would be irrelevant 
to our main cognitive goal and of dubious worth. I t is only if we have 
some reason to think that epistemic justification constitutes a path to truth 
that we as cognitive human beings have any motive for preferring 
42 , , , I'll say more about the relationship between ethical and epistemic justification in Chapter 8. 
In fact, I cannot find anyone who disagrees with this except, perhaps, Stich 1990. 
It is usually taken to be the double standard of having true beliefs and avoiding false ones, so that one 
cannot satisfy it by believing everything and, or by believing nothing. 
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epistemically justified beliefs to epistemically imjustified ones. (Bonjour 
1985, p.8)45 
One might, alternatively, attempt to delineate the epistemic wi th reference not to 
the standard of appraisal, but to the object of epistemic appraisal, i.e. beliefs^^. Or 
indeed wi th regard to both the object and the standard: beliefs and their 
relationship to truth^^. Both of these last ways deny that one can believe for non-
epistemic reasons or that there can be epistemic reasons for action - so that 
beliefs, and only beliefs, are appropriate for epistemic scrutiny. However, I think 
that we can have non-epistemic reasons for belief and epistemic reasons for 
action, so that delineating the epistemic domain wi th regard to the object of 
epistemic appraisal is too strong. I ' l l leave arguing for this view until Chapters 7 
and 8, so for now let's look at how the aim of having true beliefs and avoiding 
false ones can be used as the standard by which to pick out epistemic justification. 
Paul Moser explicitly attempts to "explain the distinction between 
epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for belief" (Moser 1989, p. 47), so looking at 
his discussion might be a good place to start. Moser's discussion provides us 
wi th three cential points: (i) that, for a given subject, an epistemic reason is 
essentially just an indication that the proposition believed is true. Here Moser 
makes a distinction between a belief state and the propositional object of that 
state. Because belief states cannot be either true or false and if epistemic reasons 
*^  See also the extensive citing of passages of this sort in David 2001, pp. 151 -152. He concludes: 'These 
passages come from advocates of various approaches to epistemology... But our theme is clearly 
discernable in all of them. Truth is either explicitly referred to as a goal or aim, or it is implicitly treated as 
such.' 
""^  This view is intimated in Audi 2001 and Skorupski 2005. 
The view usually held by "evidentialists" see Adier 2002 and Feldman and Conee 2003. 
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are, for a believer, an indication of the truth of their belief, then i t follows that 
epistemic reasons apply not to beHef states but to their prepositional objects. On 
the contrary, non-epistemic reasons, claims Moser, are not indications of the 
truth of a proposition but indications that a belief has a particular property. For 
example, prudential reasons for a believer "indicate that one's belief state is 
prudentially valuable for someone, but do not thereby indicate that the believed 
proposition is true...It might be prudent for me to believe, for example, that I 
shall recover f rom an illness even though there is no indication whatsoever that I 
shall recover" (Moser 1989, pp. 48 - 49). We can distinguish epistemic reasons for 
belief f rom non-epistemic reasons simply by identifying what given reasons 
indicate for the beUever: if they indicate that a belief state has a particular 
property, non-epistemic reasons are being offered; if they indicate the tiuth of the 
prepositional object of a belief state, epistemic reasons are being offered. 
(ii) Moser contiasts epistemic reasons wi th explanatory reasons for having 
a belief. An explanatory reason is "a reason that explains why a belief state has 
been formed or maintained" (Moser 1989, p. 49). According to Moser, i t is clear 
that an explanation as to why a belief is being held is not an indication of the 
truth of its prepositional object. Further, an epistemic reason for a beUeved 
proposition is not always the explanatory reason for having the believed state: 
"conceivably what explains why a belief state has been formed or maintained is 
one thing, and what indicates that the proposition thereby believed is true is 
quite another" (Moser 1989, p. 49). 
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(iii) According to Moser, for a subject to have epistemic reasons for 
believing that p is for the subject to have an indication that p is true. However, he 
adds the caveat that "truth indicator" is to be interpreted as designating 
"anything that provides an indication for one that a proposition is true in the 
sense that i t makes the proposition tiue to some extent for one" (Moser 1989, p. 50) 
thus highlighting the "minimal" conditions for epistemic reasons for belief. Why 
is this caveat made? Moser wants his definition of epistemic reasons to differ 
f rom those that hold that epistemic reasons are simply indicators that a belief 
state is "epistemically good" i.e. that the belief state is related to an actually true 
proposition. For Moser, to have an epistemic reason is for a belief state to be 
accompanied by an indication of the ti'uth of the appropriate proposition, and i t 
must be an indication to some extent in order not to contradict, "the commonplace 
notion of a justified false proposition or an unjustified tiue proposition" and, 
further, that one may have reasons for beUef but not thereby be justified in 
believing it , so that "a truth indicator need not make a proposition sufficiently 
probable to satisfy the justification condition" (Moser 1989, p. 49). Moser's 
project then consists in developing the notion of "to some extent" evidential 
probability makers, but I won't say anymore about that here, since 1 w i l l argue 
that while Moser's account is not hopeless, conditions (i) - ( i i i ) are problematic. 
1 take (iii) to be the least problematic of the three. Nevertheless the phrase 
"to some extent" needs to be unpacked using non-metaphorical language and 
when one tries to do that in terms of evidential probability makers (as Moser 
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indeed tiies) i t quickly becomes apparent how difficult i t is to determine, non-
arbitiarily, the probability "threshold" of what cotmts as "to some extent". Moser 
thinks this can be done, but to do so involves long discussions about probability 
theory that I think end up begging lots of questions and provide, in the end, too 
untidy and cumbersome an account of what is being discussed, namely epistemic 
reasons for belief. Of course, that on its own is no reason to reject Moser's 
accovmt. However, consider the problems raised by (ii) and (i). (ii) states that 
epistemic reasons are not explanatory reasons, since the explanation as to why a 
belief is held is not an indication of the tiuth of a proposition. But this clearly 
goes against what many epistemologists think is a requirement for epistemic 
justification (and thereby an epistemic reason), i.e. the requirement of the basing 
relation (see Chapter 5.5) - the idea that for S to have a reason to believe that p, S 
must believe that p for that reason^s. Now, Moser may argue that the basing 
relation does not identify any sufficient feature of what i t is to have epistemic 
reasons for belief, and that may be tiue, but because epistemologists take the 
basing relation to be a necessary feature of an epistemic reason then Moser's 
account seems too stiong in ruling such a feature out. Or, at least, Moser owes us 
an explanation as to why such a feature is ruled out, and such an explanation is 
not offered. 
As regards (i), i t seems inappropriate to distinguish epistemic reasons 
from other reasons on the grounds that only epistemic reasons indicate the truth 
See, for example, Pollock 1986 and Harman 1973. 
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of the prepositional object of a belief state, without already having ruled out 
Cegnitivism about, say, moral reasons - i.e. the view that moral appraisals have 
prepositional content and thereby have truth-conditions. I may, according to the 
Cognitivist in ethics, believe that lying is wrong for moral reasons, and that those 
moral reasons indicate the truth of the proposition. Under this view, perhaps 
what would determine whether one was in the presence of an epistemic or an 
ethical reason, would be the type of truth-maker each proposition had. 
Regardless of whether or net this last move is legitimate, one cannot distinguish 
what counts as epistemic reasons en the grotmds that only they have a bearing 
on the truth of their prepositional object without saying something about why 
Cegnitivism about ether reasons has been rejected, and, again, such an 
explanation fails to be offered by Meser. It would, needless to say, be highly 
question-begging to rule out Cognitivism on the grounds that all non-epistemic 
reasons only ever indicate whether a belief state has a particular property. 
Although none of these considerations en their own refute Meser's proposal, 1 
think they do enough, taken together, to estabUsh that the proposal is, at the very 
least, problematic. 
Nevertheless, even though there might be something problematic about 
saying that all and only epistemic reasons are indications of the truth of a belief, 
there does seem something right about the claim that the basic or most fundamental 
epistemic aim is to countenance true beliefs and avoid believing false ones, and 
that epistemic appraisal is apportioned relative to that aim. Where, perhaps, the 
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most basic aim by which ethical reasons are appraised is the aim to maximise the 
good, for example. Yet, there does not seem to be an argument available to prove 
this. A l l that can be done, in order to convince, is ask: what else could distinguish 
the epistemic? And as Alston answers: " I don't know anything that is more 
obvious f rom which i t could be derived" (Alston 2005, p. 30). Yet i t is one thing 
for the aim to appear obvious, another for it to be a tenable one in the light of the 
theoretical baggage that the concept of epistemic justification carries. In the next 
section I explore what I take to be a fundamental problem wi th this putative 
epistemic aim. 
6.3 The Reductio Argument 
Consider how both the truth goal and epistemic justification came to be 
intioduced to the epistemological armoury. Beginning wi th the latter, epistemic 
justification seems to have been intioduced to accommodate the intuition that 
true belief alone is insufficient for knowledge - a lucky guess, we are told, cannot 
count as a case of knowledge. So the justification condition is there to eliminate 
lucky guesses f rom counting as cases of knowledge. How does i t do this? It does 
so because of the alleged counterfactual that a behef that is justified is also more 
likely to be true than one that is not: worlds where a subject is believing 
justifiably are more likely to be worlds where the subject is believing the truth 
than in worlds where the subject is not believing justifiably. Thus the concept of 
justification gets inextiicably linked with the aim of acquiring true beliefs and 
avoiding false beliefs, 
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Truth and belief are the non-epistemic components of the tiipartite 
analysis, so i f there is an epistemic aim then i t must pertain to the justification 
condition. But epistemologists seem to feel the need for justification to be 
'grovmded' or 'anchored' to a non-epistemic component. This is in order to 
"break out of the circle" and prevent tine account from being circular by 
specifying conditions for what counts as good epistemic practice in epistemic 
terms only. So the nominal epistemic aim is also brought about for the theoretical 
reason of 'grounding' justification to the non-epistemic components of 
knowledge, namely true belief^^. 
However, being justified in believing that p cannot (indeed should not) 
guarantee the fruth of p. Justification must be fallible, we must allow for justified 
false beliefs and unjustified true beUefs. This is because, firstly, not doing so 
would make justification too demanding, something very few of us (if any) 
would ever be able to attain. This is a fallibilist intuition; though we must accept 
the possibility that our beliefs are radically wrong, we may still be justified in 
holding them, given what evidence is available to us at a given time. Secondly, 
there are again more theoretical reasons why this needs to be the case. Simply 
put, i f every justified belief turns out to be a tiue belief and every unjustified 
behef turns out to be a false belief, then it is natural to question why we are 
bothering to make justification a condition for knowledge. If justification 
This is presumably why true belief and not knowledge is taken to be the epistemic aim, as the knowledge 
goal would not serve this theoretical need of grounding justification in some non-epistemic ingredient, truth 
and belief (being those very non-epistemic ingredients to knowledge) serve that need much better. For an 
account, however, that does see knowledge as the epistemic aim see Jones 1997. 
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guaranteed t ru th and non-justification guaranteed falsehood, i t fo l lows that 
every false beUef is unjus t i f ied and every true belief jus t i f ied, so al l we need 
stipulate as conditions for knowledge are true belief - for every true belief w i l l 
also be just i f ied. Going d o w n this route means that just if icat ion shoots itself i n 
the foot , knowledge collapses into true belief, and justification's theoretical role 
dissipates into impotence (Fumerton 1990) (Maitzen 1995) (Sartwell 1992). So, for 
in tu i t ive and theoretical reasons, we must make the " f a l l i b i l i t y " of just i f icat ion a 
cri terion relative to our epistemic aim. Our epistemic a im must a l low for tiue 
beliefs that are imjus t i f i ed and false beliefs that are just i f ied. This is the f i rs t 
cri terion we must demand of our epistemic aim: that i t a l low for just if icat ion to 
be "fall ible"5o. 
Another cri terion emerges, moreover, w h e n we consider the t ru th goal i n 
more detail. For, we can ask, does the t ru th goal pertain to the beliefs a subject 
w i l l possess i n the long term? I t may be tiie case that we do indeed desire to 
possess the largest possible number of beliefs we can. However, this cannot be 
the a i m of epistemic justification^^. This is because we cannot have a jus t i f ied 
belief achieving the tiuth goal via causal means. This is because, in tu i t ive ly 
speaking, we wan t to say that a subject may or may not be jus t i f ied i n believing 
that p independently of the consequences that beUeving that p may produce. 
Take, fo r example, the proposit ion " I am not a good philosopher". Suppose that 1 
°^ This demand for fallibility is probably what allows room for Gettier cases, for being justified in believing 
that p does not guarantee the truth of p in all possible worlds, see Nozick 1981. 
Though this may already cause a rift between why we intuitively think we ought to have the truth goal 
and why theoretically we ought to have. it. 
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believe this proposi t ion on the grounds that I have never attained a good mark i n 
m y assessed essays and exams, rarely come to grips w i t h a philosophical 
argument and have never made a remark that bore any philosophical insight. 
Suppose, fur ther , that beHeving this causes me to drop out of any fur ther 
intellectual pursu i t i n favour of a career i n brick-laying and hence that 1 come to 
have fewer true beliefs than 1 w o u l d have, albeit w i t h d i f f i cu l ty , had I pursed an 
intellectual career (not that this w o u l d necessarily f o l l o w f r o m m y being a br ick 
layer!). I f the t r u th goal is a diachronic a im, the a im of believing truths and 
avoiding falsehoods i n the long run, then i t w o u l d mean that I w o u l d not be 
jus t i f ied i n bel ieving that I was not a good philosopher despite the 
overwhelming evidence for i t . This is just counter-intuitive. Similar ly, adopt ing 
the t ru th goal as a diachronic a im w o u l d have the negative upshot of count ing 
radically ill-conceived beliefs as jus t i f ied beliefs i f believing them caused the 
subject to later come to have more true beliefs than they w o u l d have had they 
not had the il l-conceived beliefs. To avoid a just i f ied belief f r o m having a causal 
role i n b r ing ing about the t ru th goal we must then make the tiuth goal a 
synchronic a im: "the goal of now having beliefs that are true and now not having 
behefs that are false" (David 2001, p. 161). Right now (at time t) i t w i l l no t pay, 
w i t h regard to the t ru th goal, for me to have radically ill-conceived beliefs, and i t 
will pay for me to have well-conceived or jus t i f ied beliefs. This, then, is the 
second criterion we must demand for our epistemic aim: i t must be a synchronic 
aim, rather than a diachronic aim. 
14] 
So we n o w have t w o criteria to demand of our epistemic aim, (i) that i t 
a l low for just i f icat ion to be fal l ible, and (ii) that i t be a synchronic aim. The 
trouble is that demanding for both of these criteria to be satisfied presents us 
w i t h a di lemma. This is because having the truth-goal as the epistemic a i m 
means that, though w e may be able to satisfy each cri terion independently, w e 
cannot satisfy both at the same time. I f we construe the t ru th goal i n a w a y that 
satisfies the f i rs t criterion then i t cannot satisfy the second, and, conversely, i f i t 
satisfies the second i t cannot satisfy the first . Mar ian D a v i d (David 2001) 
illustrates h o w this is the case. Fo l lowing Richard Foley (Foley 1993), he asks: i f 
the t r u th goal is a synchronic aim, the a im of now believing those propositions 
that are true and now not believing those that are false, then wha t w i l l be the 
means by w h i c h to attain it? W i l l they be constitutive or causal means? One cannot 
achieve a synchronic goal v ia causal means, for causal means i m p l y the passage 
of time. The t ru th goal must, then, be attained by constitutive means. However , 
as Foley puts i t : 
A constitutive means to a goal is itself par t of the goal. For example, i f we 
th ink of good health not just as a state i n wh ich y o u current ly lack disease 
but also one i n w h i c h y o u are not disposed to disease, then not having 
h i g h b lood pressure is not so much a causal means to the goal of good 
health as part of wha t i t means to be i n good health. Similarly, gett ing an 
A i n your phi losophy class is not a causal means to getting A 's i n your 
courses bu t rather par t of w h a t is involved i n getting a l l A's . (Foley 1993, 
pp . 17-18) 
So, i f just i f icat ion is seen as the means to attain the t ru th goal, and i t does so 
constitutively, then w e get in to a si tuation were every true beUef is jus t i f ied and 
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every false belief unjust i f ied: "The reason is, roughly, that w i t h a synchronic goal 
on ly constitutive means count, and a constituent of the goal must always be a 
better constitutive means than a non-constituent" (David , p. 161). I f a subject has 
an in tu i t ive ly unjus t i f ied but true belief t l iat p then according to the truth-goal, 
bel ieving that p must be a good th ing constitutively for i t w i l l serve the goal 
better than not believing that p. Conversely, an in tu i t ive ly jus t i f ied bu t false 
belief that p must be seen as a consti tutively bad th ing relative to the t r u th goal 
for i t w i l l serve the goal worse than not beheving that p. So relative to the t r u th 
goal, al l true beliefs are jus t i f ied and al l false beliefs unjustified^^ gy sat isfying 
the cri ter ion of synchronicity we violate the criterion regarding justification's 
f a l l i b i l i t y vis-a-vis the t ru th goal. Thus, either just i f icat ion is fa l l ible vis-^-vis the 
tiuth goal bu t the t ru th goal is not a synchronic aim, or, the t r u th goal is a 
synchronic a im bu t just if icat ion is infal l ible. Both criteria cannot, at once, be met. 
6.3 Responses to the dilemma 
H o w do we respond to this dilemma? We may n o w be minded to reject 
the idea that the best way to dist inguish epistemic just if icat ion is v ia appeal to its 
standards of appraisal, i.e. the t r u th goal, and to opt for dist inguishing epistemic 
just i f icat ion v ia appeal to the objects of its appraisal. This answer is 
unsatisfactory, however: though i t may get the problem of "saying epistemic" 
temporar i ly o f f the hook, 1 hope to show that dist inguishing the epistemic by 
appeal to the objects of appraisal is even more problematic i n Chapters 7 and 8. 
" (David 2001) and (Maitzen 1995) call this the reductio argument. 
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Further, abandoning the claim that c i t ing the tiuth goal is the best w a y to 
iden t i fy the epistemic, does not mean that the tiuth goal is not the correct 
epistemic a im. I f i t were not, lots of questions regarding w h y we bothered to give 
reasons (or jus t i fy) our beUefs w o u l d have to be answered. I f these questions 
cannot be answered, then the above strategy does no th ing to remedy the b ind the 
t ru th goal and epistemic just if icat ion are in . Another alternative w o u l d be to 
abandon the f a l l i b i l i t y requirement. But again tiiis seems like a ludicrous plan, 
since i t w o u l d mean that every just i f ied belief w o u l d always also be a true one, 
and we w o u l d then have to seriously question the project of iden t i fy ing 
epistemic reasons at al l . This leaves us w i t h wha t I take to be the most fruitful 
alternative: re- th inking the w a y that the tiuth goal can be f u l f i l l e d . 
I t h ink we need to re-question whether constitutive means are the only 
means by w h i c h to attain the epistemic a im, and thus question whether the fruth 
goal should be considered a synchronic a im. Recall that the reason that the tiuth 
goal is considered to be a synchronic a im is to block the idea that someone could 
be jus t i f ied for ho ld ing a false belief on very inadequate grounds because 
ho ld ing that beUef w o u l d cause the bearer subsequently to ho ld lots of frue ones. 
N o w , I th ink i t is impor tan t to notice that i t is irrelevant here whether or not the 
belief is false or not, since the consideration is meant to leave open the possibili ty 
that one can have false bu t jus t i f ied beliefs, and true bu t tmjus t i f i ed ones. 
Consequently what is important here is that the bearer of the belief is ho ld ing i t 
on inadequate grotmds, but w o u l d be " jus t i f ied" i n ho ld ing the belief they do i f 
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i t w o u l d cause them to have more true, and less false, behefs than they w o u l d i f 
they d i d not ho ld i t . What is wrong w i t h having a belief held on inadequate 
grounds? The in tu i t ion we are being urged to evoke is that a beUef based on such 
grounds w o u l d always be unjustified (since they w o u l d be unl ike ly to be tiue). 
Thus that someone could not be just i f ied (i.e. not f u l f i l the tiuth goal i n the 
correct way) i f w h a t was ju s t i fy ing their belief was its causal relation to other 
possible tiue beliefs. But i t seems that here we have smuggled i n , from the start, 
the way of ta lk ing about just if icat ion that aligns itself to the t ru th goal i n the 
synchronic way. So i t looks like the complaint runs something like: the tiuth goal 
must be a synchronic a im because i f i t were a diachronic a im i t could not be 
satisfied by criteria determined by the tiuth goal being a synchronic aim. 
Or, we could be minded to answer that we base our beliefs on adequate 
grounds because w e th ink that doing so w o u l d increase the hkel ihood of our 
beliefs being tiue and decrease the l ike l ihood of their being false. I th ink this 
answer is f ine , bu t note that here the tiuth goal is a diachronic a im, for wha t we 
are interested is that our beliefs in the long run t u r n ou t more l ike ly to be tiue. 
Thus, i n keeping w i t h the fa l l ib i l i ty requirement, i t al lows r o o m fo r unjus t i f ied 
true beliefs and jus t i f ied false ones. So what makes a belief unjus t i f ied here is that 
i t is not based on adequate grounds, wha t makes i t unjus t i f ied is not determined 
by whether or not i t f u l f i l s the tiuth goal (although we base our beliefs on 
adequate grounds to f u l f i l the t ru th goal). Are the t w o extensionally equivalent? 
i.e. are the beliefs w h i c h are based on adequate evidence the same beliefs that 
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f u l f i l the t r u th goal? Certainly not always, as i t is built in to w h y w e bother basing 
our behefs on adequate evidence that many justified (i.e based on adequate 
evidence here) beliefs are very bad at f u l f i l l i n g the tiuth goal, but that 
(hopefully!) most w i l l not. For these reasons, then, I th ink that i t is perfectly 
coherent that the tiuth goal be a diachronic aim. This is a positive result i n that i t 
gets us out of a di lemma, and, as I shall show i n Chapter 8, positive i n its support 
for the idea that there can be epistemic reasons for action and non-epistemic 
reasons fo r belief - a negative result, of course, f r o m the poin t of v iew of the 
evidentialist. 
6.4 Alston on the Epistemic Point of View 
I n his latest book (Alston 2005), W i l l i a m Alston, ci t ing Stephen Mai tzen 
(Maitzen 1995), has addressed the reductio problem for the t r u th goal as the 
epistemic aim, or as Als ton puts it : 
Maitzen's specific po in t is that if justification is something that is posi t ively 
valuable f r o m the standpoint of the tiuth goal, i t w o u l d have to be 
ident i f ied w i t h tiuth. For wha t could be more valuable f r o m the 
standpoint of an a im at t ru th than tiuth? (Alston 2005, p. 35) 
Alson's reply to this problem consists of t w o steps. This first, as 1 discussed i n 
Chapter 5, is to deny that there is one central notion of " jus t i f icat ion" and opt 
instead for a desiderata approach, wh ich makes room for a p lura l i sm about the 
d i f ferent things w h i c h are "desirable from the epistemic po in t of v i e w " (Alston 
2005, p. 23). But, of course, the question n o w is: wha t is the epistemic poin t of 
view? Alston's answer is, "that i t is defined by the a im at maximis ing true beUef 
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and min imis ing false belief" (Alston 2005, p. 23). However, and this is the second 
step of Alston's reply, this does not mean that t ru th is the only desirable feature 
from the epistemic poin t of v iew, even i f that v iew is defined i n terms of the 
fruth goal. W h y not? 
The crucial po in t is that the most basic a im of cognit ion is not the only 
th ing aimed at by cognition, not even the only th ing aimed at from the 
standpoint of that most basic aim. That is because other features of belief 
are also desirable f r o m the standpoint of that basic a im because they are 
related i n various ways to i t . (Alston 2005, p. 36) 
So i n keeping w i t h his 1993 article (see Chapter 5.5) Als ton denies that the fruth 
goal can "even come close to p ick ing ou t epistemic justification" (Alston 2005, p. 
23) as " f rue beliefs can be unjus t i f ied and, false beliefs can be jus t i f i ed" (Als ton 
1993, p. 535). But n o w the move is, and this is not i n the 1993 article, to make the 
fruth goal the most basic a im, and that this does not entail i t being the only thing 
aimed at f r o m the standpoint of that aim. I t is crucial to poin t out, however, that, 
under this v iew, only desiderata that are desirable i n a "related" w a y to the fruth 
goal can be called epistemic. Once we see h o w they can be so related, we w i l l 
discover h o w this v i ew has dire consequences for the deontological conception. 
Als ton divides wha t he sees as epistemic desiderata into five groups 
(Alston 2005 pp. 39 - 47). The first type of desiderata, wh ich consists i n fact of 
only one desideratum, and wh ich he calls the "master desideratum", is fruth. I t is 
pret ty obvious h o w having frue beliefs m i g h t fur ther the a im of hav ing frue 
beliefs and avoiding falsehoods, but perhaps i t is more contentious for 
epistemologists to sat this since they a l l agree that fruth is neither necessary nor 
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suff icient for just if icat ion, so tiuth should not be seen as an epistemic 
desideratum. However , Als ton is not ta lk ing about epistemic just if icat ion, and 
taking a plural is t line about epistemic desiderata allows for tiuth to be a (master) 
desideratum that can be more, or less, suitable " fo r the proximate goals of 
cognitive endeavour" than the other desiderata. 
The second type of desideratum he calls "fruth-conduct ive desiderata", 
w h i c h include, inter alia, having adequate evidence to believe that p, that one's 
belief that p be based on adequate evidence, that one's belief that p is the product 
of a reliable bel ief - forming procedure, and that one's belief t ha tp was fo rmed by 
the exercise of an intellectual vir tue. A l l these desiderata are constiued by Als ton 
i n a w a y that w i l l entail that p w i l l probably be true, and as such are the sort of 
desiderata that are appropriately related to the fruth goal, and as such are bona 
fide epistemic desiderata. 
The t h i r d type of desideratum Als ton terms "desiderata that are thought 
to be favourable to the discriminat ion and format ion of true beliefs", examples of 
these are: 
[Subject] S has some h igh grade cognitive access to the evidence, and so 
on, for [belief] B (and perhaps to its sufficiency). 
S has higher-level knowledge, or wel l -gro imded belief, that B has a certain 
positive epistemic status and /o r that such-and-such is responsible fo r 
that. 
(Alston 2005, p. 43) 
For Als ton this type of desideratum cannot directiy conti ibute towards the tiuth 
goal since they do not render any of the relevant beliefs more l ike ly to be tiue. 
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Further, i f one of these desiderata "were limited to non-conducive epistemic 
features, then i t w o u l d not enjoy the r ight k ind of connection w i t h the goal of 
true belief to render i t epistemically desirable" (Alston 2005, p. 44). However , 
says Als ton , the general capacity to f o r m higher-level behefs (as above) is not so 
l imi t ed i n that i t confributes to our abil i ty to acquire tiue beliefs and avoid 
acquir ing false ones because i t increases our abiUty i n disceriving the epistemic 
features of belief that are fruth-conducive f r o m those that are not. I n this indirect 
way, then, these desiderata conti ibute towards the tiuth goal, and as such can be 
properly considered epistemic. 
The f i f t h sort of desideratum (I w i l l consider the f o u r t h shortly) Als ton 
considers is not obviously related to the t r u t h goal at all , these include things 
such as explanation, understanding, coherence and systematicity. These m i g h t al l be 
considered features of systems of belief that are desirable f r o m the epistemic po in t 
of v iew. However , i f the value of these aims Hes outside the a im at tiuth, then 
wha t is i t that makes these features epistemic? According to Als ton, they do have 
an essential connection to the fruth goal, albeit a sHghtly circuitous one. The 
connection is that al though these desiderata f a i l to provide resources for 
p roduc ing true beliefs rather than false ones, their desirability depends on being 
associated w i t h tiue belief. For example: 
Explanations that do not provide the true reason w h y something 
happened are of no cognitive value qua explanations. I n seeking to 
explain an occurrence, we wan t to f i n d out wha t was i n fact responsible 
for i t , not just wha t migh t have conceivably produced i t . A n d a coherent 
or otherwise systematic body of beliefs that are all or most ly false w o u l d 
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lack wha t we are after i n seeking to render belief systems more coherent 
or systematic. (Alston 2005, p. 46) 
For Als ton , then, the question is whether w e should a l low as epistemic, 
desiderata whose desirability is over and above the tiuth goal, but w h i c h 
presuppose such a goal as a necessary condi t ion of that very desirability. " I n the 
absence of any suff icient reason to be hard nosed on this issue" (Als ton 2005, p. 
47), Als ton allows for such cognitive goals to count as epistemic desiderata. 
Final ly however, w e come to the f o u r t h type of desideratum, 
"deontological" desiderata, which , not surprisingly, Als ton does not regard as 
being genuinely epistemic. A m o n g deontological desiderata, are those features of 
belief that this thesis has been al l about, i.e. that they are held permissibly or 
responsibly, w i t h o u t the bearer of w h i c h viola t ing any epistemic obligation 
regarding them. Als ton n o w cites the reasons he has previously given to deny 
that these could be considered genuine epistemic desiderata, namely (as we saw 
i n Chapter 3) that they violate the principle that ought implies can i n their 
connection to doxastic involuntar ism, and, more impor tant ly (as we saw i n 
Chapters 4 and 5) that they fa i l to hook up to tlie tiuth goal i n the r igh t way, 
a l though he al lows for the possibility that: 
Perhaps [they are] related to the tiuth goal i n some other way that 
qualifies [them] as epistemically desirable. That is an abstract possibility. 
W h y shouldn ' t there be a f o u r t h way, as d i f ferent f r o m the first three as 
they are f r o m each other? But 1 must confess that I have f o u n d no f o u r t h 
way. (Als ton 2005, p. 80) 
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I n the absence of finding a fou r th way, Als ton concludes that deontological 
desiderata cannot be genuinely considered epistemic desiderata. A n d I must 
confess that, w i t h Als ton, I can find no f o u r t h way either. We may be minded to 
reply that this r i f t only arises once we have defined wha t is epistemic w i t h 
reference to the fruth goal, and that is question-begging against the deontologist 
given that they wan t to define what counts as epistemic i n a d i f ferent way. But 
just wha t exactly is this way, and h o w does i t ident i fy epistemic reasons f r o m 
other reasons? Aga in , w i t h Alston, I f i n d i t very hard to th ink of criteria outside 
the fruth goal that w o u l d do the frick. So I am forced to conclude that Alston's 
cri t icism goes through: appeals to "tolerant p lura l i sm" about epistemic 
just if icat ion or a desiderata approach cannot remedy tiie situation for the 
deontological conception i n the face of problems w i t h consilience, for d ivorc ing 
wha t is epistemic f r o m the fruth goal leaves us i n too much of a state of 
ignorance as to what , precisely, we are ta lking about when we say " f r o m the 
epistemic po in t of v i ew" . 
6.5. Concluding Remarks 
I n these three last chapters I hope to have shown just h o w froublesome the 
" T r u t h Problem" is for the deontological conception. We need to appeal to the 
fruth goal as the epistemic a im i f we are to make any sense of wha t i t is to have 
an epistemic reason. So i f the deontological conception does not hook up to that 
nominal epistemic a im i n the r ight way, then we cannot just eschew tiiat a im 
w i t h o u t the not ion of wha t is epistemic beginning to slip, otherwise, as Cr isp in 
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Sartwell asks, "is there any reason to th ink that we have any dist inctively 
epistemic obligations at all , i n the absence of any overarching purpose for 
enquiry?" (Sartwell 1992, p. 170). I think, however, that wh i l e these 
considerations are i n the end devastating for a deontological conception of 
epistemic justification, they do posit ively conti ibute towards a better 
understanding of wha t is involved i n epistemic normat iv i ty . 1 propose that w e 
use the dis t inct ion 1 started w i t h i n this thesis, between the level of obligations 
(typically considered the deontological level) and the purely evaluative level 
(which, 1 th ink , is the level at w h i c h reasons operate). Consider, fur ther , that i n 
c i t ing the t ru th goal we are seeking a teleological (goal oriented) system on w h i c h 
to g round our epistemic obligations (i.e. that epistemic obligations are 
hypothetical imperatives^^), but that perhaps a deontological conception is best 
v iewed as regarding such obligations as categorical (non-teleological) imperatives. 
W i t h these considerations in m i n d , 1 th ink we can take on board the 
consideration that obUgations, v iewed as such, are d i f f i c u l t to term epistemic, 
because this d i f f i c u l t y does not preclude epistemic reasons (at the evaluative 
level) conf r ibu t ing and playing a role, along w i t h other sorts of reasons (e.g. 
practical, legal, aesthetic, moral), i n determining the emergent obligation. So 
perhaps, because obUgations are the result of a network of d i f f e r ing reasons w i t h 
d i f f e r ing "forces" and "pressures", we w o u l d be mistaken to te rm them 
"epistemic", bu t not anymore than we w o u l d be mistaken i n te rming them 
" Such a view, that epistemie obligations are hypothetical imperatives, is expressed in Kornblith 1993. 
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"mora l " (or legal etc.). To say tlaat there is a reason for an action or a belief is to 
say that i t has been positively evaluated to a certain extent vis-a-vis a certain 
n o r m or standard (hence w e are tempted to call i t "normative") , bu t i n no w a y 
does a reason on its o w n (i.e. w i t h o u t regarding the whole ne twork of reasons 
and the relevant situational constraints) can i t be considered an obligation -
reasons, on their o w n , may be action-guiding but not action-compelling. As i t 
stands, tiiis is just a sketch of the proposal I w i sh to promote. I n the f o l l o w i n g 
part of this thesis, 1 w i s h to elaborate fur ther upon i t and make i t more 
defensible. Do ing so w i l l require me to defend the idea that there can be 
epistemic reasons for action and non-epistemic reasons for belief. As we shall 
see, v i e w i n g the t ru th goal as a diachronic a im w i l l help make these claims more 
plausible (part icularly the claim that there can be epistemic reasons for action) -
so i n that sense, the considerations raised i n this chapter have not been entirely 
negative! This w i l l not be obvious u n t i l Chapter 8, however, because I shall start 
by look ing at tiie evidentialist project of denying that there can be non-epistemic 
reasons fo r belief. 
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PART THREE: 
The Ethics of Belief 
Chapter 7: The Two Faces of Evidentialism 
7.1 Introduction 
I n this chapter I hope to demonsfrate two dif ferent (and seemingly 
independent) ways of interpreting the tenets of evidentialism and show w h y i t is 
impor tan t to dist inguish between them. These two ways correspond to those 
proposed by Richard Feldman (2000, 2004) and Jonathan Adler (1999, 2002). 
Feldman's way of interpreting evidentialism makes evidentialism a pr inciple 
about epistemic jush/icflfion, about what we ought to believe. Adler 's , on the other 
hand, makes evidential ism a principle about h o w we come to believe, wha t i t is, 
broadly speaking, rational for us to believe. Hav ing ident i f ied this difference, 1 
consider t w o complaints levied against evidentialism, namely what I call the 
threshold prob lem and wha t I call the availabil i ty problem, and hope to show 
that: (a) only an independent, bracketed just if icat ion principle of evidential ism 
can deal w i t h those problems, that; (b) the rationali ty principle of evidential ism is 
not i n fact independent f r o m the just if icat ion principle; (c) the rat ionali ty 
pr inciple is hard to motivate; and that (d) i n the f ina l analysis the argument fo r 
the just i f icat ion principle depends on the rat ionali ty principle. I thus conclude 
that al though i t may be convenient for evidentialists to freat these t w o principles 
as independent, such an independence cannot be maintained. 
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7.2 Evidentialism about Justification or Rationality? 
Evidential ism is a thesis that places believing i n accord w i t h adequate and 
available evidence at the pinnacle of our best doxastic practises. I t claims that we 
always ought to f o l l o w our evidence. This, however, can mean several things. I t 
can mean that we ought not to believe upon insuff ic ient evidence because i t is 
ethically w r o n g to do so. I t can mean that the norms relevant to believing, f r o m an 
epistemic point of v i ew, must be based upon evidentiaUst principles. I t can mean 
that evidentiahst considerations are the only considerations relevant to the 
rational f ixa t ion of belief. A n d there are probably many other ways of 
interpret ing the evidentialist tenet; however, for the purposes of this chapter I 
w i s h to consider only two , quite recent, interpretations of the thesis, namely due 
to Richard Feldman (Feldman 2000, 2004) and Jonatiian Adler (Adler 1999, 2002). 
Feldman's fo rmula t ion of evidentialism takes the thesis to be about justification, 
i.e. about wha t we are jus t i f ied i n believing, about wha t we ought to believe^* 
The extent to w h i c h someone believes i n accordance w i t h the available evidence 
is an index of whether they are just i f ied i n having the beliefs they do. As he puts 
i t ( I ' m call ing this pr inciple j(E)): 
j(E): For any person S, time t, and proposi t ion p , i f S has any doxastic 
attitude at al l toward p, then S epistemically ought to have the 
attitude toward p supported by S's evidence at t. (Feldman 2000 p. 
679, m y italics.) 
Which he takes to be equivalent. 
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For Feldman, then, evidentialism is not a tliesis about just if icat ion tout court, i t is 
a thesis about epistemic justification. This is because he is h m i t i n g the evidentialist 
tenet to tlie epistemic domain - i t is only f r o m an epistemic perspective that one 
ought to believe according to the available evidence. I ' m going to call this 
l i m i t i n g of evidentialist scope to the epistemic domain, the bracketing function 
(hence E is i n brackets i n j(E)). 
By contiast, Adle r sees evidentialism as a thesis not about wha t makes a 
belief i n a proposi t ion just i f ied but, rather, about the question regarding "wha t 
the nature of belief itself demands" (Adler 1999, p. 268) - he calls this an intrinsic 
approach (where Feldman's approach w o u l d be extrinsic). For Adler , bel ieving i n 
accord w i t h evidence is a requirement dictated by the nature of belief itself. 
Explor ing wha t the nature of belief is, according to Adler , tells us something 
about h o w we come to believe, bu t not wha t makes a belief jus t i f ied , because: 
I f , under ideal conditions, I cannot help bu t believe when 1 recognise that 
the evidence establishes that p, i t makes no sense to say that 1 ought to 
beheve that p. (Adler 2002, p. 51) 
However , this does not restiict Adler 's account to a merely descriptive level, 
since w e can test judgements about wha t we should and should not believe 
"against the data of what we do (and so can) actually believe when we focus on 
the claims inherent i n our believing a proposi t ion" (Adler 2002, p. 52). We w i l l 
see more about h o w such tests can be conducted i n 7.5. Ad le r describes wha t a 
"correct' belief (i.e. one that w o u l d pass the test above) as fo l lows: 
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One's believing that p is proper (i.e., i n accord w i t h the concept of belief) i f 
and only i f one's evidence establishes that p is true. (Adler 2002, p. 51) 
Such talk of proper and (by implication) improper belief, invokes the vocabulary 
of rat ional i ty (broadly construed), since an improper beUef (a belief that was not 
i n accord w i t h the nature of belief) w o u l d seem to suggest that such a belief was 
i r ra t ionals . So we may then interpret this way of taking evidentiaUsm as te l l ing 
us something about wha t sort of considerations determine the rat ionali ty of 
belief: namely, evidential considerations. This principle can be formula ted as 
such: 
rE: I f a subject S takes a rational (or proper) doxastic attitude towards a 
proposi t ion p at t ime t, then S (by def ini t ion) cannot but have taken 
the doxastic attitude that S's evidence at t suggested ( inc luding 
believing, disbelieving, and w i t h h o l d i n g belief). On ly evidentialist 
considerations determine the rationali ty of beUef (or of doxastic 
attitudes i n general). 
Richard Foley calls this k i n d of principle "epistemic chauvinism": 
Evidential ism, then, embodies a k i n d of epistemic chauvinism: Epistemic 
reasons for believing something by their very nature are thought superior 
to non-epistemic reasons for beUeving. Indeed, they are thought to be so 
superior that i t is always rational, a l l things considered, to believe only 
that for w h i c h one has good epistemic reasons (Foley 1987, p. 213). 
So under this v i ew, we cannot rationally believe for non-epistemic reasons. I t may 
be tempt ing to read rE as entailing, by extension, that i t cannot ever be ethically 
w r o n g to believe upon insuff ic ient evidence, because of i t claims that there are no 
such things as non-epistemic reasons for belief (and as such reasons for belief lie 
Adler does not like talk of'rationality', however, as he thinks it is too tied up with an extrinsic approach. 
However, if we interpret 'rationality' broadly, as telling us something about the nature of belief or how we 
come to believe, as opposed to what Justifies.belief, then nothing of import is.lost by using4his-vocabulary. 
157 
outside the ethical domain). I th ink this w o u l d be an incorrect reading, however. 
Some sort of extra rider, arguing that evidential considerations can only ever be 
epistemic considerations, w o u l d be necessary i n order to maintain this claim; i t is 
not obvious that evidential considerations are only epistemic considerations -
believing according to adequate evidence may be a func t ion of m y being able to 
act i n support of the best ethical consequences, for instance. rE has no such rider, 
and i t does not need one to make i t plausible, so we need not read i t i n this way. 
Neither does rE make the implausible c la im that non-evidential considerations 
never impinge o n our doxastic attitudes - only that they never impinge on our 
rational doxastic attitudes. So we may believe a proposi t ion out of w i s h f u l 
th ink ing , for instance, but this w o u l d not be a rationally (or properly) held belief 
(for the proponent of rE). 
A salient difference between the t w o principles is that the former, j(E), 
contains the bracketing func t ion whereas the latter, rE, does not. The upshot of 
this is that the first principle allows for non-evidentialist reasons for belief, i.e. 
that non-evidentialist considerations may be rational f r o m a mora l or prudent ia l 
po in t of v i ew, for example (but not an epistemic poin t of v i ew) , whereas the 
second stipulates that only beliefs borne out of evidential considerations can ever 
be rational. However , there are fur ther permutations available i f we apply and 
dis-apply the bracketing f imc t ion to the respective principles. Thus we can have 
a pr inciple that stipulates that beliefs can only be jus t i f ied i f they are supported 
by evidence, f r o m no matter w h i c h perspective: 
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JE: For any person S, t ime t, and proposit ion p, i f S has any doxastic 
attitude at al l toward p, then S ought to have the attitude toward p 
supported by S's evidence at t. 
We can also have a principle that l inks believing i n accord w i t h evidence to 
believing rationally, bu t only f r o m an epistemic perspective: 
r(E): Epistemically speaking, i f a subject S takes a rational doxastic attitude 
towards a proposi t ion p at t ime t, then S (by def in i t ion) can but 
have taken the doxastic attitude that S's evidence at t suggested 
( including believing, disbelieving, and w i t h h o l d i n g belief). O n l y 
evidentialist considerations determine the rationaUty of belief (or of 
doxastic attitudes i n general)^^. 
I t may be questioned whether jE and rE, bracketed or not, are i n fact 
independent, stand alone, principles. Af te r a l l , evidentiahsm is usually 
associated w i t h internalism, and the internalist is not going to be very happy 
about unh ing ing just if icat ion f r o m rationahty, for, they no doubt w i l l ask, h o w 
can y o u have a jus t i f ied belief that is not at the same time a rational one? For the 
externaUst this opt ion may be more palatable. However, we do not need to take a 
stand on the internalism/externaUsm debate here. I t w i l l suffice to po in t out, for 
now, that no principle of evidentialism need rule out the possibili ty that the 
considerations relevant to at t r ibut ing rationali ty may di f fer f r o m those relevant 
to a t t r ibut ing just if icat ion (even though rationality is a necessary condi t ion for 
just i f icat ion and vice versa). As Feldman himself puts i t , "bel ieving can be 
One may here complain that if the rationality of belief is treated as a matter of epistemic rationality, then 
perhaps the difference between r E and r(E) does not really amount to much. There is nonetheless a 
difference in that for rE the rationality of belief must always be treated as a matter of epistemic rationality, 
where r(E) denies this (i.e. it allows for the rationality of belief to be determined by other means) although 
epistemically speaking, the rationality of belief is always a question of epistemic rationality - the last claim 
is not trivial in that it allows for the situation in parentheses above). 
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rational, then, but less than f u l l y just i f ied, i n the sense that is an impor tan t 
necessary condi t ion for knowledge" (Feldman 2004, p. 223)^''. Thus we can be 
evidentialists about just if icat ion w i t h o u t being evidentialists about rationality, 
and, i t seems, we can be evidentiaHsts about rationaUty w i t h o u t being 
evidentialists about justification^^ even though one never goes w i t h o u t the other. 
I n the remainder of this chapter I consider t w o problems w i t h 
evidentialism, namely the threshold problem and the availabil i ty problem. 1 w i l l 
argue that these problems can be circumvented i f we take Feldman's pr inciple of 
evidentialism, or wha t I ' m calling j(E), i.e. that these problems only get Adler ' s 
principle (or rE), rE and jE into trouble. Thus i t w o u l d seem that j(E) is the more 
defensible principle. However , I then also consider the argtmients to motivate jE 
and rE ( w i t h or w i t h o u t brackets). I argue that the arguments i n favour of rE do 
not go through. This I w i l l suggest is a penetrating problem for the hitherto 
unscathed j(E) because, as I shall argue, the argument for j(E) depends upon 
principle rE. 
7.3 The Threshold Problem 
Evident ial ism is of ten accused of leaving the concept of "evidence" 
drastically i l l explained (Pollock 1995; Owens 2000; Foley 1993). For i t is not 
enough for a subject to believe a proposi t ion according to some evidence, he must 
" Elsewhere, however, Feldman acknowledges that something like j ( E ) does imply r E (Feldman 2000, p. 
685). I will argue that Feldman is right here (i.e. in Feldman 2000, not in Feldman 2004), but that this 
implication is seriously problematic for "evidentialism". 
Alvin Plantinga is an example of someone who holds this combination: "it is indeed true that we always 
or nearly always form beliefs upon the basis of evidence (at least where there is no cognitive pathology). 
But of course no amount of evidence of this.sort is itself sufficient.for warrant." (Elantinga.l 9.93, p._192).. 
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believe i t according to sufficient evidence. Similar ly a subject must w i t h h o l d belief 
i n a proposi t ion where there is insufficient evidence, disbelieve a proposi t ion 
where there is sufficient evidence against i t . The problem is h o w to determine 
when the threshold between some evidence and sufficient evidence is crossed. 
This is a problem famil iar to philosophers of science w h o are confronted w i t h the 
question of precisely h o w much evidence is necessary for a theory to be 
confi rmed. Their answer has ranged f r o m hypothetico-deductive models to 
models based more on probabi l i ty theory^^. In fact, the issue of h o w much 
evidence is necessary to properly con f i rm a hypothesis is a standing problem fo r 
induc t ion generally. However , the claim made here against evidential ism is not 
that determining the threshold of what constitutes sufficient and insuff ic ient 
evidence is a task incapable of being achieved; the claim is, rather, that the 
evidentialist is unable to do so. This is because evidential considerations by 
themselves cannot f ix the level of evidence that is sufficient or insuff ic ient fo r 
belief - there w o u l d be something circular about such an undertaking. We cannot 
answer questions about h o w much evidence is required for belief i n a certain 
proposi t ion w i t h recourse to considerations about evidence alone. The situation 
is fur ther compounded when we note that we don ' t just need to k n o w hoxu much 
evidence is sufficient, we also need to k n o w whether or not i t is relevant evidence. 
For instance, I may consider x, y and z as evidence for m y belief that p , but i t 
may not be the case that x, y and z i n fact support p. (DeRose 2000). So the 
For more on this see Achinstein 1983. 
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evidentialist also owes us an explanation regarding when a piece of evidence 
counts as a piece of evidence for or against a given proposit ion. Again , the c la im 
is not that determining wha t evidence is relevant is impossible, i t is that i t w o u l d 
be question-begging to provide this explanation using evidential considerations 
alone. Further, i t is not a satisfactory response to cla im that the correct measure of 
wha t constitutes sufficient and relevant evidence for a given proposi t ion is that i t 
guarantees the t r u th of that proposition. I t is not satisfactory because i t is far too 
stringent a demand to make, making i t very d i f f i c u l t indeed for us to believe 
much at a l l , and rules out most of the beliefs we have f r o m being either rational 
or jus t i f ied. 
I tiiink that the bracketing func t ion can par t ly solve this problem for the 
evidentialist. W i t h o u t the bracketing func t ion the evidentialist claim is that non-
evidential considerations can play no part i n determining whether a subject is 
jus t i f ied or rational. As we have seen this causes problems to the evidentialist 
because w e need non-evidential considerations to determine the threshold of 
when some evidence becomes suff icient evidence. Surely we need some non-
evidential considerations to determine this threshold. Using the bracketing 
func t ion enables the evidentialist to a l low non-evidential considerations to have 
a bearing on whether we att i ibute just i f icat ion or rationali ty to a subject having a 
behef. Thus non-evidential considerations can be considered legitimate means to 
determine the elusive evidential threshold. 
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However , according to the bracketing func t ion , we must v i ew these 
means as l y i n g outside the epistemic domain - i.e. they cannot help to settle w h a t 
is jus t i f ied nor wha t is rational f r o m an epistemic point of v iew. So unless we 
wan t to f i n d out wha t the threshold of evidence is that determines when one is 
jus t i f ied or rat ional f r o m a non-epistemic (e.g. mora l or prudential) po in t of v iew, 
then the use of the bracketing func t ion solves l i t t le . However , i t may make a 
difference i f we separate the bracketed just if icat ion principle of evidentialism -
j(E) - f r o m the bracketed rationali ty principle - r(E). I f we take j(E) as a separate 
principle f r o m r(E) then i t enables us to say that al though non-evidential 
considerations cannot have a role i n determining whether a subject's believing 
that p is epistemically jus t i f ied, they can indeed serve to determine the question 
of its rationaUty. So we can use non-evidential considerations to determine the 
evidential threshold, w i t h o u t excluding them f r o m the domain of epistemic 
rationali ty, but st i l l c la im that they cannot determine whether or not epistemic 
just i f icat ion is attained. The answer to wha t the evidential threshold is can be 
w i t h i n the domain of epistemic rationality, but that answer by itself w i l l no t 
settle whether or not a subject is jus t i f ied - only evidential considerations can 
settle the question of epistemic justif ication. Thus the bracketed just i f icat ion 
principle of evidential ism j(E) can deal w i t h the threshold problem, since broader 
(prudential , mora l etc.) considerations about rat ionali ty can f i x and f rame the 
variable standards of justif ication. 
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The bracketed rat ionali ty principle of evidentialism r(E), however, cannot 
deal w i t h this problem. This is because i f we reverse the situation and have r(E) 
w i t h o u t j(E), we get a situation where al though non-evidential considerations 
may settle questions about epistemic just if ication, they cannot settle questions 
about epistemic rationality. This entails that one may at t i ibute (using non-
evidential considerations) epistemic just if icat ion to a subject believing that p, 
whi l s t not at the same time a t t i ibu t ing them epistemic rationality. This seems 
highly counter-intuit ive, or at least, coimter-intui t ive to an internalist, since they 
w i l l wan t to keep a connection between believing just i f iably and bel ieving 
rat ionally ( in accordance w i t h the nature of belief). Of course, severing this 
connection w o n ' t seem so bad to an externalist. However , though I don ' t wan t to 
settie this problem by settling the debate between internalism and externalism, I 
th ink i t suffices to say t l iat i f we need to appeal to externalism for support of r(E), 
then the evidentiaUst has conceded somewhat, given the obvious discrepancy 
between evidentiaUsm and externalism. But doesn't the internalist deny that we 
can have epistemic rationali ty w i t h o u t epistemic justification? I don ' t th ink she 
necessarily needs to. Internalism stipulates that (depending on wha t sort of 
internalism) the subject be either aware of wha t is jus t i fy ing their beUef or that 
wha t is j u s t i f y ing a subject's belief be determinable by reflection alone. Being 
epistemically jus t i f ied w i t h o u t being epistemically rational entails that a subject 
may be jus t i f ied i n believing that p w i t h o u t awareness of their epistemic justifier, 
or t l iat a subject is jus t i f ied i n believing that pin a way other v ia reflection - and 
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bot l i such scenarios are i n breach of internalism. For h o w could one have 
epistemic access to one's justifier, or determine v ia reflection alone whether one 
is jus t i f ied , i f one is not believing i n a rational way (i.e. against the nature of 
belief)? Being epistemically rational and not epistemically jus t i f ied does not 
violate this internalist principle because i t does not preclude any special access 
to, or awareness of, one's epistemic justifier. One could w e l l be bel ieving 
rat ionally and be axvare that such rational believing is not sufficient for bel ieving 
w i t h just i f icat ion w i t h regard to a particular proposit ion. Thus the bracketed 
just i f icat ion pr inciple of evidentialism j(E) is the only principle of evidentiahsm 
that can deal w i t h the threshold problem. Simply put, this is because though 
there can be (consistently w i t h internalism) epistemic rat ionali ty w i t h o u t 
epistemic just if icat ion, there cannot be epistemic just if icat ion w i t h o u t epistemic 
rationaUty. One cannot, thus, determine whether one is jus t i f ied (using non-
evidentialist considerations) w i t h o u t also, at once, determining whether one is 
epistemically rational. So the stiategy of d ivorc ing j(E) f r o m r(E) is not available 
to r(E) - the independence only goes one way. 
7. 4 The Availability Problem 
Another problem associated w i t h evidentialism arises w h e n w e ask the 
question: h o w do evidential considerations (by themselves) settle w h e n w e are to 
consider evidence as available evidence? Dav id Owens illustiates this po in t w i t h 
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the f o l l o w i n g example^O; imagine that I am wonder ing whether or not I should 
buy a house at a particular moment i n time. I w i l l buy the house only i f I t h ink 
that i t is, economically speaking, a good time to buy one. I thus do some research 
on the matter and come to believe that i t is i t not a good time to buy a house, so I 
p lan to spend m y money on an expensive hol iday instead. However , just before I 
come to believe that i t is not a good time to buy a house, an article appears i n a 
newspaper, wr i t t en by a respected economist, i n wh ich argues persuasively that 
i t is, i n fact, a good time to buy one. Unfor tunate ly I don ' t have time to read the 
article and so do not change m y m i n d about the state of the current housing 
market. I t seems f ine for me not to bother reading the article as I ' m not an estate 
agent, or the like; m y other practical needs trvmip the need to read the article 
(Owens 2000, p. 26). 
The po in t of this and similar examples is to show h o w evidential 
considerations alone cannot determine wha t we should be interested in . H o w 
much evidence I seek regarding the housing market is merely a reflection of h o w 
impor tan t I regard the raising of interest rates vis-a-vis m y other practical 
concerns. Impor tan t ly , wha t I am interested i n drastically affects w h a t evidence 
becomes available to me. Further, these non-evidential considerations affect no t 
solely whether or not i t is just i f ied for me to conduct fur ther enquiry into the 
housing market, they affect the results of m y present enquiry. As Owens puts i t : 
Feldman (FeldrnanJZQOO) also cites Keith DeRose as having made this objection.during conversation. 
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" I don ' t just decide to ignore the economist's article, I make up m y m i n d about 
whether house prices w i l l rise w i t h o u t considering i t " (Owens 2000, p. 27). 
One, unsuccessful, reply may be to l i m i t the evidence that is up for 
scrutiny to evidence that a subject already possesses at a particular time. 
Whatever the evidence suggests, regarding a given proposit ion one has at a 
particular time, should determine one's doxastic attitude. Recall Richard 
Feldman's fo rmula t ion of evidentialism: 
j(E): For any person S, time t, and proposi t ion p, i f S has any doxastic 
attitude at al l t oward p at t and S's evidence at t supports p, then S 
epistemically ought to have the attitude toward p supported by S's 
evidence at t. (Feldman 2000, p. 679)^1 
Notice the phrases " t ime t" and " i f S has any doxastic attitude at a l l t oward p at 
t" . Feldman thus restricts the evidence that is relevant to determining whether or 
not a subject ought to believe i n a proposit ion to the evidence a subject already 
has regarding their attitude (if there is one) towards a given proposit ion. 
Evidence one could have had bu t d i d not (for instance, the in fo rmat ion i n the 
economist's article) is not considered relevant, even though i t may be available. 
This reply w o n ' t do for two reasons. Firstly, i t does not answer the charge that 
non-epistemic considerations are determining not just whether i t is jus t i f ied for a 
subject to conduct fur ther enquiry, but also the result (i.e. wha t doxastic attitude 
the subject w i l l take) of the enquiry. This is s imply because wha t evidence S has 
at t w i l l clearly make a difference to wha t S's doxastic attitude at t ought to be -
" We perhaps ought to add that if S's evidence at t does not support p, then S ought to withhold judgement 
.on p. 
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and wha t evidence S has at t is a result (or can be a result) of wha t S's non-
evidential commitments happen to be. So non-evidential considerations can 
continue to play a role i n determining wha t S ought to (or ought not to) be 
believing. 
Secondly, to l i m i t the evidence S has at t to the evidence that is up for 
scrutiny has the f o l l o w i n g unpleasant result: imagine that a member of some 
extreme r igh t -w ing organisation has been subject, imder some sort of l imi t ed 
duress, to selected (and perhaps biased) pieces of in format ion that allegedly 
support one of the organisation's misguided beliefs (that unemployed people 
sponge o f f the state, for example). Care has also been taken to ensure that this 
member does not have access to appropriate pieces of counter-evidence. I n this 
case, under j(E), given wha t evidence they have, the member ought to share the 
organisation's misguided belief. This just seems counter-intuit ive. Further, 
according to j(E), a subject could cut themselves o f f f r o m as much evidence as 
they could or even any evidence at al l - " i f a person f inds a d r u g or a machine 
that can erase memories f r o m his brain and arranges to be immersed i n a sensory 
deprivat ion tank" (Feldman 2000, p. 690) - and s t i l l have a h igh ly rational 
doxastic attitude by believing nothing. Again , this seems h igh ly counter-
intui t ive . 
Wha t al l these considerations really show is the need fo r the bracketing 
func t ion . I f we use the bracketing func t ion i n our evidential principles then we 
can, w i t h o u t contradicting ourselves, bite the bullet and concede that wh i l s t i t is 
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the case that non-evidential considerations can have a bearing on wha t a 
subject's doxastic attitude ought to be, they do not have a bearing epistemically. 
Thus, f r o m an epistemic point of v iew the budd ing fascist and the evidence 
recluse have the doxastic attitude they ought to have. Wha t is w r o n g w i t h their 
attitudes is a matter regarding mora l or prudent ia l consideration. I t may be 
immora l to believe the things fascists say, or imprudent to believe noth ing , bu t 
there is no th ing w r o n g epistemically w i t h these doxastic attitudes given the 
evidence the subjects hold . What matters epistemologically is a synchronic affair 
- wha t S's doxastic atti tude ought to be now - not a diachronic (over time) issue, 
the proper concern of moral or prudent ia l issues (Feldman 2000, p. 689)^2 
Bracketing the evidentialist principles can consistently deal w i t h this issue i n this 
way. This is because here we are a l lowing for non-evidential considerations to 
impinge on whether a belief is rational (albeit not f r o m an epistemological po in t 
of v iew) , precisely wha t non bracketed principles claim cannot be done. 
However , I th ink there is more to this problem. Suppose that there 
allegedly exists a paper that persuasively contradicts everything I 've been saying 
i n this thesis. Unfor tunately , i t can only be accessed by vis i t ing a remote and 
secluded l ibrary i n the Sudan. Do we consider the paper as evidence available to 
me? We may do i f I happen to be half Sudanese and vis i t Sudan regularly. We 
may not i f I am a pauper l i v ing i n England w i t h no chance of b u y i n g a plane 
ticket to go there. The problem is tiiat evidential considerations alone are not 
See, however, how making the truth goal a synchronic aim is problematic in Chapter 6.3 of this.thesis. 
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capable of answering this question. Non-evident ial considerations, whatever 
they may be, need to be brought to the fore. Moreover, these non-evidential 
considerations cannot be dismissed as being non-epistemic, given that they 
seriously affect the result of enquiry - whether or not I v is i t the l ibrary i n the 
Sudan may w e l l determine the outcome of my bel ief-forming. That we need to 
somehow take on board these non-evidential considerations w i t h i n the epistemic 
domain may, once again, motivate us to take one of the bracketed evidential 
principles independently from the other. Non-epistemic (e.g. practical) 
considerations may w e l l be relevant i n determining whether m y belief is rational 
- they may determine whether or not evidence is available - but, i n so doing, 
they do not determine whether I am jus t i f ied i n ho ld ing that beUef. However , the 
reverse cannot be the case, such non-epistemic reasons cannot determine 
whether or not m y belief is jus t i f ied w i t h o u t also determining whether or no t i t is 
rational. The issue is almost identical to the threshold problem^^ There, i n order 
" There are related problems to the threshold and availability problem that can be treated the same way, 
consider this one raised by Ralph Wedgewood (Wedgewood 2002). His problem is that evidential 
considerations alone do not answer the question of how much better it is to believe that p when p is true, 
than just suspending judgement about p. Or how much better it is to suspend judgement about p than to 
believe that p when p is false, 
but different answers to these questions have dramatically different implications about when one 
should believe p and when one should suspend judgement about p. If suspending judgement about 
p is much better than believing p when p is false, but not much worse that believing p when p is 
true, then presumably the rational attitude is to suspend judgement unless the evidence for p is 
very strong. On the other hand, if suspending judgement about p is much worse than believing p 
when p is true, but not much better than believing p when p is false, then presumably the rational 
attitude is to take one's chances and believe p when p is false, then presumably the rational 
attitude is to take one's chances and believe p even is the evidence for p is relatively weak. 
(Wedgewood 2002, p. 248) 
Further, there may be times where evidence itself can give you reason not to believe a proposition. This is 
.because belief can itself.create evidence, and_there at times when it does so that affects .what, reasons _you 
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to secure an evidential threshold, we appealed to rational non-evidential 
considerations, thereby viola t ing r(E) - and, incidentally, rE. Principle j(E) 
remained intact because i t is not implausible (and not inconsistent w i t h 
internalism) to ho ld someone epistemically rational but not epistemically 
jus t i f ied , whereas i t is implausible (or, at least, inconsistent w i t h internalism) to 
h o l d someone epistemically jus t i f ied but not rational, and this was w h a t 
pr inciple r(E), w i t h o u t principle j(E), entailed. So once again we can appeal to 
rational, non-evidential , considerations to grant us some criteria for w h e n 
evidence is to be considered available - and thereby reject principle r(E) - w h i l e 
principle j(E) remains intact, i.e. the result of the availabil i ty question does not 
settle the just i f icat ion question, only evidential considerations can settle i t . 
Principle j(E) can stand alone as a principle where r(E) cannot for the very same 
reasons as above, namely, i t is, at least, consistent w i t h some f o r m of 
internalism. 
7. 5 Motivating the Rationality Principle 
So far I 've been arguing that (a) only the just if icat ion principle of 
evidential ism j(E) can endure some of the most prominent criticisms made 
have for believing a proposition. Consider this example from Richard Foley (Foley 1991). 1 know that I am 
going to pass my exam if, and only if, I pass the exam. At the moment I am undecided on the issue, but I do 
have evidence (e) that I will pass the exam (I've done pretty well in my mocks, for example), so if I took 
the time to think about it, I would come to believe that I would pass the exam. However, my teachers, in an 
attempt to teach me some humility, decide to make it the case that I will only pass if I believe that I will not 
pass the exam. So if I believe that I do, they will make the exam so difficult for me that I will fail. Further, I 
know they are going to do this, and I have now thought about (e). It seems that I am in a bind here, for what 
should I believe? I cannot believe what I've got good evidence (e) for without somehow undermining that 
very belief (and under rE, believe irrationally), but to withhold belief is to go in the face of good evidence. 
Once again, evidential considerations alone cannot determine what I ought to believe. 
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against evidentialism and that (b) i t seems that although principle j(E) is 
independent f rom the rationality principle of evidentialism r(E), the reverse is 
not the case, i.e. r(E) is not independent form j(E). I now further my case against 
the rationality principle of evidentialism by arguing against the arguments 
designed to motivate it. However, in the section which follows, in considering 
the arguments designed to motivate the justification principle of evidentialism, I 
w i l l argue that in fact these arguments for j(E) depend on the principle r(E). 
One way to motivate the rationality principle is broached by Jane Heal 
(Heal 1990). Hers is a psychological point: when we deliberate about what 
doxastic attitude we should hold in relation to p, we are in fact just deliberating 
about whether p is the case. If you ask yourself whether the sun sets in the east, 
you ponder whether evidence supports this - look at where the sun sets in 
relation to your compass - you do not consider whether it would be practical or 
ethical for the sun to set in the east. This psychological fact purportedly gives us 
motivation for accepting r(E), what we do when we consider what doxastic 
attitude to take towards a proposition is consider what the evidence suggests. 
There are some flaws, however, wi th this way of motivating r(E). To begin with, 
i t is not obviously the case that all doxastic attitudes are, as a matter of empirical 
fact, considered wi th regard to evidence. Religious people, for example, may 
consider whether they ought to believe in God with regard to ethical (and not 
evidential) reasons. For example, a theological dictum exists that says "Lex orandi 
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est lex credenti" - "the rule for praying is the rule for believing"^. Further, 
consider the following example, which I've borrowed from Christopher 
Hookway (Hookway 2000, p. 151): beginners reading Descartes' first meditation 
for the first time often find no fault with Descartes sceptical conclusions, yet at 
the same time f ind themselves unable to genuinely suspend judgement over 
those propositions under question. This scenario suggests that here people are 
consistently believing contrary to what the epistemic optimum prescribes, and 
that they may be believing what they do for non-epistemic reasons, for instance, 
i t might be impracticable for them to negotiate wi th the world if they believe 
they are continually being conned by an evil genius. One may reply that as a 
matter of fact these people are not beheving for practical reasons but are in fact 
believing in accord wi th the evidence presented to them, which is in conflict wi th 
Descartes' considerations, and thus the example is consistent wi th principle rE. 
The problem here seems to be that of establishing this purported psychological 
matter of fact. However, given that such a fact has not been empirically 
established, it is enough to show that our intuitions can go in either direction 
(with regard to the question whether we always believe only wi th an eye to 
evidence) to put into question this type of evidentialist motivation. 
In any case, even if i t were a psychological fact that normally when we 
consider what doxastic attitude to take towards a proposition we consider what 
the evidence suggests, it does not show that this is the way we ought to believe. 
_^ See Boyd (1985) 
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Recognising this flaw, Jonathan Adler attempts to draw a similar conclusion 
from an argument that does not commit the naturalistic fallacy. He says that i t is 
not a psychological fact that links belief to evidence, but, rather, a conceptual or 
logical link. He argues that believing without considering the evidence one has is 
incoherent, equivalent to the incoherence underlying Moore's paradox - p, hut I 
do not believe that p. He asks us to consider this statement which he considers 
equivalent to a Moorean assertion: 
The number of stars is even, but I lack sufficient evidence that the number 
of stars is even. (Adler 1999, p. 271) 
Which he claims cashes out as: 
I believe that the number of stars is even. A l l that can secure for me the 
belief's claim of truth is adequate evidence (reason) of its tiuth. 1 
obviously lack adequate evidence. I cannot judge i t true that the number 
of stars is even. So 1 cannot believe it. So I do not believe it. So 1 do not 
believe that the number of stars is even. (Adler 1999, p.271) 
For Adler the incoherence comes from an explicit contradiction between the 
opening and closing statements. 1 think this stiategy is problematic. To get to the 
conclusion that: 
1 do not believe that the number of stars is even, 
we need the premise: 
that all that can secure for me the belief's claim of truth is adequate evidence 
(reason) of its tiuth. 
However, this premise is exactly what is under question here, since the non-
evidentialist would deny tiiat all that can secure for me the beliefs claim of truth 
is adequate evidence for it. An opponent may want to claim precisely that we can 
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believe (judge that a proposition is true) for moral reasons, for example. So the 
assertion that "the number of stars is even, but I lack sufficient evidence that the 
number of stars is even" does not amount to a Moorean contradiction, unless we 
insert a question begging premise. So Adler's strategy cannot confer independent 
motivation for adopting the rationality principle. Thus, not only does the 
rationality principle fail to dispatch the familiar arguments against evidentialism, 
i t also cannot be, for all that has been shown here, reasonably motivated. It seems 
that we cannot rule out, on the basis of Adler's argument, that non-evidential 
considerations can sometimes fix the rationality of beUef. 
7.6 Motivating the Justification Principle 
Richard Feldman (Feldman 2000) puts forward an argument in order to 
motivate the justification principle of evidentiaUsm - j(E) - that consists in 
claiming that following the tenets of evidentialism is the best way to bring about 
what is of epistemic value, which he characterises as follows: 
When adopting (or maintaining) an attitude toward a proposition, p, a person 
maximises epistemic value by adopting (or maintaining) a rational attitude 
toward p. (Feldman 2000, p. 685) 
The best way of achieving what is of epistemic value, argues Feldman, is to 
follow one's evidence. 
I think there are two points to consider regarding this argument. Firstiy, i t 
is only an argument for a bracketed principle of evidentialism. That following 
one's evidence is the best way of getting beliefs that have epistemic value is not 
going to show that non-evidential considerations cannot ever impinge on the 
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rationality, or justification, of a belief - all it shows is that non-evidential 
considerations for belief are not rational, or not justified, i f the aim of the believer 
is to attain beliefs that are epistemically valuable, but they may well be rational, 
or justified, if the believer aims to attain beliefs that are, say, ethically valuable. 
Secondly, as Feldman infers, following one's evidence cannot be the best way to 
attain epistemic value, if epistemic value is conceived as having beliefs that are 
true and avoiding beliefs that are false - for one may believe a proposition based 
on strong evidence that is in fact false. 
We avoid the problems associated wi th identifying epistemic value wi th 
true belief or with knowledge if instead we say that what has epistemic 
value are rational behefs. (Feldman 2000, p. 685) 
Thus, i f we are to be evidentialists, we must hold that what is of epistemic value 
is rational belief. 
This last step is important. Here is the rub. The argument for j(E) depends 
on the rationality principle of evidentialism (either rE or r(E)). Feldman's 
argument consists in the claim that "to achieve epistemic value one must, in each 
case, follow one's evidence" (Feldman 2000, p. 685). However, the claim that 
non-evidential considerations can determine the rationality of belief surely 
vitiates the contention that only evidential considerations can deternune what 
has epistemic value, since epistemic value is being defined as rational belief. So if 
rational belief is what is of epistemic value, and non-evidential considerations 
can determine whether a belief is rational or not, then i t follows that non-
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evidential considerations can bring about what is of epistemic value. Thus 
without holding that non-evidential considerations are irrelevant to the fixation 
of rational beUef, as the rationalist principle of evidentiaUsm claims, then this 
argument for j(E) does not get off the ground. The argument for j(E) is dependent 
on the rationality principle of evidentiaUsm. However, as 1 have shown, the 
rationality principle is not without serious problems. 
7.7 Concluding Remarks 
I 'm sure I've succeeded in demonstiating that evidentialism is an elusive 
doctiine. I also hope to have succeeded in demonstrating the following: (a) that 
only an independent, bracketed justification principle of evidentialism can deal 
wi th the problems levied against general evidentialism, that; (b) the rationality 
principle of evidentialism is not independent from the justification principle; (c) 
the rationahty principle is hard to motivate; and finally that (d) the argument for 
the justification principle depends on the rationality principle. Evidentialism, I 
conclude, is a two-faced theory. It can show a palatable side of itself in order to 
escape some problems while concealing a different, less acceptable, side of itself. 
Yet, in the end, we must acknowledge that both sides belong to one theory, and 
meet i t head on. But even if I am wrong about (d), there is another indicated in 
this chapter. This is that evidentialism about rationality (i.e. the view that there 
cannot be non-epistemic reasons for belief) seems to be the weak link for the 
theory of evidentialism, i.e. that the most plausible version of evidentialism 
(evidentialism about epistemic justification) would be vitiated because of its 
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entailing evidentialism about rationality. I hope this supports the view that there 
can be such things as non-epistemic reasons for belief. In the following chapter, 1 
explore further reasons for rejecting the evidentialist claim and try to support the 
idea that there can be epistemic reasons for action. Once I have established the 
plausibility (at least) of these notions, I go on to show how they support (if not 
entail) the view about epistemic normativity that I sketched out at the end of 
Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 8: On the Unity of Justification 
8.1 Obligations and Mere Evaluations 
In this chapter 1 now come to attempt to articulate this thesis' positive 
contribution. 1 w i l l here add the caveat that, as wi th most positive contributions, 
the view I that am about to express is tentative, and 1 do not claim to have done 
anything like establishing it. That said, 1 do hope to show that the results of this 
thesis do seem to make the view, if not persuasive, at least plausible. 1 started 
this thesis by making, what 1 take to be, an important distinction concerning 
justification's being a normative concept. When we wonder about someone's 
being justified in committing an action or having a belief, we are wondering 
about how to appraise their belief or action. Saying that S is justified in believing 
that p, for example, is to grant some sort of positive appraisal to S's believing that 
p; to say that S is not justified in doing is to grant some sort of negative 
appraisal to S' doing And the question is: an appraisal of what sort? I think the 
most important consideration here concerns whether the appraisal expresses 
some sort of an obligation or not, i.e. when we appraise S, are we saying 
something about whether S has done (or believed^^) what they were obliged to. 
Here is the home of the concept of "blameworthiness" and the principle that 
ought implies can. To say that justificationary appraisals are of this sort and, 
further, are made from an epistemic point of view, then we have something akin to 
If believing is something radically differejit to action, which I will contest later. 
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the "deontological66" conception of epistemic justification. However, we may 
also make appraisals that do not involve our saying anything about whether the 
person who is appraised has done what they were obliged to - we may, for 
instance, appraise someone's nose as ugly, without our holding them responsible 
(and thus not blameworthy) for doing so - 1 called such appraisals merely 
evaluative appraisals in Chapter 1. So one can make an evaluative appraisal 
without making a "deontological" one at the same time. Most of this thesis has 
been about seeing whether i t makes any sense to talk about such things as 
deontological appraisals from the epistemic point of view. (Recall how William 
Alston thinks that appraisals form the epistemic point of view can only ever be 
merely evaluative, and thus that his criticisms only make sense if the distinction 
between deontological and evaluative appraisal holds). Chapter 6 ended wi th 
the worry for the deontologist about how they could possibly say that their 
appraisals were distinctively epistemic, and I suggested that the deontologist's 
best answer was to take this criticism on board but show how the implications of 
doing so are not as counter-intuitive as may first appear. 
Showing this is what I set out to do in this chapter. My view entails 
accepting the distinction between deontological and merely evaluative appraisal, 
and suggesting that there is a level of appraisals that include saying something 
about obligations and a merely evaluative level of appraisal, and that it is in the 
latter that reasons operate. The distinction is similar to one between what W.D. 
Although. asJ pointed out in Chapter 1, thisjerm.may be misleading. 
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Ross calls "prima facie duties" and "all things considered duties" or "duties 
proper" (Ross 1930). For Ross, to say that someone has done their prima facie 
duty, is not to have appraised them as having fulfi l led what was obliged of them, 
since a stionger, better reason could have dictated that. Similarly for me, a reason 
on its own is always pro tanto^^, that is, relative to a standard or norm (hence why 
we call such reasons "normative"). To say that someone has (or does not have) a 
reason for acting (or believing) is to evaluate that someone doing that action, in a 
positive (or negative) way according to certain norms or standards. Tliat is how 
we further determine the sortal for which a particular merely evaluative 
appraisal belongs. For example, to appraise S's believing that p, wi th reference to 
the aim of believing the tiuth and avoiding falsehoods, is, perhaps, to make an 
epistemic appraisal. Because such evaluations are relative to a standard, they can 
only ever be hypothetical imperatives^^. Further, importantly, because obHgations 
arise out of a network of different reasons, a reason on its own can never express 
more than a merely evaluative appraisal (and so can only ever determine a prima 
facie duty). Again, because obUgations arise out of a network of different 
reasons, perhaps more importantly, i t fails to make sense that the obligation that 
arises is particularly epistemic, or, indeed, particularly ethical, or aesthetic or 
whatever. So i t is thus to be expected that a deontological conception is going to 
have problems with giving epistemic "deontological" appraisals. 
I take this phrase from John Broome; see Broome 1999, 2004. 
I.e. imperatives only if we value the aim that the particular standard of appraisal alludes to. Is there an 
imperative to value the aim of truth? I'm not sure, see Stich 1990 for some persuasive arguments that it is 
not, but note that nothing in making this type of evaluations would determineJhat. 
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Some care needs to be made about the use of the term "reason" here. I do 
not mean to talk about what i t is rational for us to do or believe, but what i t is for 
someone to he justified in doing or beHeving something. It may turn out that what 
i t is rational for me to do or believe, just is what is justified for me to do or 
believe, but I leave open the possibiHty that the two can diverge. Jonathan Dancy 
makes a distinction between what he calls, perhaps rather imhelpfuUy for the 
present purposes, normative reasons and motivating reasons. For Dancy, 
motivating reasons are those that "actually made a difference to how [someone] 
acted; they constitute the Ught in which he chose to do what he did", normative 
reasons, on the other hand, are those that "we tiy to cite in favour of an action, 
because they are the ones that should show that the action was sensible or right 
or whatever" (Dancy 2000, p. 2). Once again, to clarify, the sense of "reason" that 
is being used here is Dancy's normative, i.e. I do not mean the term to merely pick 
out those reasons in the light of which one actually chose to do what they did. 
This might be confusing, since reasons, on their own, for me are only ever merely 
evaluative. Take this as yet another example of a confusion that can arise out of 
the varied (and seldom consistent) use of the term 'normative'. For me, having a 
reason is 'normative', in the sense that i t is action-guiding, but this is not to say 
that having a reason means having an obligation, in other words a reason on its 
own is not action-compelling. 
The view that I 'm cotmtenancing involves the claim that there is an 
evaluative level of reasons, distinct f rom the level of obligation, and that different 
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sorts of reason (i.e. epistemic, moral, legal etc.) can operate wi th and against each 
other, within the "push and pul l" of reasons, to determine what one's emergent 
obligation w i l l be. This is just what 1 mean by a "network" of reasons, and 
because obligations arise out of a network, then it ceases to make sense to carry 
over the sortal term given for a reason, over to the level of obligation - i.e. there 
are no different sorts of obligation, no distinctively epistemic obligations, no 
distinctively legal obligations, no distinctively moral obligations and so on. Of 
course, the view is not without many complications. For example, one may 
wonder how exactly different sorts of reasons can commensurate with one 
another to determine an obligation. 1 w i l l try my best to sketch out some answers 
to this sort of question at the end of this chapter. For now however, much of the 
tenability of this thesis rests on whether or not there can be such things as non-
epistemic reasons for belief and epistemic reasons for action, since an opponent 
might well complain that action and belief are different domains which, of their 
nature, require different sorts of appraisal. As regards belief, the opponent might 
claim, only epistemic appraisal is relevant because there can be no non-epistemic 
reasons for belief, whereas wi th regard to action, epistemic reasons are irrelevant 
in determining what one is obliged to do^^. 1 hope to have done something to 
dissuade the proponent of the idea that there can be no non-epistemic reasons for 
belief in Chapter 7. What is at issue here is whether the object of appraisal (i.e. 
It must be noted that this consideration does not do any damage to the claim that with regard to action, 
the different sorts of reason that are relevant for its evaluation e.g. practical, legal, moral, can all contribute 
-to-the emerging.obligation. — . . _ 
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belief) is enough to delineate a reason as 'epistemic'. If we can delineate what 
counts as epistemic solely wi th reference to the relevant standards of appraisal, 
then we can coherently hold that there can be such things as epistemic reasons 
for action and non-epistemic reasons for belief. I w i l l now, then, evaluate some 
arguments (made mainly by Mills 1998) for the claim that epistemic appraisal is 
relevant only to evaluating beliefs. I w i l l conclude that they are unsuccessful. 
8.2 The Divergence Thesis 
It is not uncommon to hold that whatever it is that may render a subject 
justified in believing that p (from an epistemic point ofviexo) is not the same as that 
which renders a subject justified in believing that p (from an ethical point of view) -
being epistemically justified in believing that p does not entail being morally 
justified in believing that p and vice versa. As Earl Conee puts it: 
Epistemic support for a proposition indicates that i t is tiue; prudential 
reasons for beUeving a proposition are indications that believing i t would 
be prudent. In general, a proposition can be evidently true without being 
evidently prudent to believe. So epistemically justified propositions are 
not guaranteed to be prudent to believe. Similar considerations show that 
believing epistemically justified propositions need not be morally 
justified. (Conee 2004, p. 253) 
If this is the case, moral and epistemic justification can not only come apart but 
can also come into conflict. It does not seem intuitively incoherent to hold, for 
instance, that while Patient Smith was morally justified in believing his illness 
was not terminal, he was not epistemically justified in believing i t given the 
overwhelming evidence against it. Nor does it seem incoherent to hold, to use a 
more familiar example, that Wife Jones is morally justified in believing her 
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husband innocent of perfidy (given her vows of allegiance, perhaps) whilst being 
epistemically unjustified for having such a belief considering the weighty 
evidence against it. Aside from such intuitive support for the "divergence 
thesis"^° - i.e. the idea that moral and epistemic justification can come apart -
there is also a more theoretical basis on which to build the thesis. This consists of 
the claim that the way to distinguish between epistemic and ethical justification 
is by appeal to the standards over which their objects are appraised. For 
epistemic justification the standard for appraisal is its link to " t iuth", for moral 
justification its link wi th "the right" or "the good"7i. An epistemic appraisal is 
epistemic when one judges wi th authoritative reference to the tiuth, an ethical 
appraisal is ethical when one judges with authoritative reference to the right or 
the good. If this is the correct way to distinguish between ethical and epistemic 
justification, then the tiuth of the divergence thesis follows, for there is nothing 
to prevent actions f rom being appraised by application of the standards of 
epistemology and nothing to prevent beliefs being appraised by application of 
the standards of ethics. It could be objected that one can only set things up in this 
way if one makes the substantive assumption that beUefs can be considered 
actions. I ' l l consider this assumption in a moment, but for now consider that the 
divergence thesis, i f tiue, raises an issue of "normative incommensurability"''2. If 
both actions and beliefs can be evaluated f rom each of the ethical and epistemic 
™ I borrow this term from Eugene Mills (Mills 1998). 
'^ Consequentialism vs. Deontology neutral. 
" Again I borrow this term from Eugene Mills (Mills 1998), but he cites John Heil (Heil 1992) as having 
originally coined this phrase. _ 
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perspectives, then it is possible that two conflicting actions or two conflicting 
beliefs can both be justified depending on what perspective is taken. So what 
should one do or believe, whatever is ethically optimal or whatever is 
epistemically optimal? I don't think that this question can be answered i f the 
divergence tiiesis is correct. However, like Eugene Mills (Mills 1998)73 1 reject the 
divergence thesis, but, unlike Mills, 1 do not do so by rejecting the possibility that 
one can identify epistemic reasons solely by their objects of appraisal, namely 
beliefs. 1 now move to discuss how Mills ' arguments for this claim, and so 
against the divergence thesis, fail, with a view to making another attempt at a 
strategy to establish the unity of justification where justification is a 
deontological concept. 
8.3.1 Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief 
A quick response to the divergence thesis mentioned, and dismissed "for 
charity's sake" (Mills 1998, p. 30), by Mills is to deny the assumption that beliefs 
can be considered actions. Moral justification pertains only to action, so if beliefs 
are not actions then they can be neither morally justified nor unjustified. Hence 
there is no divergence: i t just does not make sense, for example, to attribute moral 
justification to Wife Jones' belief that her husband is innocent of adultery, she is 
either epistemically justified in believing what she does or she is not, there is no 
other option and so there is no tension. As Robert Audi puts is: 
The divergence that Mills discusses, however, is between practical and epistemic justification. 
Nevertheless, I don't think much is lost in applying his strategy against divergence between practical and 
epistemic justification to the divergence between^ethjcaLand epistemic justification. OTMfa/w /WM^^  
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If I have been right and neither believing nor forming beliefs is a case of 
action, then there is littie or no place for an ethics of belief. (Audi 2001, p. 
105) 
However, not only does this stiategy fail to address the intuition that 
there is a sense in which Wife Jones is justified in beUevrng her husband 
innocent, it also relies on the assumption that moral justification pertains only to 
action. Presumably this assumption can be maintained by invoking the principle 
that ought implies can; this can only work, however, if i t only makes sense to 
attiibute ethical justification in a deontological (i.e. not merely evaluative) way. If 
moral justification is a merely evaluative concept then the use of the principle 
that ought implies can is redimdant - one may judge something as good from an 
ethical point of view regardless of whether it was committed by an agent who 
could have done otherwise. So taking this line of argument against the 
divergence thesis commits one to the claim that one cannot make moral 
evaluations that are without deontological implications (i.e. implications 
pertaining to what one is obUged to do, and are blameworthy for not doing). I 'm 
not sure this latter claim is correct, but I ' l l leave saying more about that until 
Section 5. In any case I think there is something question-begging about this line 
of argument against the divergence thesis. It begins wi th the claim that only 
actions can be the objects of moral deliberation, but that claim can make sense 
only i f we think that the way to establish the difference between ethical and 
epistemic justification is via appeal to the objects of appraisal, i.e. belief and 
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action. However this is just wha t is under consideration here, for a proponent of 
the divergence thesis claims that the way to differentiate between ethical and 
epistemic just i f icat ion is not by appeal to the objects of appraisal bu t by appeal to 
the standards of appraisal, i.e. tiuth and the good, and this is h o w to establish the 
divergence thesis. 
Perhaps a more sophisticated stiategy for arguing against the divergence 
thesis, w h i c h does not rely on the mere assumption that only actions can be the 
objects of mora l just i f icat ion, is to argue that reasons for belief (i.e. "the norms 
governing beUef") can never be non-epistemic (and thus that mora l just i f icat ion 
cannot pertain to belief). This is the stiategy taken by Mi l l s . I t begins w i t h the 
consideration that we have, at best, indirect or nonbasic cont io l over beliefs, i.e. 
that unmediated believing at w i l l is, at least psychologically i f not conceptually, 
impossible. Here again M i l l s cites John Hei l : 
Even i f beheving is not something one can sensibly set out to do directly, 
one is often i n a posi t ion to take steps that w i l l , predictably, result i n the 
format ion (or extinction) of beliefs. The same, of course, is true of m y 
tu rn ing on the hght i n the study. Doing so requires m y do ing something 
else: m o v i n g m y finger, say, thereby flipping the switch and in i t ia t ing a 
process that culminates i n the l ight 's going on. Just so, 1 can scrutinize or 
ignore evidence bearing on some hypothesis I am entertaining. (Hei l 1992, 
p. 51)74 
So al though direct doxastic vo l imta r i sm is false, because we can cont io l wha t w e 
beUeve indirect ly, i t can s t i l l make sense to employ the vocabulary of action 
w h e n ta lk ing about beliefs i n the same way i t makes sense to use the vocabulary 
As cited in Mills L998, p. 32. 
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of action w h e n ta lk ing about things Uke tu rn ing on Hghts. I f w e can use the 
vocabulary of action about beliefs, then there is nothing preventing a belief being 
jus t i f ied f r o m an ethical but not an epistemic poin t of v iew, i.e. the divergence 
thesis has not yet been vi t ia ted by appeal to doxastic involuntar ism. 
We may n o w wonder, however, whether mediated control over belief is 
really analogous to mediated control over action. I t is arguable. M i l l s remarks^^^ 
that f l i p p i n g a switch i n a way that turns on a l ight , just is t u rn ing on a l ight , so i f 
I k n o w that f l i p p i n g the switch turns on the Ught, then 1 am jus t i f ied i n flipping 
the switch just i n case I am jus t i f ied i n tu rn ing on the l ight , since the t w o are the 
same action. This is fair enough w i t h regard to action but, asks M i l l s , imagine a 
case regarding belief. Can i t be the case that acceptance of a belief that p that is 
epistemically wnjustified for S, be ethically justified? Only i f S's accepting that p is 
the same th ing as S's b r ing ing i t about that S believes that p, i n the same w a y that 
flicking the swi tch is the same th ing as tu rn ing on the l ight , and M i l l s argues, this 
i t not the case. I t may be the case that S can vo l imta r i ly subject themselves to 
some procedure, such as intentional abnegation or brainwashing, that w i l l 
successfully b r ing i t about that S believes that p. However , "such subjection 
carmot, by itself, plausibly count as accepting [that p]" (Mi l l s 1998, p. 34), since S 
w i l l no t believe that p un t i l after the procedure is complete. I f S can continue to 
disbelieve or w i t h h o l d judgement that p du r ing even some of the procedure, then 
" Here Mills cites Davidson 1963. 
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undergoing such a procedure is not constitutive of believing that p i n the same 
w a y that f l i ck ing on a switch is constitutive of tu rn ing on a l ight . 
Thus i t does not f o l l o w that i f one is ethically jus t i f ied i n undergoing some 
belief altering procedure, one w i l l also be ethically jus t i f ied i n believing the 
ensuing belief. What is needed to make this inference fo l l ow , argues Mi l l s , is 
some "just i f icat ion transference principle", such as: 
JT I f S is [ethically] jus t i f ied i n doing things that w i l l predictably i n 
result i n her accepting that p, then S is [ethically] jus t i f ied i n 
accepting that p. (Mil ls 1998, p. 35) 
However , JT is false. For example, I 've been captured by some terrorists w h o for 
some reason or another give me two choices: either be brainwashed into 
accepting their (false) extremist beliefs, or have m y fami ly bruta l ly butchered. I n 
this scenario, I th ink i t is fair to say that there is noth ing counter-intuit ive i n 
saying that I am ethically jus t i f ied (or at the very least, not culpable) i n deciding 
to imdergo the brainwashing. But being moral ly jus t i f ied i n undergoing the 
brainwashing does not entail that I w i l l be moral ly jus t i f ied i n bel ieving those 
ensuing extremist beliefs. Consider that i t may be constitutive of having those 
beUefs that I commi t horrible acts of terrorism, and as Mi l l s puts i t " i t w o u l d be 
bizarre to say that I bear no culpabil i ty for the horrible murders I commi t just 
because I became a monster for the best of reasons" (Mil l s 1998, p. 35)^^. The 
absence of a just i f icat ion transference principle tells against any appeal to indirect 
My example here is not identical to that of Mills' as he's using an example which concerns practical and 
not ethical justification. 
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doxastic vo luntar i sm to establish the divergence thesis. Why? Because being 
ethically jus t i f ied i n undergoing some belief-altering procedure does not 
guarantee being jus t i f ied i n accepting the ensuing belief, so mediated believing is 
relevantly imUke mediated action, such as tu rn ing on a Hght. 
Nevertheless, a l though this consideration tells against the divergence 
thesis, I do not th ink i t does enough to refute i t . A l l i t shows is that i t does not 
necessarily f o l l o w that m y being (ui i ) just i f ied i n undergoing some belief al tering 
procedure means 1 am (un)just if ied i n accepting the ensuing belief. But a l l the 
divergence thesis needs is that i t is possible, some of the t ime, that 1 am both 
jus t i f ied i n undertaking the procedure and jus t i f ied i n accepting the resultant 
belief. I f i t can be the case that 1 am just i f ied i n undergoing the procedure and for 
the same reasons am just i f ied i n believing the culminated belief, then the 
divergence thesis is home and dry. N o w , Mi l l s denies that I can be jus t i f ied i n 
beUeving that p for the same reasons that 1 am just i f ied i n undergoing a procedure 
that w i l l b r ing i t about that 1 believe that p. For suppose 1 was asked after I ' d 
been brainwashed wha t m y reasons were for beheving that p: M i l l s conjectures 
that I w o u l d not cite ethical reasons for believing but (were the evidence te l l ing 
against p) I w o u l d cite "bad evidential reasons" (Mil l s 1998, p. 36). I w o u l d 
answer, for instance, w i t h reference to extremist religious texts w h i c h I w o u l d 
cla im had some sort of epistemic authority, and even i f i t were pointed out to me 
that I had gone through some self-inflicted procedure to get myself to believe 
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what I n o w do, I w o u l d reply that I was glad I d i d , so that I could n o w see the 
truth. However , a l though M i l l s may be r ight i n this conjecture, i t must be noted 
that i t does not f o l l o w f r o m any lack of justif ication tiansference principle on the 
part of beUef. The fact that i t does not f o l l o w that the reasons for being jus t i f ied 
i n undergoing a beUef-altering procedure, are the same as those that render m y 
being jus t i f ied i n believing the resultant belief, does not rule out that sometimes 
contingently being the case. To establish the latter we need an extra argument. 
8.3.2 Mills' Extra Argument and Epistemic Reasons for Action 
For the divergence thesis to ho ld we need to be able to "have practical, 
non-epistemic reasons w h i c h w o u l d serve as [our] reasons for withholding" (Mi l l s 
1998, p. 38) or, indeed, not w i thho ld ing , acceptance of the belief that p. Such 
reasons w o u l d be available, argues Mi l l s , " i f doxastic vo luntar i sm were tiue" 
(Mil l s 1998, p . 38). So M i l l s ' stiategy turns to denying the possibili ty of doxastic 
voluntar ism, specifically the conceptual possibility because " i f doxastic 
vo l imtar i sm is only contingently false, then epistemic and practical [or ethical] 
just i f icat ion needn't coincide, and there is no necessary un i ty of jus t i f icat ion" 
(Mil l s 1998, p. 39). However , some care needs to be taken here as to wha t 
precisely is being argued. M i l l s is correct i n c la iming that i f doxastic vo lun ta r i sm 
were tiue, then non-epistemic reasons for belief w o u l d be available^^ However , 
" I use the word "available" here and not "possible" because the issue here turns on whether non-epistemic 
reasons can motivate and thus "rationalise" belief, and this may not be the case even if non-epistemic 
reasons for belief exist in some abstract sense. 
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the impossibi l i ty of doxastic voluntar i sm w o u l d not by itself be enough to deny 
the possibili ty of believing for non-epistemic reasons. Doxastic involuntar i sm 
only claims tiiat we camiot believe at w i l l , i t does not c la im that we believe only 
epistemic reasons - i t is consistent w i t h involuntar ism that we ahuays 
involuntarily believe for ethical, practical or even aesthetic reasons. As i t happens 
the argument that Mi l l s uses to establish the impossibi l i ty of doxastic 
vo l imta r i sm can also serve as an argument against the availabil i ty of non-
epistemic reasons fo r belief, bu t i t w o u l d be a mistake to th ink that i t does so 
because i t is an argument for (conceptual or psychological) doxastic 
involuntar ism. 
Mi l l s uses an argument by D i o n Scott-Kakures (Scott-Kakures 1994) 
against the conceptual possibility of doxastic voluntar ism w h i c h 1 mentioned i n 
Chapter 2.4, and w h i c h as I say, doubles up as an argument against the 
availabil i ty of non-epistemic reasons for belief. To re-cap, the argument goes as 
fo l lows: for a reason to motivate a belief i t must be "moni tored" by an intent ion 
w h i c h "sees the action through". Say I wan t to believe that p at t, but that m y 
evidence at t does not sanction the belief. 1 intend to beUeve that p, and may 
indeed be successful i n br inging myself to believe that p, but i t cannot be m y 
intention that governs "as opposed to causing" (Mil l s 1998, p. 42) the fo rmat ion of 
the belief that p, because: 
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...the beliefs w h i c h generate the intent ion are incompatible w i t h m y 
believing that p. Thus the intent ion must be abandoned before its 
satisfaction conditions are realized. I f the intention that I formulate must 
be abandoned before I succeed in br ing ing about the state of affairs i t 
represents, then that intent ion cannot be one by w h i c h I direct and 
moni tor m y activity u n t i l success. (Scott Kakures 1994, p. 96) 
Thus doxastic voluntar ism is false and non-epistemic reasons for belief cannot be 
available to a believer, for both rely on an intention w h i c h cannot be realised -
intentions cannot "rationalize" belief, i n the Davidsonian sense, i n the w a y they 
can action. N o w for this argument to be an argument against the conceptual 
possibili ty of doxastic voluntar ism, Scott-Kakures has to mainta in that when I 
f o r m (at t) m y intent ion i n believing that p, i n order for us to attribute m y having 
an intent ion at al l , I must also possess the belief "that m y beUeving that p is not 
currently jus t i f i ed" (Scott-Kakures 1994, p. 94). However, as Dana Radcliffe 
(Radcliffe 1997) points out, this need not be the case, for not bel ieving that the 
belief that p w o u l d be jus t i f ied is not the same as believing that p is not jus t i f ied -
I may not have the higher-level belief that the behef that a particular television 
program is on at 19.00 is jus t i f ied, as I am yet to look at the Radio Times, but this 
does not mean that I believe that the beUef is not jus t i f ied, i.e. i t may tu rn out that 
the Radio Times does corroborate m y belief, though, of course, i t may not. A l l that 
is required for me to f o r m the intent ion to believe that p is that I do no t believe 
that the belief that p w o u l d be just i f ied. So i f , for instance, I wan t to believe that 
the T V programme is on at 19.00 (it w o u l d f i t nicely i n m y schedule), m y lacking 
an op in ion as to wha t the epistemic status of the belief w o u l d be does not 
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mitigate m y wan t ing to beUeve i t , for there is no "cognitive fissure" between not 
being sure as to whether the belief w o u l d be just i f ied and m y in tending to 
believe i t as there is between m y believing the belief w o u l d be unjus t i f ied and 
m y in tending to believe i t . Thus, the argument does not establish the conceptual 
impossibi l i ty of doxastic voluntar ism. Nor , incidentally, does i t establish the 
unavai labi l i ty of non-epistemic reasons for beUef, for i f in tending to believe that 
p does no t require S to believe that S's believing that p is unjus t i f ied , then S may 
w e l l intend, for non-epistemic reasons, to believe that p, and there is no th ing 
prevent ing that intent ion f r o m "rationaUsing", i n Davidson's sense, the belief, for 
i t no longer must be "abandoned before 1 succeed i n br ing ing about the state of 
affairs i t represents". So, for al l Mi l l s and Scott-Kakures show, doxastic 
vo lun ta r i sm is conceptually possible and non-epistemic reasons fo r belief 
available. More important ly , for the purposes of this paper, the availabil i ty of 
non-epistemic reasons for behef means that the divergence thesis emerges f r o m 
these considerations alive and wel l . 
Further, we n o w have no motivated reason w h y we cannot dist inguish 
epistemic appraisal w i t h sole appeal to its relevant standards of appraisal. This 
not only means that not only can we have non-epistemic reasons for beUef, i t also 
means that we can have epistemic reasons for action - p r o v i d i n g we appraise 
those actions by epistemic standards. So when someone asks me, for example, 
w h y I am reading W i l l i a m Alston's new book, I can coherently say that 1 am 
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doing so for epistemic reasons. A n d we need not take these reasons i n Dancy's 
"mot iva t ional sense", but as action-guiding, since they may w e l l emerge f r o m a 
hypothetical imperative: i f I w a n t to k n o w about the latest w o r k being done i n 
epistemology, then I really ought to read that book. They are also epistemic i n that 
doing so may pu t me i n a better posi t ion to attain the epistemic a im, viz . believe 
tiue propositions and avoid false ones. I t may emerge that reading Alston's new 
book is m y duty proper, i.e. that I am obliged to do so, but this w i l l depend on 
whether or no t there are other stionger reasons p u l l i n g me i n a d i f ferent 
direction as w e l l as force of the reason I have for reading the book, pending 
situational constiaints. 
N o w , one may complain that actions are related to the tiuth goal i n tlie 
w r o n g sort of way. A n evidentialist may claim that epistemic reasons can only 
ever - because they are tiuth indicators - pertain to propositions (namely the 
proposi t ional objects of a belief state). As Conee puts i t "wha t gets jus t i f ied by 
the answer to the quest ion—How do y o u know? —is the k n o w n proposi t ion not 
bel ieving i t " (Conee 2004, p. 252)^8. Further, they may claim, the tiuth goal can 
only ever be attained by synchronic means since "diachronic questions are mora l 
or prudent ia l questions rather than epistemic questions" (Feldman 2000, p. 689). 
However , as I showed i n Chapter 6, there is reason to be skeptical about these 
claims. 
''^  See also Moser 1989. 
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Concerning the tiuth goal, the reductio argument showed that, at the very 
least, i t is as problematic for the t ru th goal to be a synchronic a i m as i t is to be a 
diachronic aim. I t is also unclear w h y an action could not satisfy the t r u th goal 
synchronically. Nevertheless, to be sure, actions cannot be either true or false, so 
i f an epistemic reason is an indicat ion of something's t ru th , then there cannot be 
non-epistemic reasons for action. However , again as we saw i n Chapter 6, there 
is reason to be skeptical about the cla im that only epistemic reasons are 
indications of something's tiuth. Cognit ivists i n ethics c la im that mora l 
judgements do have proposit ional content, and so, for example, m y belief that i t is 
w r o n g to lie, i f moral , is tiue - bu t I do no t thereby believe that i t is w r o n g to lie 
for epistemic reasons. So moral reasons, for the cognitivists, are also an indicat ion 
of the t r u t h of something. N o w , this does not show that, i f epistemic reasons are 
s imply indications of the tiuth of a proposit ion, that epistemic reasons can apply 
to action. I t does, however, remove the appeal to cash out wha t an epistemic 
reason is i n this way - namely, to dist inguish epistemic reason f r o m other sorts of 
reason, as cashing out w h a t they are i n this way does no t so dis t inguish them. 
The best w a y to pick out wha t an epistemic reason is, is as one that has as its 
most basic a i m the goal of maximis ing believing t ru th and min imis ing bel ieving 
falsehood, and there is nothing i n this that stipulates that only propositions (and 
not the beheving of them) can get jus t i f ied f r o m the standpoint of this a im. So 
there can be epistemic reasons for action just as long as they can contribute to our 
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epistemic a im, and since clearly tiiey can, there can be epistemic reasons for 
action. 
8.4 Haack on the "Ethics of Belief 
I propose then that we take a di f ferent stiategy i f w e are going to displace 
the divergence tiiesis. In discussing the relationship between ethical and 
epistemic just i f icat ion (she uses "appraisal") Susan Haack (Haack 2001) 
delineates the f o l l o w i n g alternatives: 
(i) That epistemic appraisal is a subspecies of ethical appraisal - the 
special case thesis. 
[(i*) Ethical appraisal is a subspecies of epistemic appraisal - special cases 
thesis *.] 
(ii) Posi t ive/Negative epistemic appraisal is distinct f r o m , bu t 
invariably associated w i t h , posit ive/negative ethical appraisal - the 
correlation thesis. 
(iii) There is, not invariable correlation, but part ial overlap, where 
posi t ive/negative epistemic appraisal is associated w i t h 
posi t ive/negative ethical appraisal - the overlap thesis. 
(iv) That ethical appraisal is inapplicable where epistemological 
appraisal is relevant - the independence thesis. 
(v) That epistemic appraisal is distinct f r o m , bu t analogous to, ethical 
appraisal - the analogy thesis. (Haack 2001, p . 21) 
A n d 
(vi) That epistemic appraisal is identical to ethical appraisal - the unity 
tiiesis. 
Haack does no t discuss (i*) because " w i t h its Platonic overtones w o u l d require a 
paper of its o w n " (Haack 2001, p . 30) and dismisses (vi) as "too obviously false to 
consider" (Haack 2001, p. 30), but I n o w hope to show that a version of i t is at 
least plausible^?. I t is here that I hope to show the importance of the 
™ I will not, however, attempt to refute the other alternatives. 
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normat ive/evaluat ive/descr ipt ive distinction. Roderick Chisholm (Chisholm 
1991) is a proponent of the special case thesis (i), his argument goes as fol lows: 
(1) A n ethical du ty is one w h i c h is not superseded by any other du ty 
or requirement. 
(2) When I am subject to a requirement that is not superseded by 
another, i t is m y ethical obligation to f u l f i l l that requirement. 
(3) I f I am subject to an epistemic requirement that is not superseded 
by another, that requirement becomes m y absolute ethical duty . 
(4) Thus, ul t imately, epistemic requirements are special cases of ethical 
requirement. 
Or as he puts i t : 
The dis t inguishing feature of an ethical du ty is not to be foxmd i n the 
considerations that impose on that duty. Rather, an ethical du ty is s imply 
a requirement that is not overridden by any otlier requirement. I f I am 
subject to a requirement of etiquette - of Small Morals -and i f noth ing 
overrides this requirement, then doing wha t I am thus required to do is 
m y duty, m y "absolute ethical duty". So, too, for the requirements of 
aesthetics. A n d so, too, for epistemic requirements - the requirements of 
reasonable belief. (Chisholm 1991, p. 127) 
However , as Haack comments, (4) cannot f o l l o w f r o m (1), (2) and (3) for t w o 
reasons. Firstly, even i f premises (1) - (3) were true, al l that could be established 
is that "only some epistemic requirements - those that are not overr idden by 
other requirements - are ethical" (Haack 2001, p. 23). Those epistemic 
requirements that are t rumped by other requirements remain epistemic 
requirements, so not al l epistemic requirements are ethical, so the special case 
thesis is not estabUshed vis-a-vis all epistemic requirements. Secondly, wha t 
exactly is dist inctively ethical about a requirement that has not been "overr idden" 
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by another requirement? I t seems that Chisholm is gui l ty of re-defining the w o r d 
"ethical" to f i t his thesis, "that tiiis is a re-defini t ion becomes apparent when one 
considers that i t implies, for example, that any requirement of prudence, say, or 
aesthetics, w o u l d be classified as ethical" (Haack 2001, p. 23). Further, surely, w e 
want to continue to call a requirement "ethical" once another requirement has 
come along to override i t , part icularly i f had we considered i t "ethical" before the 
overr id ing took place. Otherwise what w o u l d we call such a tiumped 
requirement?^^ 
H a v i n g dismissed Chisholm's case for the special-case thesis, Haack 
moves on to consider wha t she takes to be its nearest alternative, namely, the 
idea that epistemic just if icat ion is distinct f r o m , bu t invariably associated w i t h , 
ethical just i f icat ion - the correlation thesis. Haack argues against the correlation 
thesis on the grounds that i t is at least not in tu i t ive ly incoherent to ascribe 
epistemic just i f icat ion to S's beheving that p wh i l s t not at the same time ascribing 
ethical just i f icat ion - i n other words, that divergence is more i n accord w i t h our 
intui t ions than correlation. Her next opt ion, the one she goes for , is to opt for the 
overlap thesis - that, though there is not inevitable correlation (so there can s t i l l 
be divergence), there is part ial overlap between epistemic and ethical 
just if ication. I n the absence of a posit ion less s t iong than st iaight out correlation 
and less weak than independence, the overlap thesis n o w seems the more 
°^ We might say that it then ceases to be a requirement, but a non-action guiding norm or convention 
perhaps, but that would continue to fail to answer the question of what sort of a norm or convention it 
would be if not an ethical norm or convention. 
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sensible alternative. However, al though I do not want directly to argue against 
the overlap thesis, I do th ink that i t has a tenable r ival . 
That r i v a l is the claim that epistemic just if icat ion (where deontological) is 
identical to ethical just if icat ion - i.e. a version of the xmity thesis. N o w , al though 
i t may seem that this is a stronger thesis than correlation, I hope to show that i t is 
at least more palatable. I th ink i t can be established w i t h reference to a version of 
Chisholm's argument for the special case thesis, the fact that d i f ferent sorts of 
reason can cont i ibute i n determining obligations (shown by the possibil i ty of 
non-epistemic reasons for belief and epistemic reasons for action) and to the 
dist inction between the level of obligations (deontological, " a l l things 
considered") and the level of g iv ing reasons (evaluative, "p r ima facie"). 
Chisholm's description of what an ethical requirement consists of can serve as a 
description of wha t is an obligation, as opposed to a mere evaluation of a 
possible course of action^^ A deontological requirement (or obUgation) is one 
that is not overr idden or superseded by another requirement. One be held 
b lameworthy only for not f u l f i l l i n g a deontological requirement. When we make 
a merely evaluative judgement on someone's cognitive status, we mean that the 
norms by w h i c h w e are appraising may have been overr idden b y other 
requirements, the subject w o u l d not be blameworthy fo r f a i l ing to abide by 
those overr idden norms (provid ing they have done a l l they can to f u l f i l l the 
" Can it make sense to speak of a merely evaluative requirement? Probably not. So when I use the phrase 
"evaluative requirement" take me to me to be meaning something like a g^ua /^'-requirement, a norm that 
would be a requirement were it not trumped by another requirement. 
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overr id ing requirement). So i f the concept of just if icat ion is a deontological 
concept (and a not merely evaluative one) i n the way described above, we can 
n o w establish a sort of un i ty thesis. Tlie problem w i t h Chisholm's argument for 
the special case thesis is that i t seemed to re-define wha t we mean by 'ethical ' , 
and that i t fa i led to a l low room for merely evaluative etliical judgements. We 
circumvent these problems, however, i f we use his strategy as a w a y of 
establishing the u n i t y thesis: when a requirement becomes obligatory i n the 
deontological sense, i t fails to make any sense to qua l i fy the requirement w i t h the 
prefixes "epistemic" requirement or "ethical" requirement; one's absolute du ty is 
one's absolute du ty tout court. This is because obligations emerge out of networks 
of d i f f e r i n g sorts of reason, and even where a particular sort of reason has r i d i n g 
force over its (potential) alternatives, the emergent obligation does not carry over 
the sortal term the reason has as the obligation emerges because the other (albeit 
weaker) reasons were also relevant i n determining i t . Further, d i f ferent sorts of 
reasons may prescribe the same action at t, thereby contr ibut ing to the force of 
the emergent obligation. So where just i f icat ion is a deontological concept, 
epistemic and ethical justif ication are identical, never part icularly epistemic, 
never par t icular ly ethical or prudential . The divergence thesis does not ho ld at 
the level of obligations. 
Of course, a l l this does not rule out tlie possibili ty of making merely 
evaluative judgments f r o m either an epistemic or ethical (or whatever) po in t of 
v iew - to say that tliere is a reason for an action or belief is to say that i t has been 
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posi t ively evaluated to a certain respect relative to a certain standard or no rm, i t 
is to say that the reason is action-guiding, but not action-compelling. So we do 
not r u n a fou l of Haack's complaint against the correlation thesis, tiiat divergence 
between ethical and epistemic just i f icat ion is in tu i t ive ly coherent, fo r we are n o w 
t r y i n g to accommodate that in tu i t ion : there are times when epistemic and ethical 
appraisal come apart, sure, bu t that is only when we are mak ing merely 
evaluative appraisals. This, I believe, is at home w i t h our intui t ions, fo r i f a 
subject had a choice between either do ing their epistemic (prima facie) du ty or 
their mora l (prima facie) du ty at t (and one duty does not override the other), 
w o u l d we consider them blameworthy for fa i l ing to f u l f i l l either one of their 
duties? I w o u l d suggest not. The i m i t y thesis, thus construed, is weaker than the 
correlation thesis, i n that i t does not do away w i t h divergence altogether, yet i t is 
stionger than either the correlation or independence thesis i n that i t stipulates 
that sometimes - i.e. when we make appraisals concerning our obligations -
epistemic and ethical appraisal are not distinct. So there is an alternative to the 
overly s t iong correlation thesis, and the weak independence thesis, that is not the 
overlap thesis. I f the only mot iva t ion for adopt ing the overlap thesis is that i t has 
no r iva l alternative, then there is no mot ivat ion for adopt ing i t . This is not to 
deny, however, that where appraisal is merely evaluative, the overlap thesis is 
the only viable alternative. 
8.5. Conclusion - Normative Incommensurability 
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I have been trying to argue here that where justification is a deontological 
concept, the divergence thesis does not hold. I have called this the unity thesis. 
This, I think, is a way for the deontological conception of epistemic justification 
to take on board the criticism concerning its inability to say how deontological 
appraisals are distinctively epistemic. This way of doing it, it must be said, does 
not defend that epistemic justification is deontological because the evaluative 
level of giving reasons has remained intact. I think this is healthier form of 
"tolerant pluralism" than perhaps is Alston's. A l l I have done so far is show that 
the unity thesis is at least as tenable as Haack's overlap thesis, because i t is 
tenable for the same reasons. I would like to end this chapter by making some 
suggestions as to why my version of the unity thesis is a preferable alternative. I 
think i t is preferable because i t is more promising in its ability of answering the 
charge of normative incommensurability. Without invoking the difference 
between deontological and evaluative appraisal, and from within the overlap 
thesis, what do we say a subject ought to do when they are in the presence of 
genuine divergence? Ought they to do what is epistemically right? Or what is 
ethically right? I don't think there can be an answer to this question f rom within 
these parameters. Maybe, we can answer i t f rom a standpoint within the unity 
thesis, however: there is no problem of deontological incommensurability when 
merely evaluative epistemic and ethical justification come apart, for we are not 
here saying anything about what a subject ought to do, and at the deontological 
level, according to the unity thesis, there is no divergence, so no dilemma. 
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Nevertheless, one may wonder how it is possible for an ethical norm to 
"override" an epistemic one, or vice versa, if the two can diverge at the 
evaluative level. Further, 1 have left open exactly how obligations emerge f rom 
reasons, and how we might be able to know what our "duty proper" or 
obligation is. Again, unfortunately, I am going to have to concede these as 
genuine worries and have no f i rm solution to offer here. Nevertheless I do 
wonder whether ethical reasons and epistemic reasons do not in fact in some 
way conunensurate when we consider what we are obliged to do (though not 
when we are fixated on doing what is right from one or another particular point 
of view) - one does not object that spending time at the library at the expense of 
the livelihood of one's child is worthy of just reproach, for instance. Yet, it would 
be easy to object that spending time at the library is an action that is being 
evaluated against another f rom the point of view of ethics. But the waters are 
muddy here as i t must be remembered that we only have indirect control over 
our beliefs and that it does not seem illegitimate to use the vocabulary of action 
to talk about belief, so it is not clear that here we are only talking about ethics. I 
suggest that this muddiness indicates that, really, there is no divergence at level 
of obligations, so although epistemic and ethical reasons can come apart, 
obligations cannot (for different sorts of reason can be relevant in determining 
what we are obliged to do) but I have, really, only managed to suggest this here. 
A l l the same, on this score I do think Eugene Mills is absolutely correct: 
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The falsity of the divergence tliesis would console the intellect, for i t 
would obviate the need for a solution to an apparent problem of 
normative incommensurability. It would offer little pragmatic consolation, 
however. For we may still f ind ourselves in situations i n which our only 
justifiable option is to take steps which we justifiably beheve w i l l result in 
our having unjustified beliefs. This would usually be bad luck. It would 
not be as bad, though, as having no univocally justified option. (Mills 1998, 
p. 49) 
Mills thinks that in the absence of a good argument for the divergence thesis we 
may be optimistic in thinking that a "univocally justified option" exists. The 
pragmatic consolation of the unity thesis, as I have presented it, might be its 
potential freeing us f rom the burden of having to be merely optimistic. 
Conclusion 
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This thesis has been a defence of what is known as the deontological 
conception of epistemic justification. In Chapter one, I raised some reservations 
as to whether some version of deontologism could not be compatible wi th a 
merely evaluative conception like William Alston's. However, because the topic 
of this thesis concerns whether or not we have epistemic obligations (and whether 
they can serve to ground our conception of epistemic justification), I have only 
discussed deontologism in a way that would not be compatible wi th a merely 
evaluative conception. My defence of deontologism has consisted in claiming 
that at the level of obligations there is a unity of justification. A t this level, i t 
makes no sense to say that justification is epistemic, moral, legal, prudential, or 
whatever, and so I have suggested that i t is perhaps a little unfair on the 
deontologist to criticise him for leaving what i t is that makes justification 
epistemic xmexplained. This vmity of justification follows if, I argued, there can be 
non-epistemic reasons for belief and epistemic reasons for action as well as there 
being a distinction between a merely evaluative and a deontological level of 
appraisal. If reasons, on their own, are only ever merely evaluative, and differing 
sorts of reasons (epistemic, moral, prudential etc.) can contiibute towards 
ensuing obligations, then obligation can never be a purely epistemic affair any 
more than i t can be a purely moral affair. However, stiictly speaking, this cannot 
then be a defence of a deontological conception of epistemic justification, since at 
the deontological level, there is no particular epistemic domain. Nevertheless, 
because this picture allows for there being particularly epistemic reasons at the 
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merely evaluative level, and that such reasons can contiibute in determining 
obligations, then this kind of defence does serve as a defence of epistemic 
deontologism, since i t does not entirely preclude an epistemic dimension. So i t is 
a defence of epistemic deontologism in an overall account of normativity. 
Though I have given a sketch of what such an overall accoxmt may be, 1 
have, by no means, ful ly defended i t here. The account, no doubt, raises as many 
questions as i t solves, for instance the issue of normative incommensurability 
raised at the end of Chapter 8. Nevertheless, I think that the issues that i t does 
raise are issues that any account of normativity has to deal with, and as such, i t 
w i l l not do to raise those issues as a means to refute this account. 1 have also 
shown that such an account is not unmotivated. Or, at least, I have tried to show 
what an overall picture of normativity would have to look like i f we are going to 
have anytiiing like an 'ethics' of belief. In Chapter 2-6,1 looked at the problems 
of doxastic voluntarism and consilience failure for the deontological conception. I 
argued that these two problems are not as independent as may first appear, 
indeed that the consilience problem emerges out of what I have argued is the 
most promising line of defence to take wi th regard to the voluntarism issue. I 
also argued that the "tolerant pluralism" invoked by Alston, Barnes, and Vahid 
as a way to defend the deontological conception, whilst dealing wi th the problem 
of consilience failure, remains incomplete in that i t is open to the problem of how 
deontological justification remains particularly epistemic. M y thesis has thus 
been an attempt to try to answer how deontologism can take this issue on board. 
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IS an The thesis that there is a uiuty of justification at the level of obligation 
intuitive one for me, insofar as I have made this claim plausible, this thesis has its 
success gauged accordingly. 
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